In the current market, whether it is GP, LP, or founders, there may be a lack of motivation to accurately mark assets and actively correct valuations.

Author: MD

Produced by: Mingliang Company

Recently, the well-known investment podcast Invest Like the Best invited Benchmark partner Bill Gurley again to comprehensively discuss the current realities of the U.S. primary market, as well as the valuation and investment contradictions faced by AI companies.

In the interview, Bill analyzed the structural changes and challenges in the current venture capital industry. He pointed out that the rise of MegaFunds has led to a dramatic increase in capital scale, blurring the lines between early and late-stage investments, and that massive capital has driven the birth of numerous AI and tech unicorns. However, among these companies, there are many "zombie unicorns," which are companies that have received huge funding but show weak growth and whose real value is questionable. Bill emphasized that in the current market, whether it is GP, LP, or founders, there may be a lack of motivation to accurately mark assets and actively correct valuations, leading to a serious divergence between book value and actual value, and misalignment of incentive mechanisms.

In the interview, Bill also analyzed the investment (speculative) environment under a zero-interest-rate environment, where excess capital has extended the "survival period" of companies, allowing those that should have been eliminated by the market to still exist, making the market competition landscape exceptionally complex. At the same time, the closure of IPO and merger windows has trapped a large amount of capital in the primary market, with LP liquidity issues becoming increasingly prominent, even prestigious university endowment funds have had to resort to issuing bonds or selling private equity assets to cope with funding pressures.

Bill also believes that the arrival of the AI wave has interrupted the market corrections that should have occurred, with AI being seen as a historic platform transformation, driving a new wave of investment enthusiasm and valuation bubbles. He cautioned that while AI presents enormous opportunities, all parties in the industry need to be vigilant about the importance of fundamentals and unit economic models, and should not blindly chase high valuations.

Although Bill candidly admitted in the interview that he "no longer writes checks," he remains very focused on the models of AI and technological innovation in China.

In the latest episode of Bill's own podcast BG2, he also analyzed the shift in the "competitive model" of Chinese companies—from photovoltaics and new energy vehicles to today's AI, the intense competitive environment in China may actually shape more competitive companies. Benchmark remains one of the most successful VC firms in Silicon Valley, and not long ago, Benchmark participated as a lead investor in a new round of financing for ManusAI.

The following is the interview text translated by "Mingliang Company":

Patrick: Our guest today is Bill Gurley. Bill was a general partner at Benchmark Capital. This is his sixth appearance on Invest Like the Best, and it is also his most comprehensive market analysis, discussing the realities reshaping the venture capital industry. Bill confronted the unsettling mathematical issues behind today's venture capital returns, especially the phenomenon of companies remaining private for longer periods. He also explained why no one—from GP to LP to founders—has enough motivation to accurately mark assets, leading to a coordination problem for the entire system. We also delved into the investment implications of AI as a platform transformation, from assessing AI revenue quality to international competitive dynamics. Bill provided key perspectives on how to respond to the current and future situations. Please enjoy my conversation with Bill Gurley.

Patrick: Bill, you have reclaimed the title of the most frequent guest on Invest Like the Best, surpassing our good friend Michael Mauboussin. Welcome back.

Bill: Well, I can't think of anyone else who could compete with Michael for that title.

Patrick: Interestingly, this is the first time since 2019 that it’s just the two of us on the show, unbelievable. Time flies. Since it’s just the two of us, I want to take a big-picture view and talk about the current situation as you see it. I know you used to start your LP meetings with a market version of the "State of the Union" when you were at Benchmark. I hope you can do that for us and share what you see for the market in the summer of 2025.

Bill: I’m happy to do that. Yes, I used to open our LP meetings with the state of venture capital. That was my routine and presentation style. Recently, I’ve noticed many different aspects of the venture capital world, some of which may even be permanent changes. Much of what I used to talk about was based on the cyclical nature of the venture capital industry, but recently those patterns have been disrupted or have become somewhat chaotic, and we will discuss those.

Before we dive in, I have two premises to clarify. First, Michael would agree with me that I really enjoy thinking at a systems level. There’s a great book on systems thinking (note: but the book's name is not mentioned). Michael and I spent our time at the Santa Fe Institute largely focused on systems theory—the behavior of a system is different from that of its individual components. Observing across systems is actually quite difficult. But as we delve deeper, I think many components in the industry are colliding with each other, and the sum of all these interactions is what’s most interesting. So you have to step back and look at the big picture.

The second point I want to state upfront is that I do not make moral judgments about any participants. Some actions taken by individuals and companies have changed the industry landscape, and I believe they are acting rationally in their own interests. The overall effect may not be beneficial to the world, but I won’t attribute malice to anyone; I want to make that clear first.

Now I’ll start. I want to list some market realities that I see. In the first part, I don’t intend to do too much analysis; I just want to lay out some things you would encounter if you were in the venture capital market. By the way, I think what we’re going to discuss is very important for venture capitalists, founders, LPs, and anyone interacting with this ecosystem. These are very high-level topics. Let me first mention these realities, and then we can discuss some interpretations back and forth.

Seven Realities of the Primary Market

1. Mega VC Fund

Bill: The first thing I want to mention, which everyone is talking about, is the continued rise of super venture capital funds. When I first entered the industry, everything was very customized, and most well-known funds focused on early-stage investments. They did not participate in late-stage investments, and their fund sizes were much smaller than they are now.

Today, many well-known funds have transformed from commitments of $500 million every three to four years to $5 billion, a tenfold increase. They are very actively participating in what is called "late-stage" investments—although I have always felt that "late-stage" is just a euphemism for "large checks." Now, there are people willing to invest $300 million in an AI company that has been established for just 12 months. This is not late-stage; it’s just a large check.

Many companies are moving upstream and have set up various industry-specific funds, which has led to a significant increase in the scale of many brand-managed funds. There are also many new players entering the late-stage market, employing various strategies, and some established institutions occasionally participate, such as Fidelity and Capital Group. But I think Atreides, Coatue, Altimeter, and Thrive (I think they are doing something distinctive in the market) are all very active. Also, Masa (Son Masayoshi) is back. We haven’t heard much from him in recent years, but he is active in the market again.

Patrick: He himself is a metric.

Bill: Yes, I agree. So there is more money in the market now.

2. Zombie Unicorns

Bill: The second reality that everyone is talking about is "zombie unicorns." I don’t particularly like this term, but it’s the most commonly used. If you look at the number of these companies, I like to use the LLM as a dividing line because it truly is a watershed moment, and everyone is excited about this new platform transformation. There are about a thousand such private companies that have raised over $1 billion. ChatGPT tells me it’s 1,250, while NVCA (National Venture Capital Association) says it’s 900. Let’s say it’s roughly a thousand.

Patrick: About a thousand, yes.

Bill: Right. Each of them has raised about $200 million to $300 million. That adds up to $300 billion. NVCA estimates that LPs have $3 trillion in book assets. I’ve talked one-on-one with LPs, and they have gradually increased their allocation to venture capital from 5-7% to 10-15%. Some even reach half of their private equity allocation. Venture capital and private equity are on par, with some LPs having larger PE allocations, but venture capital is increasingly significant on their balance sheets, so it’s important.

I think there are many questions about this batch of companies. First, what is their real value? Many companies last priced themselves in 2021.

Patrick: Around 2021, yes.

Bill: Right, that was just at the market peak, the second year of COVID, if you remember, all tech stocks surged, and Zoom exploded at that time; everyone performed well during that window. So what are they worth now is a question. The investment community is generally not interested in this batch of companies. Their growth rates are not high, and I will discuss the reasons shortly.

Many may not believe it, but I assure you it’s true—no one has the motivation to accurately mark valuations. For those unfamiliar with this world—private investments, whether PE or VC—there is this strange model where GPs report prices to LPs, and they set their own prices.

Of course, there are auditors working behind the scenes, and you will hear LPs complain that some funds are conservatively priced low while others are priced high. The information LPs receive is also varied.

Patrick: The same asset can have different prices from different GPs?

Bill: Yes. But many people don’t realize that the managers of VC groups in large endowment funds actually have no motivation to correct this number. In fact, many of their bonuses are based on book valuations. So they even have a reverse incentive to correct.

3. Misaligned Incentives, Poor Outcomes

Patrick: Don’t founders have the motivation to get these things right? In the long run, isn’t it more beneficial for building the company?

Bill: Good question. I think two things are working against that. First, every founder I know multiplies their ownership percentage by the company’s historical highest valuation and then treats that number as their net worth.

Patrick: But does that make sense? It doesn’t really represent anything.

Bill: I don’t make judgments; I think it’s a natural reaction. But it’s hard to accept cutting that number by 70%. Another issue is liquidation preference. This is another technical detail, so let me explain it to the audience.

The amount of capital you have raised becomes your liquidation preference. In a merger, investors can choose to take back their principal instead of converting to common stock. So if a company raises $300 million with a valuation of $2 billion, the liquidation preference doesn’t matter much. If the valuation drops to $400 million, the liquidation preference could take away 75% of the company’s value at sale. This is a real issue.

Patrick: If we go back to those thousand zombie unicorns and analyze them closely, how many do you think are profitable and can continue like this until they are willing to reprice? And how many will struggle and ultimately have to raise funds and reset their prices?

Bill: To be honest, I haven't conducted a statistically significant survey; maybe someone can, like fund of funds, Pitchbook, or Carta. I think it can serve as a prelude to discuss what has happened. We are in a long period of zero interest rates, now called ZIRP, which hasn't been seen in a century. Zero interest rates have lasted for five, six, or seven years? About that.

Patrick: A long time.

Bill: On one hand, this has delayed VC adjustments; on the other hand, it has brought in a lot of capital and speculation. A little anecdote: I've only met Buffett once in my life, at a small fundraising event with about 20 people, where each person could only ask one question. I asked him, "Your DCF doesn't hold under zero interest rates, does it? That only leads to speculation." He replied, "You're right." And that was it, a brief encounter with a great man.

In short, speculation is rampant. The $20-30 billion I just mentioned is unprecedented before that.

When companies receive so much money, several things happen. I believe a field will have too many participants, and companies that should have been eliminated earlier can survive. This makes market expansion more difficult because the number of surviving companies increases from 1-2 to 3-5. When you overfinance, you do everything. There are many articles and studies showing that constraints lead to creativity; it's better to focus on one or two core products. But when there's too much money, you end up doing seven projects.

Patrick: Doing them all.

Bill: Right, doing them all. I think there was a small adjustment in 2022 and 2023, before AI exploded. Most companies turned towards breakeven, just as you said. So once they turn towards breakeven, they will cut those seven projects and keep only two.

But those seven projects and the over-expanded sales teams brought in revenue, but not sustainable revenue. Once you contract and pursue breakeven, the growth rate will naturally be affected. So I think this is the reason for the sluggish growth.

I agree with your point that many companies have enough capital to reach breakeven or come close to it. According to my previous views on traditional company building, this should be a good thing, and I certainly support it. But the reality is, they might really be able to exist indefinitely, which is where the "zombie" label comes from.

Patrick: So what does that mean? Since no one has the motivation to correct valuations, will this situation continue indefinitely? Will there be any changes?

Bill: We'll come back to that question later. Let me finish discussing these market realities first.

Patrick: Okay, go ahead.

Bill: Then we can delve into the possible changes that might occur.

4. Exit Window Closure

Patrick: The next question is about exits. How these companies will be priced in the real market.

Bill: Right, so we talked about super funds, zombie unicorns, and then the capital markets. For some reasons that haven't been well articulated and are not well understood, the IPO and M&A markets have stagnated over the past few years. Both were actually quite good in 2021, but then they stopped. If you look at last year (2024), the Nasdaq rose 30%, but the window is still closed. This is a common consensus.

In my history of following capital markets and engaging in venture capital, I have never seen a situation where the Nasdaq performs well but the exit window is closed.

Patrick: No IPOs, right.

Bill: Right, that doesn't make sense. In the past, these two were correlated, so something else must be happening now. I've always been concerned about IPO discounts, especially the discounts imposed by well-known large firms on the market. But some also argue that the cost of going public is too high, and others believe that the cost of being a public company is too high. Of course, money is everywhere. We'll return to this topic later—successful companies now have no need to go public, or at least they don't have to rush to go public.

M&A is harder to interpret. Everyone blames Lina Khan (FTC Commissioner), but she has left, and there have been no record-breaking mergers in the first five months of this year. I think this may be related to the "seven giants." These seven companies have an astonishing amount of cash on hand, which should lead to large-scale mergers, and I believe they would be willing to use that money. But Washington is not keen on it, and the EU is even less keen on them being active, so the situation is stuck. No one wants to take the risk of a merger agreement that cannot be completed smoothly.

Even big deals like Wiz this year, as soon as they were announced, said it would take over a year to complete. For the board and management team, that’s hard to accept. Waiting a year is too difficult.

Patrick: Do you think we will soon see a private company valued at a trillion dollars?

Bill: How far is SpaceX from that goal?

Patrick: About a third, I guess. OpenAI is also about a third. Stripe is a tenth. There are several companies that, if they can maintain success, could likely achieve that. What I mean is, if you can become a trillion-dollar private company, do you even need to go public? That sounds crazy.

Bill: We will talk about that. Another factor that could affect M&A is high valuations. In 2021, we pushed the most exciting companies to extreme high prices, and that continues today. This will also affect M&A.

Patrick: Can you elaborate on why this situation might persist? Is it the feedback loop we just discussed?

Bill: I think ZIRP (zero interest rate) is the main reason before LLM. After LLM, everyone believes AI is the biggest technological platform transformation of our lifetime. So if you believe that… One more thing, I recall thirty years ago when I was with Mauboussin at First Boston, the network effects and compounding effects were not fully understood or recognized. Now everyone completely believes in them.

So those who have seen Google or Meta grow from $12 billion to $3 trillion, if they think a certain company might reach that height, in their view, there is no such thing as "overpaying"—it’s reasonable for independent investors to think that way. If everyone thinks this way, the market will price in those expectations, but we will wait and see.

5. LP Liquidity Issues

Bill: The next reality is that many LPs are facing liquidity issues. This is a new phenomenon related to the closure of IPO and M&A windows. Another interesting data point is that in the first quarter of 2025, U.S. universities issued $12 billion in bonds, the third-highest quarter in history. If you are using debt to meet capital commitments, it’s because your endowment fund lacks sufficient liquidity to pay out 3% or 5% of expenses annually as it used to.

Recently, you may have seen that Harvard announced it would sell $1 billion in private equity assets on the secondary market. They have many special reasons, but more interestingly, Yale announced it would sell $6 billion in private equity assets.

Yale doing this is very important and interesting; historically, no institution has had a greater impact on endowment fund management strategies.

Patrick: Indeed, none.

Bill: David Swensen (former CIO of Yale and author of "Pioneering Portfolio Management") is the pioneer of this model.

Patrick: He is the godfather of this model.

Bill: Exactly. Yale reportedly achieved a 13% annualized return over 35 years under his leadership. His famous "Yale Model" involved investing more money in illiquid assets rather than liquid assets. Initially, no one did this due to a lack of transparency, liquidity, and management difficulty. But he made it work and was very successful. What we might be seeing now is the result of everyone imitating the Yale model. Howard Marks once said, "You can only make big money when you are non-consensus and right." But if everyone imitates Swensen and allocates 50% to illiquid assets, can they still succeed?

I think this is a very challenging question, but that might be the reality. The strategy that Yale pioneered is now being exited by them, which is very interesting.

6. Private is the New Public

Patrick: If you consider the liquidity issues of LPs, could this be the key to breaking the deadlock you just described?

Bill: It’s possible. If I can continue to finish these realities, we will—

Patrick: Sorry, I couldn't help but interrupt.

Bill: The AI wave has come at a very opportune time. This is my fifth point, I believe. We were heading towards a small correction. You have to remember, Patrick, at that time everyone was tightening their belts, laying off employees, pursuing breakeven, and worrying about whether they could raise funds again.

In my thirty years in venture capital, every time the industry overheats, there is a correction, and then everything calms down. I have seen Morgan and Goldman open offices on Sand Hill Road and then close them, and I have seen Fortune and Forbes focus on Silicon Valley and then withdraw. I have seen this several times.

But this time there was no complete correction, because AI emerged, and everyone got too excited. I'm not saying we shouldn't be excited; if this is indeed the biggest technological platform transformation of our lifetime, we must be excited, and this will affect the zombie unicorns and everything.

But suddenly, investment enthusiasm surged. What are the multiples of AI company valuations and revenues? 10 times, 20 times that of ordinary companies, right?

Patrick: About that, some even higher.

Bill: Right. Even though traditional LPs are tight on funds, they can still find money elsewhere. The Middle East is a major source of funding. How many friends have you had go to the Middle East in the past 12 months? A lot, right? They are all talking to fundraisers, so money has found its way, and everyone is chasing this opportunity, and no one wants to miss out. This is a very important component of the entire situation.

7. New Developments in the Late-Stage Market

Bill: The last reality you already mentioned is the new actions in the late-stage market. I think Josh and the Thrive team have taken the lead in this, but they are not the only ones.

They are looking for companies that were originally preparing to go public, and the media reported they would go public, and they are making an offer that is hard to refuse, encouraging liquidity for founders, employees, and angel investors, and companies are more willing to remain private. A recent example is Databricks.

Patrick and John from Stripe have also talked about this on different podcasts. At first, they said, "Maybe we will go public, but not in a hurry," and later it became more like what you said, "Maybe we will never go public." I have talked to some LPs about this, and it’s quite unusual. They are going in and out of Stripe, and the company is adapting well. This is fresh in our industry.

Patrick: These companies can get the funding they need, whether it's for employee cash-outs or early investors selling shares, basically like a "reservation-based public market"?

Bill: Yes, like an old-fashioned pink sheet market, trading by reservation.

Patrick: Stripe is undoubtedly a great company led by outstanding founders. If you can have your own private market, why take on the extra work, regulation, data disclosure, and let competitors know your situation? It makes sense for everyone, so I wonder if this model will continue indefinitely.

Bill: Maybe.

Patrick: If LPs can gain liquidity by transferring Stripe shares, then the liquidity issue is resolved, right?

Bill: We will discuss that shortly. I want to add one more point—these investors encouraging companies to remain private have another motivation. During traditional IPOs, banks are very cautious about allocating shares. If a large public or private fund applies for allocation, it is usually oversubscribed by 100 times, hoping to get 1-2%. They can't possibly get 30%. But these investors can take 30% of the shares in private large rounds, which is much more than in an IPO. And they often collaborate on these deals.

So this is an oligopolistic opportunity, taking the growth dividends of IPOs away from the public market. When Amazon went public, it was worth less than $10 billion, and now it’s worth over a trillion; the public market enjoyed that compounding growth. If you delay going public and secure a high percentage of shares early, these investors are better off than if they bought in after the company goes public.

Another important point is that they will tell LPs: the company is no longer going public like it used to; if you want to benefit from these high-growth tech companies, you must invest with me. This is very persuasive.

Is the U.S. Capital Market Healthy?

Patrick: You've finished discussing the market realities. Now I want to dig deeper. For me, the interesting premise is that I have always hoped for a healthy functioning of the capital markets. The U.S. capital market has been an extremely important engine of innovation in world history, driving countless innovations.

So my view is that as long as we can price risk reasonably and keep the capital markets functioning healthily, I support it. I'm curious where you think the system is the least healthy under these realities, and what changes you hope to see.

Bill: I share your wish. I believe we would be better off with more companies participating. I didn't mention it earlier, but you surely know, and most people do, that the total number of publicly listed companies in the U.S. has significantly decreased from its peak. The decline in public companies is largely due to the IPO process.

Well-known investment banks, I asked my friend Jay Ritter to run the data again—the current IPO discount is 25-26%, plus a 7% fee, making the capital cost 33%. I know a CEO preparing for an IPO, and when discussing with the investment bank, they said you should issue at price X, the founder said I can raise $1 billion at a 20% higher price in the private market tomorrow.

As you said, if the private market is so liquid, flexible, and optimal, why go public? I don't know what changes are needed. I feel that as long as it involves financing, everyone will avoid that part of the IPO.

SEC's Hester Peirce has an interesting article that you might want to include in the show notes. She is the longest-serving commissioner at the SEC, and now there are only four commissioners, and she is the one most supportive of cryptocurrency. The article is titled "A Creative and Cooperative Balancing Act," and she believes blockchain might fix the IPO market, which is quite challenging.

Patrick: How specifically? Tokenizing private assets and then trading them freely?

Bill: Tokenizing securities. No one will revert to the IPO allocation method for crypto assets. It will definitely use distributed ledgers. ICOs have already done this. So this is interesting, and I will keep an eye on it.

M&A is difficult, and regulatory pressure is too high. In the AI field, there are some "workaround acquisitions," like signing licensing agreements first and then hiring people, but I haven't seen any real big deals in a long time. This is a roundabout way.

Moreover, if the pricing is too high, like many AI funding rounds now, I can understand that Apple might want to acquire a company like Perplexity, but they just raised funds at a $15 billion valuation. The price is too high, making it hard to close the deal. So I can't do much about it.

Regarding the capital markets, you just said everyone claims that the U.S. capital market is the best in the world and envied globally. Personally, I'm not so sure.

Patrick: What other interesting capital market innovations have you seen? You mentioned that the Middle East is very proactive in the new technology wave, striving to participate in the most interesting companies, technologies, and infrastructure. Are there other capital market innovations you find interesting?

Bill: It may not necessarily be an innovation, but Coatue has made a new move recently. I haven't talked to Philippe, just sharing what I've seen. Their previous minimum subscription amount was $5 million, and now it has dropped to $25,000, and they are collaborating with an investment bank to promote this. This is similar to what I just mentioned about marketing to LPs, but it actually develops a new source of capital. Sometimes people refer to these types of investors as "dentists and doctors," who previously couldn't invest in funds like Coatue, but now they can. The PE industry is also doing similar things. A large PE firm is lobbying in Washington to allow 401(k) plans to invest in private equity, trying to unlock new sources of capital.

Some have countered me, saying, "It doesn't matter that U.S. institutional LPs are tight on funds; we will find money elsewhere, and it has proven to be true." But this is just adding more water to the pipeline. If the outlet is blocked, adding more won't help. I can't think of a better metaphor; perhaps the human digestive system is the most fitting—only taking in, not out, leading to constipation; no matter how much you eat, it won't help.

Patrick: When you chat with LPs, what do they usually say? Is there anything they don't publicly discuss but talk about privately that you think is important?

Bill: I think they have a high awareness of the market realities I just mentioned. In their position, they must make decisions. When it comes to long-term decisions, if you work in an endowment fund, the decision-making time is very short, but the feedback cycle can be as long as 10-15 years, which makes it difficult.

But you must start thinking about whether the issues we are discussing are temporary or permanent. If they are permanent, you must change your approach. As I mentioned, some LPs have gone in and out of Stripe, knowing who to contact in the company's capital markets team, and they are starting to consider that this might be permanent, thinking about how to prepare for such a world.

Patrick: Apollo recently released a report, stating that among companies with annual revenues exceeding $100 million, 87% are now private companies. Of course, if calculated by market capitalization, public companies still dominate because the tech giants are so large, but it's quite striking. $100 million in revenue is no small feat. We indeed live in a highly privatized world, and that cannot be denied.

Bill: Yes, maybe I should rephrase that. You just said that the best world is one where capital markets are efficient, going public is easy, liquidity is strong, and transaction costs are low. I do believe that such a world is better.

If we enter a new world where ordinary investors can only participate in high-growth tech companies indirectly through 2/20 venture funds, I think… that famous investment book, what was it called? "One Up On Wall Street"? Harvey…

Patrick: Yes, that's the one.

Bill: He would never want the world to become like this. But it seems we are heading in that direction. I feel that information is less transparent, transparency is lower, fraud is more prevalent, and transaction costs are higher. This is an inevitable result. Take Stripe as an example; it is one company. At most, you can name five similar companies, but we are concerned about 1,500 companies. They can't all become Stripe.

Patrick: You once taught me something— you have to play by the existing rules while also thinking about future changes in the rules to prepare for the future. But if we take the "rules of the game" as a premise, facing this more chaotic reality dominated by private markets and tight liquidity, how do you think different groups should act? Starting from the founders to the entrepreneurs who truly create value, funded by these capital markets.

In the AI world, if they can raise funds at a $15 billion valuation, maybe they should take it. So how would you advise them to make the optimal choice under the current rules of the game?

Bill: They are forced to act under the rules of the game. This is also what I think is the worst part of this world. I recently came across a term called "gavagetube," do you know what it is?

Patrick: No.

Bill: The French use it to force-feed geese to make foie gras. This is a photo of a feeding funnel. In this world, the reality is—this was the case in 2021—whenever there is a bit of a trend, there are people knocking at the door wanting to shove $100 million, $200 million, or $300 million at you.

For those founders who have been struggling for financing, this may sound absurd, but this is the reality, and you know it. This leads everyone to go all in.

I experienced this firsthand during the Uber-Lyft competition. Now every niche will have this capital battle. You just mentioned traditional company building. Traditional companies don't burn $100-150 million a year, but all the big AI companies are doing just that, or even more. OpenAI says they are burning $7 billion a year.

This is not your grandfather's way of starting a business, nor your grandfather's venture capital; this is a completely different world. If you are a founder, you might wish to ignore all this and build your company your way. But if your competitor raises $300 million and expands their sales team 10x or 50x, you will soon be eliminated.

So you are forced to act under the rules of the game. The good news is that because investors are so eager, you can probably achieve founder liquidity. I think this is detrimental to the long-term success of the company, but because it aligns with the investors' strategy, they all encourage you to do so. So you should take some liquidity. If someone is willing to invest at a 30x revenue valuation, forcing you to play a high-burn game that you are not accustomed to, you should leave yourself a way out.

I think this is bad for the ecosystem because we will lose all small and medium exits, leaving only the high-stakes home runs. But that is the reality. It seems we have not learned any lessons from the ZIRP era.

The issue of zombie unicorns we discussed earlier is now being replayed in AI companies.

Thoughts on the AI Platform Transformation

Patrick: I want to ask a critical question about AI as a new generation of general enabling technology. This is the biggest difference between now and 2021. Just as we have never seen such huge funding rounds, we have also never seen companies grow their revenues so quickly. I know you, like me, love technology; I use these things every day, and it feels like the most magical technology I've ever used.

So I want you to elaborate on the "bull market theory," which suggests that people are not being irrational because we are really going to see 5% GDP growth or even crazier numbers. Because this is indeed a different level of technology, even bigger than the internet.

Bill: First, I agree with what you said. I would never oppose it being a true platform transformation. If it is a platform transformation, like mobile internet or PCs, that is already big enough; it doesn't have to be bigger than previous ones.

Patrick: Even if it's just another platform transformation?

Bill: Yes, absolutely one of them, and it might even be bigger. This leads us to everything we just discussed. As I mentioned at the beginning, I don't judge any participants; reality is reality. I do have a possibility in my mind that some of the revenue growth is actually counted in the resale of computing power.

Many companies in the market are essentially repackaging foundational models and cloud services. Many companies are actually operating at negative gross margins. When you buy products from these "shell" companies, it might be cheaper than directly purchasing the models or cloud services, and this revenue is counted multiple times, resulting in negative gross margins.

Until the day we truly care about unit economics— but during the all-in phase of the capital battle, this is impossible; everyone can only fight for market share. When the optimization model arrives, that will be the key point. I have no doubt about this; even without discussing foundational models, like what Bret Taylor is doing at Sierra, I have no doubt that AI will fundamentally change every business it touches.

I completely believe this. That is to say, many phenomena are actually rational responses to reality.

Patrick: If you've experienced many technological paradigm shifts, what excites you the most about this wave?

Bill: This question is very personal for me, just like what you said earlier. I now use AI platforms to conduct 40-50 searches daily, more frequently than I use Google. Almost all of it is rapid learning, whether recalling details or acquiring new knowledge, happening every day.

I think for those who are naturally self-learners, their efficiency and growth speed will be astonishingly fast. Besides that, I am also very interested in things like Tesla's autonomous driving and other problems solved by traditional AI, which may even have more far-reaching implications. I do worry about the limitations of LLMs; while they may be able to solve problems, they are fundamentally language models and not very good with numbers.

When people say general AI will replace all computation, I don't agree unless these flaws are fixed or integrated. Right now, if you ask AI math questions, it will write Python; in the future, there will be more similar approaches. If you want to defend "AI is really useful," I can't refute you.

The Dilemma Facing GPs and LPs

Patrick: Let's take a step further and talk about GPs (General Partners). The same question: what is the rational approach under the current rules of the game? There are two versions: one is the "Spock-like" rational answer, and the other is the "Kirk-like" emotionally driven answer.

The Spock-like answer is: since the market is like this, I want to build a platform to rationally maximize investment returns.

The Kirk-like answer is: if you were to start a venture capital firm today, how would you do it? Would you create small funds like you did at Benchmark? Or would you create a fund that invests in everything, with a different fee structure that can adapt to the new rules? I want to hear your answers from both perspectives.

Bill: I want to emphasize the first point in my answer: time is a big issue. We have extended the liquidity time for companies from 5-7 years to 10-15 years. I don't know the exact numbers, but every LP is aware of this issue.

I sent you a chart from NVCA showing the percentage of venture funds returning committed capital within 5-10 years. In the past, the average was 20%, peaking at 30%, but last year it dropped to 5%, and now it’s around 5-7%. This reflects a significant liquidity problem for LPs.

But this is also a problem for GPs. Why is time a big trouble? Because there is a capital cost, and IRR (Internal Rate of Return) will be eroded by time. Everyone says, oh, what's important is DPI, not IRR, but if time doubles, IRR becomes critical. That is what truly matters.

In addition to time and capital costs, there is dilution. Every zombie unicorn has to issue 3-6% new shares annually for employee incentives.

Combining these two points creates a significant problem. Assuming you originally hoped to get back $100 in the 10th year, now you have to push it to the 15th year. Just calculating with 10% compounding, by the 15th year, it would need to be worth $160 to be equivalent. If you think these people invest in venture capital for big returns, then your capital cost isn't 5%; it's the risk-free rate. The real cost is 15%, plus 5% equity dilution, making it 20%.

If you wait another five years, $100 would need to become $250 to meet the original return expectations. So this is a big issue.

Another unclear point is that previously, a certain number of companies would be acquired or go public, and then entropy would increase, making long-term growth difficult for all companies.

People like to say, if there are no big winners, how will fund returns be? But I haven't seen anyone ask, if only big winners remain and all others are gone, what will fund returns look like? Because it seems we are heading toward this situation. After saying all this, I actually don't know the answer to your question. I have spent my career doing early-stage investments, and I still enjoy that phase because it is the window for the largest bets and the highest returns.

But I really dislike the new generation of GPs repeating the kind of competition seen in Uber-Lyft for every company. You go to a board meeting and find that a competitor has raised another billion dollars, and the decision on the table becomes, "Should we lose money for another two years and operate at a negative gross margin to capture market share?" You won't see this scenario in a Harvard case study.

This is a very unique hand, a super high-risk poker game; the strategy is not like "From Good to Great." This is not the traditional way of managing a company, nor is it the approach described in Buffett's letters; it doesn't apply in this world of capital battles.

Patrick: I want to talk about LPs and whether capital will really flow to the places with the highest risk-adjusted returns. Theoretically, capital should continuously flow to the areas with the highest risk-adjusted returns. This is the meaning of the entire system.

So I want to ask, what do you think is hindering this flow? In other words, what should LPs do now? They are the owners of capital, or rather, they represent the owners of capital. Their duty should be to achieve optimal risk-adjusted returns. What do you think they should do? And what is stopping them from doing so?

Bill: This is probably the last point I want to emphasize, and then we can chat freely. You asked a very insightful question at the beginning. You asked early on whether the liquidity problem for LPs would become a catalyst for changing this world.

There are many factors driving this change. Time is an issue, as we have discussed, and LPs are also leveraging. Washington is now discussing taxing endowment funds, which will bring more liquidity pressure, something they have never encountered before. There is also a reduction in research funding; it's not just Harvard's radical measures; even the ordinary research funding from NIH and NSF has been cut. For example, indirect costs have been reduced from 60% to 10%.

All of these will lead universities to tell endowment funds that we don't want 3%, but rather 5% or 6% annual spending. These are all factors that could make LPs' situations more difficult. Yale being the first to enter the secondary market seems very interesting.

If you are a small endowment fund that has never invested in Sequoia, you can now indirectly participate by buying shares from Yale. But if more and more big players enter the secondary market, causing prices to collapse, that could trigger a chain reaction throughout the entire system.

Another thing worth noting is whether the Middle East will change its mind. I sent you a link about Sheikh Saoud Salem Al-Sabah, the investment chief of Qatar. He said, the head of the world's largest sovereign wealth fund indicated that the bell for private equity has rung, and he has joined the growing concerns among investors about the industry's valuation methods. This is a different voice from the Middle East. If this perspective spreads and influences all players, the impact could be significant. So this is an area worth paying attention to.

If I were an LP, what would I do? I would definitely engage in both buying and selling in the late private market, personally experiencing the market mechanisms. It's not about creating a run on the bank, but you might really need to reassess whether the Yale model is still effective. It was definitely effective when only Yale was doing it, but now that everyone is doing it, it may not be. I would pay attention to whether there are PE firms willing to actively dig for value among the zombie unicorns. I think there might be opportunities here, and it’s worth being optimistic about. I would also be interested.

Patrick: If you only consider returns, as your former partner Andy Ratcliffe often said, to make big money, you have to go against the trend and be right. Could it be worth considering investing in the public markets outside of AI? The pricing and supply-demand dynamics there are completely different. If you look for those ordinary companies, the capital markets are very harsh on them, strictly evaluating them with calculators, which is completely different from the AI field. Shouldn't we pay more attention to these areas?

Bill: I even feel that those institutions that are considered late-stage investors are thinking this way. They are wondering if they can find a traditional company that perhaps hasn't realized that AI can enhance it, but we can do it ourselves; maybe this is a disruptive opportunity.

Howard Marks first proposed the idea of "non-consensus and correct," and I have read a lot of his work. But this idea conflicts with platform transformation. Because platform transformation has now become consensus; if you want to go against the trend, you can't invest in AI, which sounds absurd. So it's difficult to do both at the same time.

Another interesting phenomenon with AI is that large companies seem to be reacting quickly. For example, if you go to the ServiceNow website, it's all about AI. Microsoft mentioned AI 67 times in its earnings report, and Satya talked about AI for two hours straight. This is quite strange.

In "Crossing the Chasm" and "The Innovator's Dilemma," we read that large companies are always slow to react to mobile internet and PCs, which gives startups opportunities. But this time, I feel that large companies have been alert early on.

Patrick: Do you think this is just happening in a different way? For example, theoretically, Google should have the most advantages in dominating all AI scenarios, but I hardly see anyone around me using Gemini or Google for code generation; instead, they are using startups like Cursor, Anthropic, and OpenAI. Although large companies are reacting quickly, the tech companies themselves are still replaying the same phenomenon.

Bill: There are data points on both sides. I find your argument very interesting. Apple is an example. Microsoft missed once (with mobile internet), and this time they are more alert.

I saw Friedberg (note: one of the hosts of the All-in podcast) interview Sundar and ask him if he had read "The Innovator's Dilemma," and he candidly admitted he hadn't. When your company is doing very well, these theories seem to be for others, but now he might need to read it.

Patrick: When evaluating an exciting new AI company, its revenue nature may differ from traditional models like enterprise SaaS— as an investor, how would you assess the revenue quality of a new AI startup?

Bill: I think this is difficult, as mentioned earlier. You might secure a $1 million order, but it could be at a negative gross margin for you. On the other hand, if you look at any AI model from two generations ago, the current prices are just a fraction of what they used to be. You can probably be confident that future efficiency will be improved through price optimization.

One interesting thing that the partners at Benchmark have been focusing on and evaluating recently is when companies will shift to an optimization model, and how their decision-making will differ once they transition from the experimental and sandbox mode. With ample capital now, you can operate in sandbox mode for a longer time before shifting to an optimization model. We have seen similar situations during the internet era. I like to emphasize that in the first two years, all startups were built on Sun and Oracle. Everyone was. Five or six years later, no one was using them anymore. This is why it is crucial to closely monitor this transition.

"If China's tech giants open source their AI products, it would be incredibly powerful"

Patrick: What do you think about the interesting international competitive landscape in the AI field? In previous platform transformations, this competition was not as apparent, with the U.S. and Western technology at the forefront. China is clearly the biggest variable here, with projects like DeepSeek and an increasing number of impressive startups from China. How do you view this international AI race, especially between China and the U.S.?

Bill: I think there is a super interesting development in the situation in China that is worth paying attention to. When DeepSeek became popular, we were all focused on the U.S. response, the U.S. models, and Washington's policies. For example, AWS hosted DeepSeek, etc. But in China, Alibaba has open-sourced Qwen, and Xiaomi now has its own model, I can't remember the name, maybe it's called MiMo, which is also open-source. Baidu's Robin Li originally had a closed-source model, but he said it would be open-sourced in June.

If it ultimately turns into four well-funded companies open-sourcing their products, that would be incredibly powerful. We already know that these models can train and enhance each other. If there are four open-source models that can learn from each other, and everyone can access them, I believe this will create a vast array of choices and experimental space, which we won't have in the U.S. This is the most fascinating part of the international AI narrative that I see.

Patrick: To what extent do you have an emotional inclination to "hope one side wins"? What do you most want to see? Is it competition?

Bill: It's interesting that you bring this up. I've noticed that some of the most radical "China hawks" are actually betting on military companies supported by the new generation of venture capital. I hate that you might become a warmonger, but I know this situation could happen because when I invested in Uber, you would defend it at all costs. It's natural, like with your child; you would protect it, so your stance will change with the investment object. I still have this emotional connection to any company related to Benchmark, and I'm not sure if I will ever lose that feeling. This is reality, and it's how the world operates.

In terms of technology itself, I find some non-LLM directions very exciting. I'm looking forward to seeing what breakthroughs robotic intelligence can achieve. I hope we can make progress in the healthcare field. I don't think all diseases will disappear in ten years, as some AI founders say. I think that's an exaggeration, but the process will be interesting. As you said, I use these things every day. The speed of change is the fastest I've seen in my career. If you miss a week of news, a week later it feels like you've entered another world.

Patrick: You just mentioned the defense startup ecosystem. I want to expand this to the physical world and hard tech ecosystems, many of which are unrelated to war, such as mining companies, etc. What do you think about this type of company? They are undoubtedly tech companies, usually operating in large markets, but with high capital density, taking a long time from investment to revenue. For example, nuclear fusion, fission, etc. What are your thoughts on this type of private market tech investment? I know you haven't invested much in these types of projects before, and maybe you don't like them?

Bill: As a rule of thumb, if I were a professor, I would say you can study these areas mathematically, and the returns are usually not high. You can look back—15 or 20 years ago, there was a lot of venture capital flowing into solar energy, and the results were not good. The only exception is anything involving Elon Musk. So SpaceX and Tesla are data points, but they are both exceptions and are related to Elon.

I think we can only determine if this is feasible once we see four or five successful cases not led by Elon. I've learned and heard a lot about his execution and development speed in these companies, and I'm not sure if others can do it. If they can and succeed, it would certainly be good for the world. By the way, we also see that when capital is abundant, people are more willing to invest in businesses with low capital efficiency; these two are related.

So another thing to watch is whether people will still be interested if capital tightens. Many of these businesses involve regulation, and if we can't use Chinese resources, mining becomes more attractive. I hate this part of the world. A few years ago, I gave a talk on regulatory capture when no one in Silicon Valley was going to Washington. And now everyone is going—"Hill and Valley," etc. So this is another element that perhaps should be placed in my "real world."

Patrick: It seems this is the trend—companies supported by venture capital and early private markets, facing large regulated industries, will ultimately be "processed." For example, Anduril is now valued at about $30 billion; although it's not at the level of SpaceX, it's still significant—do you think this counts as another data point indicating that we can indeed achieve success in companies that require substantial capital?

Bill: Undoubtedly, from a regulatory perspective, it is indeed so. Historically, companies in these industries have struggled to break through, primarily due to regulation. Before Tesla, there were attempts to build cars like Seven Motors, but they all failed. I think many were stuck due to regulation.

So Anduril being approved by the U.S. Department of Defense and actively selling to the military is definitely a new data point, and it's very commendable for startups. But I don't think this means all venture capital should rush into these tracks. It's difficult. If you can create a software company, or as people often say, a social networking company that can quickly grow revenue and profits, that path is much easier than what we're discussing now.

Patrick: Are there any other ecological sub-sectors, company types, investment strategies, or dynamics that we haven't discussed that particularly interest you?

Bill: If I were still an active GP, I would consider verticals in AI, thinking about where AI excels. AI is very strong in language, and coding is actually a more refined form of language, so AI is stronger in programming, and these areas are all important. There has already been a lot of exploration in fields like law and customer service. But I think there are still some areas that have not been fully explored. This intersection is very interesting to me.

How to Fix System Failures: Advice for Founders

Patrick: Returning to the LP perspective and the systemic issues in the capital markets we discussed at the beginning, what do you think will happen in the next five years? You've described the reality and various incentives (or lack thereof). What do you think will happen next?

Bill: My intuition is that we do have problems. Although I've had some success in venture capital, I've always been more of an analyst than an optimist. I am naturally inclined toward critical thinking, so my bias is on this side. Someone could certainly counter me by saying Gurley always predicts downturns and so on.

But my intuition is that we do have problems. The current system is leading to worse liquidity, fewer traditional high-quality companies being built, and faster burn rates. From my perspective, this is not a good combination. And all of this is self-reinforcing; all the components are interacting with each other, and unless there is a change at the LP level, I don't see a corrective mechanism. I think we will only become more entrenched in this cycle.

You may have seen a video by Josh Kopelman where he derived this problem with very simple GP math.

Patrick: Yes, the one he did with Jack Altman. Yes, I've seen it.

Bill: It's about a three-minute video. Maybe we can share it. I find it hard to disagree with the points he makes in the video. It's very simple math. This system currently looks unsustainable. Given the prices we are paying, the money being spent, and the conditions required to achieve historical levels of venture capital returns, the situation is difficult to resolve.

Patrick: What would happen if there were a reset? Suppose we could bring the pricing mechanism of the public markets to all assets, resulting in a large-scale price reset. What would happen afterward? What do you think are the pros and cons of this "reset"?

Bill: I find it hard to imagine. I think most people would feel it would be terrible. I've experienced a few resets, and one interesting thing—when I was an active GP, I was actually calmer and happier during resets, feeling more accomplished and efficient in my work. It wasn't as good during the bubble period. Some people might prefer the bubble, like sales-oriented people who enjoy that lively atmosphere. But I find that discussions about company building are more efficient and authentic during reset periods.

When the internet bubble burst, the pretenders left Silicon Valley. There was a joke at the time that B2C and B2B turned into "Back to Consulting" and "Back to Banking," because money was hard to come by, and opportunists left. I don't like these people; they didn't participate for the right reasons, liked to overhype, overfinance, and over-involve themselves in the secondary market, leaving a mess behind. I don't like that, but in this fast-paced world, it's also part of it. If the market corrects, people will look for new opportunities. One of the reasons for this situation is that everyone has studied history, understands the effects of compounding, network effects, and cyclical cycles, and has seen booms and busts. Do you remember how long the stock market drop lasted at the beginning of COVID?

Patrick: About three weeks, right?

Bill: Yes, and then everyone started bottom-fishing. So I suspect that the confidence in the AI field is high enough that even if people feel AI is overvalued for six months, it will quickly rebound.

Patrick: If you were to start a brand new investment company now, what do you think are the most important factors in building a brand? We are in a new era, with some emerging private market companies like Thrive, Greenoaks, a16z, Ribbit, etc., founded around 2010, now very large and prestigious. They each have their own way of building a brand. What advice would you give to new investors starting this year who hope to become like these companies in twelve years?

Bill: Your comment reminds me of a point that is unrelated to your question.

Patrick: That's fine.

Bill: Another negative impact of systemic issues is that some companies rely on writing big checks of $300 million to "beg" to get on the shareholder list, and their differentiation is becoming the best friend of the founders. It's easy for me to say this because I no longer write checks, and no one will stop me from being a director because of what I say, so it doesn't matter.

But they won't take on the responsibility of "helping you make better decisions." They will never say "no." An extreme example is the SBF FTX incident; no one went to the board, and everyone believed he didn't misappropriate funds, and in the end, it collapsed. In fact, having someone who can "call a halt" at critical moments and push for unit economic models is very useful. I'm worried that such "contrarian voices" are becoming increasingly rare now.

The best CEOs, like Barton (former CEO of Zillow), Benioff (CEO of Salesforce), and even Mark from Meta, have all said that they believe going public makes them operate more efficiently. Another negative impact of long-term privatization of companies is that they don't receive this kind of feedback.

Back to your question, I don't know how to answer. It's hard to imagine starting this journey over again, given the reasons mentioned earlier. So I can only temporarily skip this question.

Patrick: I'm glad my question sparked that thought from you; it was very valuable. Can you leave a few words for the founders? I always want to return to the founders because without them doing the work, none of this matters.

Bill: I completely agree.

Patrick: Founders may now be facing the best entrepreneurial environment ever, with the most tools, the most exciting technology, and capital willing to support them. As an investor who has directly supported many great companies, can you give them some advice on opportunities and ways of thinking?

Bill: If you are lucky enough to be in a hot company, in the world we are discussing, I would offer a few pieces of advice.

First, unit economics will eventually become important. But that doesn't mean you need to account for every penny right now. As mentioned earlier, the model prices from two generations ago were only one percent of what they are now. You can plan for a future shift to that kind of model; that's fine. I think it's okay to burn money now, but unit economics will eventually become core. You still need to scale the company and operate efficiently. I find that many founders view certain operational capabilities as "bureaucracy," thinking that it's something only big companies do, not the original intent of entrepreneurship. But when your revenue exceeds $100 million or even $1 billion, you can't operate without these capabilities. This applies in any cycle, but it's especially important in times of abundant capital.

One of my favorite people, Reid Hoffman, wrote an article about Uber using the metaphor of "pirates and navies," saying that all startups start as pirates but eventually have to become navies. This is true. For some, this transition is uncomfortable, but you must find a way that works for you.

Another related thought is that Ben Horowitz also wrote a great blog, saying they only want to support founders who can stick it out. This statement is cleverly written because founders love to hear it. But in reality, every venture capital firm feels the same way because changing CEOs has a 50% chance of failure, and no one wants to take that risk. But in that article, there are two or three paragraphs that say, "Of course, the premise is that the founder is willing to learn how to lead." I think we often overlook this in our industry—founders are not necessarily born to lead a team of a thousand people. Some people spend their whole lives studying how to manage organizations. Only a very few founders, maybe thirty or so, have the opportunity to work with Bill Campbell and learn how to lead. This is not innate, nor is it free; you have to be determined to learn. Some personality types find it very difficult. I had a great conversation with Michael Dell; he made it work, and for a time, he felt he didn't want to do it, but then he found a way to do it that made him happy. It's really hard.

Finally, two more points. First, network effects are real, and if you pay attention to them, you can make them stronger. If you are in a hot market, growth is everywhere, and it's easy to overlook network effects. But you need to think: does your business have some kind of "data byproduct" or other mechanisms? For example, if you have a thousand customers, when you grow to two thousand customers, the experience of the two-thousandth customer should be better than that of the first thousand. Can you design this mechanism into the system? If you can do that, it will have a huge impact on the long-term success of the company.

Patrick: How do you think this can be achieved in the AI era? Is it mainly a data issue? Allowing products to naturally generate more data to enhance their own capabilities?

Bill: Suppose you are serving a functional vertical. If the learning outcomes of one customer can become the learning outcomes of the entire customer base, and everyone benefits, that is very powerful. I think this is entirely feasible. For example, there are some AI legal companies I haven't invested in; they study all the litigation input information and also research all the case law and legal history. AI will do certain things, and if there is human involvement, you will find failure points and continuously improve the model. This kind of mechanism will allow the leaders to run faster and faster as long as the model continues to improve.

Patrick: Do you think AI will make consumer internet investment-worthy again?** Since the mobile internet era, U.S. VCs have paid little attention to the consumer sector, and capital has flowed there very little. Do you think AI will make this field attractive again?

Bill: Some researchers have studied new phenomena emerging in China that may indicate this; I should do more homework. We actually had an early attempt with Character.ai. But the first wave of LLMs had two issues that made them unsuitable for the consumer sector: the first is voice capability, which is improving; the second is memory capability, which is also improving, although it's being achieved outside the main model, but that's okay; it will eventually be integrated into the context window.

As these capabilities improve—many of the early negative feedback on Character.ai was "it doesn't really understand you"—so the network effects, learning improvements, and switching costs are not obvious. I can completely imagine the plot of the movie "Her" coming to fruition—that was truly a forward-thinking film. I would be very surprised if four or five such companies don't emerge next year. Perhaps this is the "reverse opportunity" we've been looking for—most of the energy in the U.S. is focused on the enterprise side, and there may really be a big opportunity on the consumer side.

Patrick: Bill, it's been so interesting talking to you. Maybe we should do a market status update every few years; since you're no longer directly doing this for LPs, we can do it for the whole industry. Thank you for sharing your experiences and insights with us.

Bill: Of course, I know the LP community is very interested in what you are doing, Patrick. If anyone has feedback on what I said, wants to correct me, or has any suggestions, feel free to reach out. I really enjoy this industry and hope my sharing is useful. I'm currently in a "giving back to society" phase and am very willing to help.

Patrick: We will send out the signal. Bill, thank you very much for your time.

Bill: Good.

免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。