Author: Spinach Spinach

DeFi lending has been around for nearly ten years, and there's really only one main line: floating rate money markets.

From Aave, Compound to Morpho Blue, interest rates have always been "passively discovered" through utilization.

In May 2026, Morpho released the Midnight white paper. What it aims to fill is the missing piece that has long been absent on this main line—fixed rates and fixed terms.

Do not underestimate these two terms.

Fixed income (bonds, notes, credit) is an asset class that is larger in scale than the stock market globally, and its entire set of pricing and risk control logic—predictable funding costs, duration management, a reference yield curve—are all based on "fixed rates and clear terms."

Despite so many years of on-chain lending, it has always remained stuck in a floating rate perpetual money market: it neither provides the certainty that institutions desire nor can it develop a decent yield curve.

This is precisely one of the structural barriers that prevents real institutional funds and trillions of RWA from scaling up on-chain. In other words, what Midnight fills is not a function, but the underlying grammar that on-chain credit needs to access the traditional fixed income market.

This may sound like just "adding an option," but the real meaning is: for the first time, on-chain credit has a complete language to transition from 'money markets' to 'fixed income markets.'

1. What is Midnight

To summarize in one sentence: Midnight is a fixed-rate lending protocol designed for EVM that is non-custodial.

It is organized around a market that is "isolated, immutable, can be created without permission, and has a fixed maturity date" redefining borrowing and lending as the buying and selling of a "zero-interest certificate."—the lender buys the certificate, the borrower sells the certificate, with both parties' returns and costs included in the discounted transaction price.

If Morpho Blue answers the question of "how to simplify, isolate, and create floating rate lending without permission," then Midnight answers the next question: how to create an on-chain credit market that has fixed rates, clear terms, and is not drowned by liquidity fragmentation.

Now, let's delve deeper into the evolution of this design in line with Morpho's evolutionary main line.

2. From Aave to Blue to Midnight: A Clear Evolutionary Main Line

To understand Midnight's design choices, one must first recognize which main line it stands on.

First Generation: Pooling + Floating Rate (Aave / Compound):

Early lending protocols emerged in an environment of thin liquidity on-chain, passive, and with high transaction costs. Under such constraints, aggregating all users into a unified funding pool that can be entered and exited at any time was the optimal solution for maximizing liquidity concentration.

The cost is: the protocol itself must make decisions for everyone—not only in settlement and accounting, but also including key pricing and risk parameters. This design operates well when user preferences are highly homogeneous, but when the range of assets, users, and credit scenarios expands, and risk/liquidity/compliance preferences begin to differentiate, a single funding pool cannot accommodate multiple risk profiles without fragmenting liquidity.

Second Generation: Morpho Blue—Minimal Core + Curation Layer:

Blue proposed a different architecture: based on isolation, immutability, and permissionless market creation. The protocol itself does not judge "what assets deserve credit" or "how capital should be allocated," leaving these decisions intentionally to lenders—to create and select markets that match their needs.

In practice, most of the supply comes from vaults constructed on top of the protocol. Thus, the market layer remains very thin, while curation and capital allocation become competitive layers above the protocol. This is the core philosophy of Morpho: the fewer the core components, the better, moving complexity to a competitive outer layer.

Third Generation: Midnight—Bringing Fixed Rates and Fixed Terms On-Chain:

Pooling architecture and floating rates are a natural pair: the pool's utilization is adjusted by the Interest Rate Model (IRM), and in turn, the rates are "discovered" through utilization. This mechanism is simple, but comes with a few structural costs.

Midnight inherits all of Blue's genes—markets remain isolated, immutable, and permissionless, serving as trustless primitives upon which independent products can be built to serve different jurisdictions—but replaces the interest rate mechanism with fixed rates, introducing fixed maturity and offer-based matching.

Understanding this main line, you will see that Midnight is not a new species that appeared out of nowhere but a natural extension of Morpho's idea of "pushing decision-making from protocol level to market/curation level": Blue returned interest rates and allocations to the market, and Midnight further devolves the "rate discovery" itself back to market quotes.

3. Why Fixed Rates + Fixed Terms?—Clarifying the Underlying Motivation

Many will ask: if floating rates work well, why go through so much trouble to create fixed rates? Because floating rates have several unavoidable structural issues:

First, interest rate risk is a direct barrier for borrowers.

For borrowers who need predictable financing costs—typical of institutions matching on-chain credit with off-chain fixed-income liabilities, RWA borrowers—floating rates are a threshold. Financing costs fluctuate with utilization, making cash flow matching impossible.

Second, floating rates make it difficult for new credit scenarios to cold start.

In small markets, moderate inflows and outflows can drastically shift utilization, driving rates to extremes. This volatility makes it difficult for new markets to establish stable expectations.

Third, lenders are forced to constantly monitor the market.

To ensure their allocations always align with their risk-return preferences, lenders must keep a close eye on changes in utilization and adjust their allocations accordingly.

Fixed rates naturally alleviate these restrictions.

They decouple rates from utilization: interest rates are no longer a function of utilization but are rather a direct result of quotes agreed upon by buyers and sellers in the market. Borrowers receive a fixed financing cost, lenders get a fixed maturity yield, and no one needs to revolve around a utilization curve.

Fixed rates have been explored in DeFi for some time (e.g., Yield Protocol), but they have not become the universal foundation for on-chain lending—what Midnight aims to do is exactly this.

Fixed maturity is the twin premise of fixed rates. Only when positions have explicit maturity dates does "borrowing/lending at a certain rate for a certain term" become meaningful; multiple markets with different maturities create a term structure, which is the on-chain equivalent of a yield curve.

4. Market and Units: Redefining Lending as "Trading Zero-Interest Certificates"

This is the key to understanding all mechanisms of Midnight.

4.1 Composition of Markets

Midnight is organized around isolated, immutable fixed-term markets, where configurations, once created, cannot be changed. Each market specifies three things:

One loaned asset (loan token); a maturity date; a set of acceptable collateral assets and their respective parameters (which can be single or multiple collateral).

4.2 Redefining Lending with "Units"

Positions within the market are measured in "units," with a very clean logic:

One debt unit = the obligation to return one unit of loaned asset before maturity;

One credit unit = the claim to those repaid assets.

Thus: buying units → increases your credit (you become the lender); selling units → increases your debt (you become the borrower). Interest rates do not need to be set separately; they are embedded in the transaction discount. For any transaction price P > 0, the simple interest for the remaining term is:

r = 1 / P - 1

For example: if you buy a unit at the price of 0.95, and it redeems 1 unit of loaned asset at maturity, then this remaining term's return is 1/0.95 - 1 ≈ 5.26%. This is exactly the pricing logic of zero-coupon bonds/treasury bills—buy at a discount and redeem at face value, with the entire yield residing in the discount. Midnight has completely translated "lending" into "buying and selling zero-interest certificates," which is the fundamental reason it can express fixed rates so simply: at its core, an interest rate is fundamentally just a price.

4.3 Homogenization and "Fixed Calendar Maturity": Why Liquidity Will Not Fragment

This is a very easily overlooked yet extremely critical design.

Every transaction has a buyer and a seller, but the result of the transaction is fungible positions at the market level, rather than an ongoing bilateral relationship between the buyer and seller. Credit and debt are accounted for at the market level; positions are not tied to the specific transactions that created them. More cleverly: the market has fixed calendar expirations, rather than rolling durations calculated from the opening time. This means that—positions opened at different times but with the same maturity date belong to the same market and are fully fungible with each other.

Why is this important?

Because in an isolated market structure, the greatest enemy of liquidity is fragmentation: if each loan becomes a unique independent tool based on "opening date + term," then even if everyone wants to do "90 days," funds will be sliced into countless small pools that do not connect with each other.

Fixed calendar maturity cuts this issue off at the pass: the position that enters today "maturing on December 31," and the position that entered yesterday with the same maturity date, is the same thing, can trade with each other, and can balance each other out. Hence, liquidity is consolidated along the "maturity date" dimension, instead of being dispersed by the opening time.

4.4 Early Exit: Four Transaction Scenarios

Since credit and debt are homogenized within the market, both lenders and borrowers can reduce their positions at any time: lenders sell units to reduce credit, borrowers buy units to reduce debt.

The rules have a clean priority—buyers will first offset their debts before accumulating credit, while sellers will settle their credits before accumulating debt.

Thus, a transaction (buyer ⇄ seller) depending on the differing starting positions will fall into one of four scenarios:

Early exits provide users with more flexible revenue curves and, since both entry and exit occur within the same unified market, deepen liquidity for all participants.

One detail: transactions can still occur after maturity; the only exception is that no new debts can be added after maturity (i.e., the two scenarios under "Seller Increases Debt" in the table are prohibited). Allowing transactions after maturity is intended to complete positions even when there is no profit in liquidation.

5. Offer Mechanism: The True Innovative Core of Midnight

If the previous section is about "redefining lending as certificate trading," this section is about "how to ensure these certificates can be traded efficiently with very low capital costs." Midnight's answer here distinguishes it from all existing designs.

5.1 Offer: Off-Chain Quotations Without Locked Funds

Market makers express "I am willing to trade a maximum size at a certain price in a certain market" through offers. Note two key points:

- Offers are not broadcast at the protocol layer; they can be distributed through any off-chain or on-chain channel— the protocol does not maintain an order book.

- An offer itself does not lock any funds; it is merely an executable intention with a price and size cap.

The taker executes it by submitting the offer to the Midnight contract. Transactions can be partial: any size that does not exceed the remaining capacity of the offer is allowed, and a single offer can be filled by multiple takers until exhausted. The contract settles atomically for the referenced market—creating, transferring, or destroying corresponding credit and debt units as needed.

Each offer comes with a ratifier (approval contract), which contains verification logic called on when the offer is filled. Typically, it verifies the signature against the market maker's public key.

This modular design allows market makers to use different signature schemes (such as passkey, quantum-resistant schemes) or custom verification logic—also laying the foundation for "one signature to approve multiple offers."

5.2 Maker Callback: Funding Needed Only at Transaction Time

This is the soul of the entire mechanism.

Offers can specify a callback to be executed at the moment of transaction, allowing market makers to gather the needed funds or collateral only when the offer is filled, rather than needing to prepare their positions in advance.

This means: market makers can continue to use the capital backing these offers elsewhere for efficient yield until their offers are filled.

The example given in the white paper is straightforward: a lender can keep funds earning interest in a Morpho Blue market while placing a fixed-rate offer on Midnight; once the offer is filled, the callback retrieves the funds from Blue and completes settlement (provided there is sufficient liquidity).

Callbacks are also extremely useful for rolling fixed-term exposure. Near-maturity borrowers can use callbacks to buy back/repay debt in the current market, and atomically enter a market with a later expiration; lenders can similarly roll their credit exposure from one maturity date to another without needing to first return idle balances.

5.3 Multi-Market Quotations, Consumption Groups, and Merkle Roots: Covering the Whole Market with One Fund

Callbacks bring a stronger capability: market makers can place multiple offers covering multiple markets simultaneously with the same liquidity—this is a key weapon against liquidity fragmentation.

But there is an obvious risk here: if a fund of 10 ETH supports three offers of 10 ETH each on markets A, B, and C, can it be filled for a total of 30 ETH?

Of course not.

Midnight solves this with consumption groups:

- Multiple offers belonging to the same consumption group share a fill budget.

- Any offer within the group that gets executed will deduct from the remaining budget of all offers in the group;

- Once the budget runs out, no offers within the group can be filled anymore.

Thus, the market maker's actual exposure is constrained by the budget rather than by the cumulative size of all signed offers.

To visualize this with an example from the white paper:

A lender has 10 ETH and places Offer 1/2/3 corresponding to markets A/B/C, all sharing the 10 ETH budget. A borrower first fills 3 ETH from market B, leaving a budget of 7 and consumption of 3; another borrower then fills 7 ETH from market A, depleting the budget, having consumed 10—at this point, all three offers become invalid.

One fund, offering throughout the market, with controlled exposure.

To enable this efficiently at scale, the ratifier can support approving a Merkle root for a group of offers: with one signature/one interaction, the market maker can place many offers across multiple markets; these offers can later be filled by presenting the corresponding Merkle proof.

Signing efficiency + capital efficiency, both unlocked.

Looking at sections 5.1–5.3 together, you will see that Midnight effectively eliminates the implicit cost of "locking up funds for pending orders" found in traditional order books.

In traditional designs, providing conditional liquidity ("I will only transact at a certain interest rate and size") requires locking up funds in advance, which incurs a high opportunity cost under the combination of isolated markets × multiple maturities, resulting in reluctance to place large orders, leading to thin liquidity.

Midnight allows liquidity to exist in the form of "quotes without locked funds," only accessing capital at execution, enabling the market to start operating before stable trading volumes are formed—this is the antidote to the cold-start problem.

5.4 Routing: Off-Chain Search, Not Centralized Order Books

The protocol does not enforce a specific order queue, but routing naturally sorts offers by price. The problem is: the protocol layer does not guarantee the executability of any offer (considering whether callbacks can be successfully executed, whether the consumption group has been depleted, gas costs, etc.).

Therefore, finding the "best executable liquidity" among all posted offers presents a real search problem for takers. This process is referred to as routing, occurring outside the protocol and anyone can engage in it.

This fundamentally differentiates Midnight from centralized limit order books (CLOB):

The protocol does not maintain a standardized order queue; there are no price-time priorities at the protocol layer; and no capital is reserved at the protocol layer.

In other words, Midnight moves the complex task of "matching/routing" to a competitive solver (solver/router) layer outside the protocol, just as Blue moved "curation/allocation" to a higher layer.

The core is responsible for one thing: executing a submitted offer and settling it atomically.

5.5 Price Tiers (Ticks): Gridding by Interest Rates Instead of Prices

Midnight sets a minimum tick size for quotes—just like stocks can only move up by one cent per tick.

The reasoning is straightforward: if prices can be infinitely divided, market makers will rush to compete for transactions using negligible price differences, ultimately leading everyone to avoid placing large orders, resulting in dead liquidity.

Its real ingenuity lies in: the tiers are divided by "interest rates" rather than by price.

Why not just evenly divide by price?

Because prices and interest rates do not have a one-to-one rigid relationship—reducing the price by 1% in a market set to expire in one month translates into a significantly larger annualized interest rate; putting it in a market that expires a year later results in a much smaller annualized rate. In other words, evenly spaced price tiers may fluctuate drastically when applied to the "interest rates" that everyone truly cares about.

When making market quotes, market makers consider interest rates, not prices.

Thus, Midnight allows the interest rates between adjacent tiers to change in a fixed ratio (defaulting to a 2% change per tier), ensuring that regardless of the term, the experience of "moving one tier" corresponds uniformly to interest rate changes.

This tiering can also progress from coarse to fine: the market begins with 2% coarse tiers and can tighten to 1% or 0.5% as depth and participation increase. There is a clean design hidden here: finer tiers are "supersets" of coarser tiers, so when tightening precision, all existing tiers remain valid and offers that have already been placed will not become void.

Thus, the market can smoothen the precision tightening without disturbing existing offers, following the same logic as exchanges providing better liquidity to stocks by lowering tick sizes.

6. Liquidation Mechanism: Gentler on Borrowers, Fairer Loss Sharing

Fixed maturity introduces several scenarios for liquidation that Blue need not consider, making Midnight's mechanism worth explaining in detail.

Overall, it focuses on two things: being gentler on borrowers during liquidation, and ensuring that any potential losses are shared more fairly. Below, we will go through several core mechanisms one by one—not with formulas, but rather clarifying "what was done" and "why."

6.1 When Will Liquidation Occur

How much you can borrow is determined by the "discounted market value" of the collateral: each collateral is discounted according to its specific discount rate (LLTV, liquidation loan-to-value ratio) and summing multiple collaterals' discounted values equals your borrowing limit. Once debt exceeds this limit, the position turns from "healthy" to "liquidatable."

During liquidation, a third party repays a portion of your debt, taking away the corresponding collateral at a discount price; the repaid debt returns to the market for lenders to withdraw.

It is worth mentioning that each collateral has its independent pricing and discount rate, so the risks of different collaterals within the same market can be set separately.

6.2 How Much Discount Liquidators Can Take Can Be Adjusted by Collateral

Liquidators' willingness to work comes from the ability to acquire collateral at a price lower than the market price—this discount serves as their compensation (liquidation incentive).

The uniqueness of Midnight is that the discount ceiling is not a one-size-fits-all across the protocol, but is set individually for each market based on the properties of the collateral (this knob in the white paper is referred to as "liquidation slider," with loose and tight options).

The logic is straightforward: If a small discount is provided, more excess collateral is left as a buffer for the borrower, resulting in lower bad debt risk; if a large discount is provided, it attracts more liquidators to handle those difficult-to-sell or challenge collateral.

In contrast, Blue applies the same tier across all markets, while Midnight increases the precision of this risk measuring tool.

6.3 Only Liquidating to "Just Healthy," Not Completely Clearing Positions

While a position may be liquidated when it is unhealthy, the amount a liquidator can repay has a limit—it can only repay up to the point of "exactly bringing the position back to healthy," not completely clear it (this limit is referred to as "restorative margin call").

Why does fixed-term market particularly need it?

Because in Midnight, borrowers must always have collateral ready for "the full amount due at maturity." If liquidators were allowed to close out an entire position even slightly over the line, it would force borrowers to surrender collateral for the full debt—yet the term has clearly only progressed a portion, making the penalty excessive.

The only exception is when the remaining position is too small: if the remaining collateral after liquidation is small enough to be no longer worth liquidating, then one-time liquidation is allowed to avoid leaving remnants that no one wants to clean up.

6.4 Failing to Repay at Maturity: Rewarding "Slow Price Increases" to Avoid Penalty for Late Borrowers

After the maturity date, the rules tighten: as long as there is still an outstanding debt that hasn’t been repaid, even if the position appears healthy, it can be liquidated—because lenders are entitled to get their money back at the due date.

However, this scenario is mostly just the borrower being "late," not necessarily insolvent.

So Midnight does not immediately award full incentives but starts the liquidation rewards from zero and gradually increases to the normal cap over about 15 minutes, akin to a slow Dutch auction.

This ensures that ultimately someone will come to close out the position without allowing liquidators to take excessive value from a borrower who is merely late in repaying. (For "truly insolvent" positions, liquidations can occur at any point after the maturity date, with lenders receiving full protection.)

6.5 Bad Debt Accounting is More Timely, Plugging the "Early Exit" Hole

If collateral depreciates significantly and even full liquidation fails to recover the debt, that loss becomes bad debt, which the lenders will ultimately bear proportionally. Bad debts are not uncommon, but the key difference lies in the timing of the accounting.

Blue waits until the collateral has been entirely used up before taking this loss into account, allowing a position that is clearly already insolvent to linger while the loss is delayed from being recorded—lenders who are informed could withdraw before the loss is accounted, leaving the hole for those who are taken unaware.

Conversely, Midnight: when a liquidator first acts on this position, they immediately account for unrecoverable losses, thereby compressing the "early exit" time window to an extremely narrow margin.

Ultimately, this is a fairness fix aimed at addressing information asymmetries and front-running.

7. Access Control and Authorization: Leaving Interfaces for Compliance and Institutions

7.1 Gate: Two Types of Optional Gatekeeping

Midnight is designed to support flexible access control conditions. A market can specify up to two optional gate contracts at creation (which will remain fixed thereafter), and the protocol will call them when attempting operations subject to gating: entry gates control who can establish or increase positions, i.e., who is qualified to start lending or borrowing, typically used to implement KYC or whitelist access conditions. One significant design constraint is: gating only applies to "entry," not to "exit." Even if the gate contract denies access, participants can still withdraw funds, repay debts, and retrieve collateral—ensuring an unblocked exit path. The reason is that gating is an external contract that may evolve over time, or even fail; by limiting it to entry, it ensures that funds can never be locked within the market, maintaining it as a layer of access filtering that does not evolve into custodial risk. Liquidator gates control who can execute liquidations, limiting liquidations (and the associated bad debt accounting) to a designated group of entities, such as only approved liquidators being allowed to participate. For RWA and institutional credit, these two gates are key interfaces for compliance implementation: one can directly build compliant markets with "whitelisted access only" and "designated liquidator only" on the same set of immutable primitives without rewriting the protocol from scratch.

7.2 Authorization: Coarse Grain and Delegable

Midnight provides a single, coarse-grained authorization primitive: an account can authorize another address to act on its behalf within the protocol, eliminating the need to separately sign for each operation. Common uses include:

• Authorizing a keeper to roll over positions on behalf of the borrower at maturity;
• Authorizing a router or bundler contract to complete "repayments, retrieving collateral, and entering new markets" atomically in a single transaction;
• And most typically—lenders depositing funds into a vault contract, with the vault operationally managing them on the protocol.

It is important to note that this authorization is global: once granted, the authorized address gains complete control over all Midnight states of the authorizer, being able to roll positions, withdraw collateral, incur debt on their behalf, and even add or revoke other authorizations. The protocol layer does not provide granular permissions limited by operation or market scope. Therefore, authorized entities should only be fully trusted addresses or contracts whose permissions have been strictly bounded by code. This illustrates the meaning of "granularity lying above the protocol, not within." To grant only partial permissions to a third party, the only method is to introduce an intermediate contract: this contract retains full authorization at the protocol layer but exposes only a set of limited interfaces externally. The vault itself is such an intermediate contract—it has full authority over Midnight, but its code specifies that the curator/allocator can only adjust reserves between whitelisted markets without extracting funds to their own address; depositors can only deposit and withdraw shares. Thus, the "who can do what" granular logic all resides in the vault code, while the Midnight protocol only needs to recognize "full power/no power" states—this again reflects Morpho's design philosophy of "minimal core, with complexity moved outside."

8. New Fee Types: Settlement Fee and Continuous Fee

Midnight charges at most two types of fees at the protocol layer—settlement fee and continuous fee—both constrained by hard upper limits set in the contracts during writing, providing participants with "permanent certainty on how much the protocol can charge."

The fee rates are by default set according to the loaned asset and could be separately covered per market; the setting of rates and collecting of fees are the responsibility of two different roles.

Settlement fee is charged per executed transaction, reflected as a price difference rather than a separate charge. A tiny price difference is inserted between the settlement prices of buyers and sellers, borne by the party initiating the transaction (the taker). This fee rate is linearly set by remaining term segments, but it has a hard ceiling—no matter how configured, when annualized, it will not exceed 50 basis points (0.5%). Continuous fee accumulates over time on the outstanding loan position and is borne by the lender, settling when the lender reduces their credit (i.e., exits or withdraws). It has an important protection for the lender: the applicable fee rate is locked at the moment the loan position is established, so even if the protocol increases that rate later, it will not affect established positions. Its ceiling is an annualized 1%.

9. What It Means: A Few Judgments for Practitioners

Having explained the mechanisms, let's finally return to "so what." Personally, I believe the significance of Midnight can be seen from several layers:

1. It completes the landscape of Morpho, pushing on-chain credit from "money markets" to "fixed income markets." Blue + vault gave us an isolated, immutable floating rate market and a curation layer; Midnight adds the missing primitives of fixed rates and fixed terms. Multiple markets with different maturity dates create an on-chain native term structure/yield curve.

Having reached this step, on-chain truly possesses a language to converse with traditional fixed income markets.

2. Its underlying abstraction is essentially transferring the microstructure of fixed income markets on-chain.

Zero-coupon discount pricing, calendar expirations, homogenized secondary liquidity, quote-based, off-chain distribution, off-chain routing, tick grids, and maturity liquidations—these almost correspond one-to-one to the structures of traditional bond/note markets.

However, Midnight is built on the DNA of Morpho's "isolation/immutability/permissionless creation," retaining the trustless and composable nature of DeFi while borrowing the mature experiences of TradFi in market microstructures.

3. "Non-locking offers with funding only taken at execution" is an underrated capital efficiency engine.

For professional market makers, this means the same amount of capital can be used to quote dozens of markets × multiple maturity dates while keeping exposure precisely constrained by the consumption group's budget. This directly reduces the opportunity cost of providing conditional liquidity, making it the real handhold to address liquidity fragmentation and cold start issues in isolate market structures.

Whoever can excel at off-chain routing/solver layer will reap structural dividends.

4. For RWA and institutional credit, this is almost a tailor-made primitive for us.

Institutional borrowers need predictable financing costs and clear terms—fixed rates + fixed terms hit the nail on the head; RWA assets mostly carry term structures, allowing on-chain credit to finally do duration matching with them.

Moreover, the entry gate and liquidator gate allow compliance access and designated liquidation to be embedded directly into the market where KYC, whitelisting, and permissioned markets can all be achieved on the same set of immutable primitives, and the discipline of "focusing only on entry and not on exit" guarantees that gating will not evolve into custodial risk.

5. For the curator/vault layer, this opens up a new product space.

Just as Blue gave rise to a whole curation ecosystem, the same applies to Midnight, where structured credit products with fixed rates and fixed terms can be constructed—layered by maturity dates, implementing yield curve strategies, and bundling on-chain fixed income for institutions.

The work of risk curation will also expand: beyond collateral due diligence and parameter setting, it will need to manage term structures, maturity rolling, overdue liquidation routes, and other risks unique to fixed-term markets.

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