Author: Zhou Ziheng

As of April 2026, the military confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz has continued for nearly two months, with the US Navy's maritime blockade intercepting 27 vessels headed for Iranian ports. However, the global financial markets are showing significant divergence: the S&P 500 Index is just a stone's throw from its all-time high, while the traditional safe-haven currency, the US dollar, has not shown strength during the crisis, and gold has regained upward momentum after an initial sell-off under liquidity pressure. This market performance, which diverges from traditional crisis response patterns, points to a deeper structural transformation—an old global macro order based on the "petrodollar" cycle is facing triple pressures of physical supply chain bottlenecks, diversification of the monetary system, and geopolitical reconfiguration.

This article integrates analysis from both the commodity physical side and the monetary financial side, systematically examining the transmission mechanisms of the current crisis, key bottlenecks, and the strategic implications for asset allocation. The core judgment is: the current crisis has transcended traditional geopolitical risk categories, evolving into a pressure test for the foundations of the global monetary system and the resilience of industrial supply chains.

1. The Fracture of the Physical World: From Hormuz to the Domino Effect in Supply Chains

1.1 Immediate and Derivative Effects of the Strait Blockade

The Strait of Hormuz carries about 20% of the world's crude oil trade. As of late April 2026, the US Navy's blockade has entered its third week, and Brent crude oil prices have surpassed $100 per barrel, rising about 35% from pre-war levels. However, beyond the direct impact on energy prices, the complexity of the derivative transmission mechanisms is more concerning. The blockade has disrupted the transportation of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar, used for producing semiconductor-grade helium, with such helium accounting for approximately one-third of global supply. Helium's irreplaceability in chip manufacturing processes such as cooling, wafer etching, and leak detection has led the current supply chain to invoke force majeure clauses and implement supply rationing. Meanwhile, disruptions in the transportation of petrochemical raw materials like naphtha are affecting the supply of key consumables for semiconductor production, such as photoresist precursors, solvents, and polymers.

1.2 The Vulnerability of Industrial Infrastructure to 'One Closure, Immediate Damage'

The asymmetry in the start-stop cycles of industrial production is the most underestimated variable in the current crisis. The production restart cycle for aluminum smelters is about 12 months, requiring the use of pneumatic tools to clear solidified electrolyte; similarly, an unplanned shutdown of a refinery's catalytic cracking unit will lead to feed filters becoming sintered, and the recovery cycle far exceeds financial model assumptions. In the semiconductor sector, even if the Strait reopens the next day, the interrupted helium purification chain and the restarting of the naphtha cracking unit will also take months. This "physical lag" means that even if diplomatic agreements are reached, the physical transmission will continue to ferment.

1.3 Lagged Impact on Agriculture and Fertilizers

Sulfur is a key raw material for phosphate fertilizer production, and its supply chain highly depends on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The blockade has caused fertilizer plants in countries like Bangladesh, which rely on fertilizer imports, to operate at about 20% capacity. The planting season is irreversible—if the sowing window is missed, even if the Strait reopens, this year's food production cannot be compensated for. This poses a potential risk of rising food prices in the second half of 2026.

2. The Unpriced Critical Point: The Collective Misjudgment of Financial Markets

2.1 The Information Gap Between Physical and Financial Analysts

The most notable feature of the current market is the disconnection between financial asset prices and physical conditions. Financial institutions generally anchor to the benchmark of "historically, such conflicts have only been short-term shocks," but overlook four structural differences in this conflict: first, all parties to the conflict view it as a "survival" game rather than a limited agent war; second, the involvement of China and Russia has changed the balance of power; third, the initial state of global supply chains was tight rather than relaxed; and fourth, the production and processing locations of key raw materials are highly concentrated in a single geopolitical block.

2.2 The Paradox of US Policy: Suppressing Price Signals While Maintaining the Illusion of a Free Market

During the crisis, the US government has attempted to suppress the pricing of war risks in the free market while maintaining the superficial appearance of market freedom. A typical case of this paradox is reflected in the US Treasury market: on February 25, 2026, the Treasury conducted the largest single-day buyback operation of government bonds, accepting about $745 million in Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS). These buyback operations aim to maintain "orderly functioning" in the government bond market, which effectively constitutes implicit yield curve control. The fragility of this intervention will become evident when physical shortages manifest—when the market realizes that "copper is nonexistent" and "helium is nonexistent," any bond purchases will not prevent a repricing of asset values.

2.3 The Catalytic Mechanism of Critical Points

The market's "Tom Hanks moment" (referring to the critical turning point in public consciousness during the COVID-19 pandemic) could stem from any one of the following triggers: sovereign debt defaults (especially in emerging markets that depend on food imports), key companies issuing earnings warnings due to input shortages, or a forced liquidation event in physical delivery markets. At that point, the currently concealed disruptions in supply chains will be concentrated and exposed, triggering a reassessment of the value of risk assets.

3. The Movements of the Monetary System: From Petrodollars to Commodity Standards

3.1 The Anomalous Weakness of the Dollar in the Crisis

In traditional crisis models, the dollar, as the world's primary safe-haven currency, should exhibit strength. However, since the escalation of the conflict in March 2026, the dollar index (DXY) has remained under pressure, falling below the 98 mark in April. Multiple institutions have recommended shorting the dollar: Deutsche Bank points out that the dollar has lost its "high-yield currency" status, while Asian currencies are exhibiting greater safe-haven attributes due to fiscal buffer mechanisms. Westpac predicts that the DXY will further decline to 96.8 by the end of 2026 and reach 94.0 by the end of 2027. The renminbi has performed robustly during the crisis, with the dollar against offshore renminbi only slightly fluctuating from 6.85 at the end of February to 6.82 in April, reflecting China's structural advantages as a core manufacturing nation.

3.2 The Structural Shift in Central Bank Gold Reserve Behavior

The event in 2022 where the West froze about $300 billion of Russian central bank assets marks a watershed moment in post-war international reserve management systems. Since then, central banks in emerging markets have accelerated the diversification of their holdings from dollars to gold. As of February 2026, Poland led global central bank gold purchases with an increase of 20.23 tons, followed by Uzbekistan (16.48 tons) and Kazakhstan (6.51 tons), with China adding 2.18 tons. These purchases reflect a direct hedge against the risk of "foreign currency reserves being subject to foreign jurisdictions"—gold is the only reserve asset that does not carry counterparty risk.

Notably, Russia (-15.55 tons) and Turkey (-8.08 tons) became the largest net sellers during the same period. Russia's reduction reflects the fiscal difficulties under the pressure of war expenditures and sanctions—its central bank had to sell gold in exchange for foreign exchanges; Turkey's reduction is related to domestic policies aimed at stabilizing the lira exchange rate and managing domestic gold demand. This divergence shows that gold is both a geopolitical hedge tool and a source of ultimate liquidity for economies under pressure.

3.3 The Evolution from 'Petrodollar' to a 'Commodity-Gold' Dual System

The probability of the collapse of the old order is accumulating.

4. Key Bottlenecks and Strategic Positioning: Who Controls the Processing Chain Sets the Rules

4.1 China's Absolute Dominance in Key Material Processing

China's control over the global processing stage of key materials is a central reality in the current supply chain discussion. In the field of rare earth refining, China accounts for about 90% of global capacity; it similarly holds a dominant share in the refining stages of lithium, cobalt, and graphite. This control is not only reflected in market share but also in rule-making power—China transforms processing capacity into a geopolitical tool through export controls and compliance requirements.

4.2 Supply-Demand Imbalance of Industrial Metals like Copper, Silver, and Tungsten

Copper, as an "electrification metal," is experiencing a widening supply-demand gap. The "2026 Economic Survey" points out that current copper demand is driven by both the deployment of renewable energy and the expansion of AI data centers, significantly exceeding supply growth. A single 1-gigawatt wind turbine requires about 2,866 tons of copper, involving processing nearly 480,000 tons of ore (excluding waste rock and cover). The copper demand from AI chip designers like Nvidia is expected to soar from the current 30,000 to 40,000 tons per year to 250,000 tons by 2028, while global mining capital expenditure has consistently fallen short over the past decade. Silver, a key material for photovoltaic cells, requires about 18.5 tons per gigawatt of solar capacity, and the silver market has been in structural shortfall for five consecutive years. Tungsten prices surged significantly during the conflict; this metal is used for semiconductor etching masks and plasma tools, with its supply chain also highly concentrated.

4.3 The Scale and Timing Mismatch of Western 'Friend-Shoring'

The US is actively building alternative supply chains through mechanisms like the "Mineral Security Partnership" (MSP): it signed an $8.5 billion project pipeline agreement with Australia and pledged $1.6 billion to USA Rare Earth to strengthen domestic refining capabilities. However, these projects face triple constraints: first, there is a timing mismatch, as new mines typically take 5-10 years from exploration to production, while supply chain pressures are manifesting now; second, there is a talent gap, as the average age of mining engineers and metallurgists is high, with insufficient young labor replenishment; third, equipment dependency exists, as much of the refining equipment needs to be imported from China, forming a cycle of dependency.

5. Stagflation Pressure and Policy Dilemma: The Central Bank's 'Impossible Trinity'

5.1 War Budget and Debt Spiral

The US is facing a deep-seated conflict between fiscal and monetary policies. Federal expenditures on Medicare, Social Security, and interest payments have exceeded total fiscal revenues. This means that any slowdown in economic growth will directly lead to a jump in the deficit rate, thereby pushing up government bond yields, further worsening interest expenses—a typical "debt spiral" mechanism. Under this constraint, the independence of the Federal Reserve faces unprecedented pressure: raising interest rates will intensify fiscal burdens, while lowering rates may unanchor inflation expectations.

5.2 Asset Performance Patterns in a Stagflation Environment

The current environment is highly comparable to the stagflation period of the 1970s: inflation driven by supply shocks coexists with economic slowdown. From historical experience, the best-performing asset classes during stagflation periods have been: physical commodities (especially gold and industrial metals), inflation-linked bonds, and companies with pricing power that can pass on costs to downstream. The traditional "60/40 stock-bond portfolio" has significantly weakened its risk-hedging function in this environment.

5.3 Possible Paths for Policy Intervention

In the face of difficulties, US policymakers have a range of tools available: first, implicit yield curve control (to stabilize the government bond market through buyback operations, as implemented in February 2026); second, direct intervention in commodity markets (releasing strategic petroleum reserves or establishing strategic mineral reserves); third, currency reassessment of gold. The third option—officially revaluing gold at higher prices—is the ultimate means to cope with debt accumulation, historically traceable to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934 and the Nixon Shock of 1971.

6.1 Base Scenario: Slow Rebalancing Under Protracted Confrontation

The most likely scenario is that tensions in the Strait of Hormuz will be in a "semi-open" state—limited shipping recovery, but insurance premiums remain high, and military friction risks become normalized. In this scenario, the price center for energy and key minerals will structurally rise, and the "security premium" for global supply chains will become a permanent cost item. The dollar index will tend to decline amid volatility, while gold and the renminbi will benefit from the trend of reserve diversification.

6.2 Strategic Framework for Asset Allocation

In the current environment, asset allocation needs to be built around three pillars: cash provides liquidity and tail risk hedging ability, with current money market yields making holding cash yield positive returns; physical gold, as a counterparty risk-free reserve asset, should be prioritized in physical form rather than paper certificates to avoid counterparty risk; bottleneck assets include commodity producers exposed to supply chain disruptions (especially small and medium-sized producers with robust capital structures and no hedged tail risk), companies related to electrification infrastructure, and industrial companies with pricing power.

Regarding gold: gold prices in dollars surpassed $3,200 per ounce in April 2026. If we consider the historical mean reversion of global gold reserves relative to the global monetary base (such as 100% in 1980 or levels in the 1940s), the implied gold price is in the range of $20,000 per ounce. Although this is not a baseline prediction, it reflects the extent to which current gold pricing is "underestimated" relative to the expansion of fiat currency. European family offices allocate about 2% to precious metals, while US institutions allocate about 1.7% to gold ETFs, indicating significant inflow potential if the macro environment triggers a systemic rebalancing.

Regarding Chinese assets: among major economies, China's stock market valuations are at historical lows, while corporate competitiveness and market share continue to rise. The resilience shown by the renminbi during the crisis, combined with China's irreplaceable position in key material processing, makes Chinese assets a potential option for diversified allocation. However, geopolitical tail risks remain an important consideration.

6.3 Areas to Avoid

Asset categories facing the greatest downside risk include: "mega-cap tech stocks" with valuations at historical highs (whose profits heavily depend on smooth global supply chains and a low interest rate environment), high-yield bonds (where credit spreads will significantly widen in an environment of economic slowdown and rising refinancing pressures), and midstream manufacturing firms lacking pricing power (whose profit margins will be squeezed by rising upstream costs and weak downstream demand).

The core characteristic of the current macro environment is structural rather than cyclical. The military confrontation in the Strait of Hormuz, the supply chain bottlenecks of key minerals, and the marginal erosion of the dollar's reserve status are not isolated events, but different facets of a deep reordering of global order. For investors, this means that the "buy-the-dip" strategy that has worked effectively over the past forty years may face a paradigm shift. In the new environment where physical shortages manifest, and the monetary system fragments, retaining cash to obtain options in future fluctuations, holding physical gold to hedge against monetary and geopolitical risks, and focusing on tangible assets with real output capacity constitute the core logic of defensive allocation. The physical constraints will ultimately overcome financial illusions—it's just a matter of time, not if.

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