The danger signal for American credit!! BlackRock is starting to encounter trouble. Recently, there has been a signal that I think is becoming increasingly important, which is that the risks of private equity credit in the United States have gradually been exposed again. I have previously posted the expectations of global fund managers for a recession in the United States, and the market believes that the country is not yet at the level of a recession. Although the US stock market has fluctuated, the overall narrative remains, and even confidence in the economy not landing is high. The concern about recession has reached its lowest point in history. But in recent data disclosures, private equity credit has been increasingly listed as one of the important tail risks, and then we see that the open interest of hedge put options in credit ETFs has surged to historical highs, coupled with the continuous redemption or liquidity pressure of top institutions. This matter is no longer just talk. （1） BlackRock users request an increase in redemptions The most sensitive thing for the market recently is that HPS Corporate Lending Fund (HLEND) under BlackRock has started to restrict redemptions. The fund size is approximately $26 billion, and the redemption requests made by investors in the first quarter of 2026 are equivalent to approximately 9.3% of the total fund shares. However, the fund's original quarterly repurchase limit was only 5%, which means that BlackRock has triggered the liquidity limit in its terms for the first time. According to media estimates, investors originally wanted to get back about 1.2 billion US dollars this time, but in the end, they could only take back about 620 million US dollars first. To put it simply, this type of product is not something that can be sold in full just by wanting to. What really makes the market nervous this time is that even products of BlackRock's level have clearly hit the redemption limit for the first time. （2） Blackstone completed the redemption out of its own pocket Not only BlackRock, but also BCRED under Blackstone, although not directly stuck to 5% like BlackRock, the pressure is not small at all. BCRED received approximately $3.7 billion in redemption requests in the first quarter of 2026, equivalent to 7.9% of fund shares. Then Blackstone raised the usual repurchase limit from 5% to 7%, and also invested an additional $400 million in internal funds. More than $150 million came from executives and senior employees. This indicates that although Blackstone is also under pressure, it still chooses to stabilize investors by increasing the repurchase limit and internal capital injection. This is no longer just individual customer sentiment, but the reality that the entire industry is facing investors wanting to leave and funds have to find ways to repay. （3） Clearing and Refund of Blue Owl This is not over yet. Blue Owl's OBDC II, which has a scale of approximately $1.6 billion, has also encountered the same situation. Blue Owl's approach is more aggressive than BlackRock and Blackstone's, canceling the original quarterly redemption arrangement and instead providing liquidity to investors by selling assets and returning capital. Blue Owl sold approximately $1.4 billion in assets from three funds to pension and insurance institutions in North America, and returned this money to shareholders, changing the original quarterly redemption framework from 5% to a maximum return arrangement of approximately 30%. This batch of sold loans corresponds to 128 companies and 27 industries, of which approximately 13% are in the software industry. PS: I will write about the software industry when I have some free time. If we look at these three cases together, we will find that whether it is BlackRock's redemption of credit cards according to terms, Blackstone's increase in credit limit and self funding to withstand it, or Blue Owl's cancellation of the original quarterly redemption arrangement and instead providing liquidity by selling assets and returning capital, although the three approaches are different, they all indicate that the liquidity of credit has begun to tighten, and behind this tight liquidity is likely the risk of redemption. Moreover, the more this happens, the easier it is to further strengthen investors' willingness to redeem. Fitch's February data shows that the average redemption rate of its tracked permanent non listed BDC has risen to 4.5% NAV in the fourth quarter of 2025, compared to 1.6% in the previous quarter. That is to say, this indicates that the pressure of capital withdrawal is no longer a problem of individual products, but a common occurrence in the entire retail private equity credit channel. （4） Why is there a concentrated explosion now? Because high interest rates have been in place for too long, the Federal Reserve's rate cuts have been too slow. Private credit has been lent to many targets in the past, including medium-sized enterprises, private equity backed companies, high leverage borrowers, and companies that traditional banks are unwilling to lend or cannot lend enough. Usually, low interest rates, smooth financing, and high asset prices can all be concealed. But once high interest rates persist and the difficulty of refinancing increases, the expectation of an economic slowdown will arise, and investors will start to question three things again: Firstly, can the underlying borrowers hold on. Secondly, is the book valuation accurate enough. Thirdly, can it be redeemed when it's time to ask for money. Now that institutions' protective bearish positions on credit ETFs have surged to historical highs, it is essentially using money to hedge against these three things. So the most dangerous place now is that institutions have begun to slowly reduce their holdings of risky assets, increase cash, go long on gold, go short or hedge credit. Once private credit really encounters problems, more foundations begin to restrict redemptions, more borrowers default, and credit spreads quickly widen, the first reaction of institutions may be to sell the most liquid assets first. For example, technology stocks. （5） In summary, the risk is gradually increasing At present, there is no comprehensive credit crisis in the United States, but it has reached a very dangerous edge. BlackRock may only be at the beginning of encountering redemption issues. If high interest rates continue to persist and market differentiation continues to widen, private credit is likely to face higher redemption pressure and stricter valuation questions. Once redemptions expand, defaults increase, and credit spreads widen, liquidity pressure may further evolve into a real credit event. （6） The impact on AI cannot be underestimated If private equity credit continues to tighten, it will not only affect ordinary corporate financing, but also put pressure on AI itself. The most expensive areas for AI now are data centers, electricity, servers, and supporting networks, which heavily rely on continuous financing. The Chicago Fed's 2026 study explicitly states that the financing chains of banks and non bank institutions are increasingly flowing indirectly or directly towards data centers and AI related investments, indicating that AI infrastructure itself is closely linked to credit. S&P Global Ratings listed "AI driven technology bond issuance, AI valuation risk, and rising leverage of non bank institutions" as key variables for credit market liquidity in 2026 this year. The market has begun to worry about whether AI and infrastructure financing will be affected if the credit environment deteriorates. A typical case is oracle bone script! Because the core issue of AI infrastructure has always been the need for sustained and low-cost continuous investment. Once the credit environment deteriorates, AI infrastructure may not stop immediately, but financing costs will rise and the pace of expansion will slow down. The market's demand for return rates will also be higher. Overall, once credit tightens, AI infrastructure is likely to become more expensive, slower, and more difficult to finance. This will slow down the pace of AI development. end PS: I know this article is very long, and there are almost no friends who have the patience to read it, but this is the most likely risk to happen recently.