Following the previous article "Sun Yuchen's Lecture 9 Years Ago Shook the Internet: Why Not Buy a House, Not Buy a Car, Not Get Married?", after a deep interpretation of Sun Yuchen's "Three No Principles", we found that behind this seemingly extreme life choice lies a more grand thinking system: his deep reflection on the essence of wealth, the changes of the times, and the positioning of individuals in the historical tide.

"Not buying a house, not buying a car, not getting married" is just the surface; what is truly worth discussing is: how does Sun Yuchen understand wealth? What insights does he have regarding the dilemmas of wealth creation and inheritance in Chinese society? Why can't Chinese people become rich, and why can't wealth last beyond three generations? What are the institutional and cultural roots behind this? In his view, what kind of era transformation are we experiencing? Why did he recognize Trump's election as president nine years ago?

The answers to these questions are also hidden in Sun Yuchen's audio course "The Path to Financial Freedom Revolution" from nine years ago. At that life juncture when he had just graduated from Peking University and returned from studying in the United States, Sun Yuchen's thoughts explained his personal concept of wealth. Over the years, he has indeed validated his judgments through practice.

For ease of reading, Rhythm BlockBeats continues to make minimal edits and reorganization based on the original audio. Here is a complete presentation of Sun Yuchen's wealth value system.

1. Question: Why do you say this is a new era? What kind of social transformation are we experiencing?

Sun Yuchen: Li Ao once wrote a book specifically criticizing the Kuomintang's so-called "power structure distribution"—he called it "the linkage of reproductive organs." Although the words are harsh, they hit the nail on the head: the closer one is to Chiang Kai-shek's reproductive organ, the greater their power. Why could Song Ziwen become the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the President of the Bank of China, and the Minister of Finance? Isn't it because Chiang Kai-shek married his sister? The reasoning is straightforward. On a broader scale, fifty years ago, the power distribution in many parts of China often relied on this power structure logic: from governing a country to managing a city or even a family, political families emerged endlessly. Essentially, this is related to "industrial society based on family units."

Here, I would like to quote a sentence I really like, from Wilde (which Underwood also said in "House of Cards"): Everything in the world is about sex, except sex. Sex is about power. This means that in traditional society, almost everything in the world revolves around "sex and reproduction"; only "sex itself/reproduction itself" is not about sex, but about power.

Why say "everything is about sex and reproduction"? Because agricultural and industrial societies based on family units essentially revolve around the arrangement of resources for reproduction and family interests. Each person's life path: when reaching marriageable age, one must marry; after marriage, one must have children; after having children, one must provide education, housing, and inheritance for them. These almost all revolve around the logic of "sex and reproduction." When you look back at every step you've taken, every penny you've earned, every choice you've made, are they not all serving this purpose?

On a national level, it is similar. For two to three thousand years in feudal society, power distribution was not based on ability but on the primogeniture system—who's surname and background determined who held power. Resource distribution and power distribution are essentially a chain of "sex—bloodline—power." Even within families, it is the same. Recently, I went back to my hometown in Shandong to look through the family tree; women had no inheritance rights and could not even enter the family tree—this is a direct manifestation of "sex is about power": surnames and power are highly intertwined. We often decide who dominates a family or a class not by "ability or contribution," but more by bloodline and background, which is the underlying logic of a family-based society.

Today, we are at the juncture of transitioning from the "family/sex—power" logic to the "individual/ability—network" logic. Therefore, I repeatedly emphasize the need for strategic awareness: in this intergenerational transformation, those who first understand, act, and reconstruct themselves as "individual-based, leveraging networks" producers are more likely to avoid pitfalls and seize opportunities in the fluctuations of the next two to three decades.

I believe that the shift from power-based distribution to money-based distribution is itself a great achievement. So, returning to the topic of "why is this a new era?" we are essentially transitioning from a society dominated by sex and power to one dominated by money and freedom.

Thus, I think if anyone deeply understands the ideas in this chapter, they will arrive at a dichotomy: anything related to sexual power is backward and should be discarded, while anything related to money and freedom should be encouraged and is progressive. If you understand this, you can analyze the various aspects of your life and the choices you make, and I believe you will have many of your own thoughts.

2. Question: What are the essential characteristics and features of this transformation?

Sun Yuchen: The earlier quote from Wilde: "Everything in the world is about sex; sex is about power" has clearly articulated the underlying logic of traditional society.

However, as time progresses, this system is retreating. Although it remains a mainstream form in contemporary society, its specific manifestations are changing. For example, the old notion that women cannot enter family trees or work no longer exists; power distribution is no longer solely determined by "proximity to the core," although similar phenomena are still common. What force is changing this? Borrowing Wilde's phrasing, I summarize the new society as: "Everything in the world is about money, except money; money is about freedom."

What does this translate to? It means that everything in today's society is about money. We must note that we have transitioned from sex and reproduction to money, and beyond money, money is about freedom. First, it is easy to understand why everything in this world is about money. I believe this is something everyone can feel more deeply than I can explain, but do not misunderstand this understanding as saying everything is for money; it is not that simple. You must note that it has replaced reproduction and sex, meaning that the forces that may determine various aspects of this world in the future are shifting from reproductive to monetary.

We can see some early signs, for instance, some people work hard their whole lives not necessarily to get married and have children, but to contribute more to humanity and earn more money. I believe you have started to notice such individuals. Do not underestimate the significance of not getting married; it is quite substantial as it fundamentally challenges the previous structure of human society. Think about it: if a person chooses not to marry, they essentially abandon the basic functions of industrial production and society based on family units. In the past, everything in the world was about sex; if you are not engaging in sex, then you are likely to focus all your energy on yourself and on personal matters. Since I have no children and no parents to care for, I only care about myself, humanity, and even the development of society as a whole. This gives your existence a new meaning.

Another example from around us: many rural girls still come to the city to work, sending most of their money back home—to support their parents and pay for their younger brother's education. Why has "supporting the younger brother" become her natural obligation? From a boundary perspective, this should be a responsibility for the brother or parents. But in the traditional structure, this is a typical power distribution of "female sacrifice subsidizing male": women are seen as resources that can be traded or drawn upon. In such situations, my advice is usually very decisive: first, clarify the boundaries with parents and the brother—our relationship is purely familial, and family ties should not be bound by money; each should bear their own responsibilities. I will fulfill my filial duties but will not provide unlimited subsidies. If this cannot be communicated, decisively stop the financial support when necessary.

From this perspective, as money becomes involved in social distribution and becomes the mainstream resource determining social forms and evaluating people, everyone has unprecedented freedom. This is why we often say "money is about freedom." The meaning of this latter statement is that there are basically only two ways to judge people in society: one is based on sex, and the other can only be based on money.

A simple example: we often hear about the U.S. elections; when we were in school, people often said, "Oh, the U.S. elections are manipulated by money, and money manipulation is bad." But what was the manipulation before money? Before money manipulation, it was only sex manipulation. So this is an example of the transition from "sex is about power" to "money is about freedom."

3. Question: Why is it always difficult for the poor in China to become rich? Even when they do become rich, why do the wealthy in China never seem to last beyond three generations?

Sun Yuchen: These two questions are indeed very interesting. At that time, we discussed this extensively with the board member Shen Guojun at Lakeview University.

First, let's look at the situation in Europe and America. Many families in Europe and America, not to mention three generations, have thrived for over ten generations, and some have lasted for over a thousand years—like the Rothschilds, Rockefellers, DuPonts, etc., who have survived wars and economic crises. The United States has only been established for a little over 200 years, but the history of many families' prosperity even predates the history of the country. Looking at our neighbor Japan, many businesses have been passed down from the Edo period to today, still thriving.

In 2006, Hurun released a list of "the world's oldest family businesses," which counted 100 enduring family enterprises. The top-ranked is "Kongō Gumi," a temple construction company in Osaka, Japan, which has been passed down for 40 generations and has a history of over 1,400 years. The companies on the list are mainly concentrated in Europe, the United States, and Japan, with the UK, France, and the US ranking first, second, and third, with 17, 16, and 15 companies respectively, and Japan having 10. Even the company ranked 100th has a history of over 225 years.

In contrast, in China, not to mention 200 years ago, even the wealthy families from fifty or sixty years ago—such as the patriotic entrepreneurs Zhang Jian and Lu Zuofu mentioned in history books—have seen their families and businesses largely vanish. Today, most of China's wealthy are self-made "first-generation rich," and even "second-generation rich" are still rare, only just beginning to emerge in recent years. It is quite puzzling: claiming to be a civilization with a history of five thousand years, there are hardly any "second-generation rich," and "third-generation rich" are virtually nonexistent. When we occasionally hear about "third-generation rich," they are mostly families returning from Hong Kong or overseas, while local families are still stuck at the second generation. In contrast, many families in Europe and America (especially on the European continent) have been passed down for an average of 20 to 40 generations. The saying "wealth does not last beyond three generations" is indeed a uniquely Chinese phenomenon.

Upon deeper reflection, it becomes even more perplexing: my grandfather was wealthy, my father was wealthy, and I am wealthy, yet why does my son's fortune plummet? Not only wealth, but even life itself is hard to guarantee. We often say, "Standing on the shoulders of giants allows one to see further," but in China, standing on the shoulders of the wealthy can lead to a quicker demise. This issue has long troubled the wealthy in China. Some may say, "I'm not wealthy; isn't it a good thing that the rich have fallen?" But one must understand that in a country, everyone is like grasshoppers on the same rope: if the wealthy cannot retain their wealth, it is also very difficult for the poor to accumulate and become rich.

China has a civilization spanning five thousand years, and its people are very hardworking. Surveys show that Chinese employees work an average of 8.66 hours a day, higher than the vast majority of major economies, far exceeding developed countries like Germany, France, and Switzerland, and even surpassing developing countries like Mexico and Costa Rica. Yet why are there still so many poor people in China, with many remaining in poverty for extended periods? Of course, in the past forty years, China has experienced rapid poverty alleviation: forty years ago, we were among the poorest, and now the label of "poorest" has been passed on to some African countries. But the reality remains: there are still many poor people, and the wealth gap is widening.

So, why can't hardworking Chinese people become rich? Why is it that even when they do become wealthy, they cannot "last beyond three generations"? These are indeed two "heavenly questions." CEO of Himalaya, Lao Yu, once discussed this with me, and he himself couldn't figure it out: why are Chinese people hardworking yet not wealthy? I am only 26 years old this year, a post-90s generation, so my answer may not be authoritative. However, I believe the true answers to these two questions are as important to the nation and the people as those "big questions" we often mention—space exploration, aircraft carriers, reclaiming Taiwan, world dominance, and so on. When can Chinese people become wealthy through hard work and retain that wealth long-term? The significance of this matter is even greater than national strength and the rise of the nation.

During a discussion at Lakeview University, Shen Guojun, chairman of Intime Group, raised this question, and many classmates provided answers. I also shared my views, which he strongly agreed with at the time. Today, I will share my thoughts.

From a macro perspective, the core reason why Chinese people cannot become wealthy and cannot last beyond three generations is simple: the entire society's indifference to and trampling of wealth and property rights. It is only natural to think: if one does not take wealth seriously from the heart, how can they possibly retain it for the long term? To put it simply, Chinese people do not regard "money" as a sacred thing, nor do they believe that property rights are inviolable.

So what do Chinese people consider sacred? Clues can be seen from online public opinion: for example, if a girl gets married not for the first time, some people see this as "a grave sin" and will launch fierce attacks; another example is when Tencent creates a software that is accused of "plagiarism," critics can tear it apart; yet another example is when a natural disaster occurs, if someone does not donate, even if they propose "limited donations" like Wang Shi did back in the day, they will be mercilessly criticized. Those who experienced the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake know that Wang Shi was almost criticized to the lowest point of his life, nearly resigning from Vanke.

However, upon closer inspection, the people being criticized in these three examples are actually morally blameless, and it is even hard to say they are "wrong." First, whether a woman is marrying for the first time is an exercise of personal bodily rights; as long as both parties are willing and communicate truthfully, it is a normal act of free love. If there is a "wrong," it only lies in whether there is deception, not in "whether it is the first time" itself. Second, is Tencent guilty of plagiarism? Over the years, people have gradually formed a more just perspective. The WeChat we use every day was initially inspired by MiTalk. In the business world, product competition is essentially a market mechanism; what should really be considered is: how to improve the product based on originality and better serve users, rather than "I did it first, you can't do it." Plagiarism is certainly unethical and illegal in academic research, but in business practice, "borrowing and surpassing" is the norm. Tencent and Apple have both refined their ideas to the extreme through learning and iteration, serving a broader consumer base. Even if Tencent "copies" my product in the future, it serves as motivation for me, proving that my product is good. I will work harder to improve it; if I am defeated because of this, I will not blame Tencent. Third, in the face of natural disasters, whether to donate is a matter of personal property freedom. Society can advocate for mutual assistance, but insisting on "not donating" is also a freedom that should not be morally coerced.

From this, it can be seen that Chinese people particularly love to entangle themselves in morally irrelevant trivialities, even elevating some matters that do not even constitute "moral issues" to a moral height. The question of whether to eat dog meat is similar. Every year, the Yulin Dog Meat Festival becomes a focal point of public opinion. To say something that might lose me followers: no matter how "noble" dogs are, they are essentially pets, a type of commodity; there is no legal concept of "right to life" for them (at least within the current legal framework). Whether to eat dog meat is a personal choice. Currently, human society only explicitly protects "humans from being eaten" at the level of human rights; whether animals are consumed or not falls more within the realm of personal and social customs. Yet every year, there are many people who stop dog transport vehicles—thankfully, pigs are not "cute" enough; otherwise, even pig transport vehicles would be stopped, and there might be no meat on everyone's dining tables. It is evident that we expend a lot of energy on these trivial matters, elevating unnecessary "details" to an extreme.

Conversely, the things that should be sacredly defended—property rights—are often treated with indifference. The most worthy of protection in this world is the property that each person legally owns. Even a single copper coin, as long as it belongs to someone, deserves the respect and protection of society; once it is robbed, it should provoke public outrage, as it constitutes a violation of social bottom lines that everyone should condemn. Even the perpetrator of the encroachment should be condemned in conscience and should not find peace.

But is this the case in today's China? Clearly not. Many people feel entitled to occupy others' property, even taking pride in it. In daily life, everyone has borrowed money to some extent; perhaps you have also defaulted on a debt, promising to repay in a month, only to delay various excuses when the time comes, or even outright refuse to pay. The popular saying online, "I borrowed money based on my ability; why should I pay it back?" sounds like a joke, but it is not; there are too many such people in reality. The essence is: they fundamentally do not take "money" seriously, nor do they regard "not repaying borrowed money" as a serious matter.

Think about it: not repaying a debt is certainly not on the same legal level as "murder and arson," but in terms of damaging social order and infringing on others' rights, the nature is not light. Ordinary people, let alone murder, would feel guilty even for killing a chicken; yet when it comes to "not repaying borrowed money," many people feel no remorse. Even more tragically, when you share your experience of being defaulted on with others, you should logically receive understanding and support, but the result is often: "Just let it go; it's only a few hundred bucks; consider it charity; don't be so calculative." Thus, what was originally an effort to protect one's sacred property rights is instead labeled as "being petty and not magnanimous." This is the most ridiculous and tragic reality of the present.

In Western countries, property rights are sacred and cannot be trampled upon. Thus, there is a term in the West called "trust." What is a trust? For example, I, Sun Yuchen, as a trustee, after a friend's death, manage the trust to take care of his children. In China, in such situations, one might superficially say: "Give me the money, brother; you can rest assured; I will take good care of the children." But who knows, you might just leave, and they could immediately occupy your property along with your wife and children.

Would the Western trust system work this way? Of course not. The trustee has sworn before God, "To take on the trust is to fulfill the duty," and they uphold their promise for a lifetime. This is why there are trust institutions and organizations in the West that have lasted for hundreds or even thousands of years.

Some readers might say: "Doesn't China also have 'trust'?" But in this magical land, Western trusts have been turned into financial products. "Buying a trust" often refers to fixed-income financial products with an annualized return of 8%, which is not at all the wealth inheritance trust in the Western sense. Chinese people have almost no concept of true trusts and do not trust "trusts" very much. From this perspective, we essentially do not have a real trust.

In the West, money and property are as sacred as God, and faith is closely linked to trust. Earning money is the highest reward for one's soul. As Max Weber said in "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," this is the core of capitalism: earning money brings one closer to God and elevates one's morality.

In contrast, what is popular in China is another narrative: "Isn't it just a couple of stinky coins? Being rich is unkind!"—thus "robbing" becomes justice. The "logic" of Chinese people often is: having money is a sin in itself, and you must explain "why you are wealthy." In Europe and America, it is precisely the opposite: being poor is the original sin; the poor must repent before God: "I have been too lazy and not diligent enough, which has led to my poverty."

In China, it is reversed: the wealthy must repent, not to God, but to those who are preparing to rob them. Under this traditional moral value system, property rights have been long suppressed, and every half-century or even shorter, there will be a large-scale "property reshuffle." Many wealthy people not only cannot protect their property but also cannot protect their lives; this is no longer a matter of "wealth not lasting beyond three generations," but rather "not living beyond three generations."

It sounds terrifying: in this land, once you become wealthy, the likely outcome is this—if you are lucky, you may die a good death; if your son is also lucky, he may die a good death; by the time it reaches your grandson, the probability of a "good death" is basically zero. For those who do not believe it, just look at history.

Taking the past two hundred years as an example: about 200 years ago, in 1817, in just over thirty years, the Taiping Rebellion would break out. Hong Xiuquan led a group of rebels who "took pleasure in robbing," almost wiping out the wealthy in Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, and the entire area south of the Yangtze River (Li Xiucheng and others once marched north and almost reached Beijing).

Do you think, "Fortunately, I am in the north"? You can dodge the first day but not the fifteenth: the Nian Rebellion, the Hui People's Uprising, the White Lotus Society, and the Red Lantern Society are all waiting for you. The Nian Army (1851–1868) swept through the Huang-Huai region; the Shaanxi-Gansu Hui People's Uprising (1862–1873) ravaged Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Gansu.

By the time the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s were slightly more stable, there were the Eight-Nation Alliance and the Xinhai Revolution, followed by years of warlord chaos. During this time, not to mention ordinary people being unable to retain wealth, even the last emperor, Puyi, could not protect his own. It is important to note that Puyi's private property was explicitly stated in the "Conditions for the Favorable Treatment of the Qing Dynasty"—"The private property of the Qing emperor is specially protected by the government." Yet, just a few years after this "special" protection, in 1924, Feng Yuxiang expelled Puyi from the Forbidden City, giving him three hours to leave the palace, or else he would be bombarded. The originally agreed "annual allowance of 2.4 million taels of silver" was casually changed to "an annual subsidy of 500,000 yuan."

The "Conditions for Favorable Treatment" also stated: "The Qing emperor's ancestral temples and tombs are forever sealed, with guards for protection." But who took this seriously? The warlord Sun Dianying directly looted the tombs of the Qianlong Emperor and Empress Dowager Cixi, robbing them of gold, silver, and jewels. Later, not only did he face no consequences, but he was also promoted and given titles. At that time, he distributed the stolen goods as gifts, and "the law does not punish the many," so high society gladly accepted them, with few people condemning "this is robbery." The treaty became a joke. Even more amusing is that even Puyi, the one who was robbed, seemed not to take it seriously.

There is a historical photo from 1961: during the 50th anniversary of the Xinhai Revolution, Lu Zhonglin, Puyi, and Xiong Bingkun posed together, laughing and joking. Puyi was the last emperor, and Xiong Bingkun was the one who fired the first shot in the Wuchang Uprising; the two of them posing together is understandable; but Lu Zhonglin? He served as the commander of the Kyoto garrison in 1924, ordered by Feng Yuxiang to expel Puyi from the Forbidden City. This is an outright "robber." Yet the two could still embrace and take a photo together, laughing as if robbery were just child's play.

If even the robbed do not take robbery seriously, and even the Qing emperor cannot protect his own property, how can ordinary people's wealth be preserved in such turbulent times? The answer is self-evident.

We just discussed the core reasons why Chinese people cannot become wealthy and cannot last beyond three generations from a macro perspective. Now, from a micro perspective, I believe the root of the phenomenon lies in: many people cannot distinguish the boundaries between individuals and do not understand the value of personal existence in the world. In the previous chapter on "Family Boundaries," we talked about the importance of distinguishing boundaries. Here, I want to say that rampant robbery is fundamentally related to blurred boundaries. Think about it: why do some people dare to rob strangers without restraint? The core reason is simple: they dare to "rob" even their own family members. We often joke, "I can even hit myself," right? If they can turn on themselves, how could they not dare to act against you? If they can act against their own father, son, husband, or wife without batting an eye, robbing a stranger is just a matter of minutes. Therefore, such robberies often spread from close relationships to distant ones. The phenomenon of "loving and killing each other" in Chinese families precisely illustrates this point.

Now, why is there no hesitation in infringing on property rights? Because many times, even "human rights" are not taken seriously. A significant number of parents treat their children as their own appendages, and many children also treat their parents as their own appendages. You are merely "a person in the family," and in their eyes, you are not "an independent person." Thus, trampling on your human rights becomes a perfectly normal thing. Parents interfere in their children's marriages, simplifying marriage to exorbitant bride prices; they demand that children send money every month; children also unrestrainedly interfere with their parents, demanding that parents solve housing and car issues for them; they even interfere with whether their parents should remarry or divorce. If even close relatives can brazenly "rob" each other, infringing on strangers becomes even more commonplace. It's like the saying we often hear: not robbing is foolish. Everyone rushes to "rob," embodying a kind of A Q-style bravado of "the monk can touch me, but I cannot touch him."

This is the clear boundary between individuals that we repeatedly emphasize. Whether a person's basic human rights—including the right to life and property—can receive respect and recognition from society does not primarily depend on outsiders but on whether their parents, spouses, children, siblings, and extended family recognize them. If these people do not respect your human rights or acknowledge your right to control your own life, how can you expect to gain recognition and protection from society as a whole?

Sadly, in today's China, many people cannot distinguish family boundaries and do not understand what it means to respect human rights. Take a nearly universal example: domestic violence. In Western countries, once domestic violence occurs—whether a husband hits a wife or a father hits a child—any victim can immediately call the police, and the police will arrive promptly and handle the situation according to the law, often without the burden of proof falling on the victim. If the police arrive and find that the woman has injuries, they will arrest the man first; the man must hire a lawyer and pay a hefty bail to be released. Even if released, the judge usually issues a protection order for the woman; during the protection order period, even if the husband returns home, he cannot threaten the wife and may even be prohibited from returning home or contacting her. If he reoffends, he will be arrested again immediately. At the same time, if the woman has no income, the man must also pay alimony. This shows that Western society has a very clear understanding of protecting family boundaries.

In mainland China, too many people grow up in environments of domestic violence. Family arguments and physical conflicts are often ignored by the police, who frequently brush them off with the saying, "A good official finds it hard to resolve family matters." Even if they do intervene, it is often seen as a matter for the neighborhood committee or extended family, not wanting to occupy "precious police resources," and at most, they focus on education and mediation. Thus, it can be seen that while the West treats "people as people," here, once the other party is your father, husband, or family member, you are "not a person" in their eyes. Even for a long time, "marital rape" was not considered rape. If a man rapes a woman and the police arrive, as long as he says, "I am her husband/boyfriend," the matter is often settled. Even more absurdly, when a scammer or human trafficker abducts a woman on the street, their usual trick when stopped by bystanders is to say, "I am her boyfriend/husband." Sometimes they add, "She cheated on me." At this point, bystanders not only do not help the victim but instead applaud and even assist the perpetrator. Such cases are not uncommon, to the point that they have been adapted into TV dramas. For example, similar scenes appear in "Psychological Crime" and Liu Tao's "Next Stop Marriage": the woman clearly does not know the man, but the crowd believes the "relative's" one-sided story, and the prejudice against the "cheating woman" is poured onto her, drowning out her defense in applause, with even legitimate resistance being labeled as the shameless behavior of a "bad woman."

It can be seen that in the minds of many, as long as someone is a "husband/wife," they can be disposed of at will. If you search on Weibo for "beating a mistress in public" or "live-streaming infidelity," there are countless examples; few people step in to stop women from being stripped and beaten in broad daylight. Many even feel, "Isn't this just right? It aligns with my values." In contrast, in Europe and America, even if the other party really "cheated," that is still a moral issue; you have no right to infringe on another person's personal freedom and right to life. The police will immediately control the perpetrator, and bystanders' first reaction is often to intervene and call the police.

Therefore, many feminists call for anti-domestic violence measures. I believe their understanding of "domestic violence" can be deeper: it is not merely "male chauvinism," but rather a lack of respect for human rights and the right to life in society as a whole. If a person does not respect the right to life, you cannot expect them to respect property rights.

Now, let's look at property boundaries. Many families have very unclear divisions regarding property. A few days ago, I saw a case on Zhihu: the parents were getting older and could not take out a loan to buy a house, so they bought it in their daughter's name. Half of the down payment was made by the father, and the parents planned to bear the subsequent repayments, with the house intended for their retirement. Because the property certificate was in the daughter's name, the father asked her to write him an IOU. The daughter felt hurt: she subconsciously believed that the house "was originally mine," and the money her parents contributed "was essentially mine." Some even asked how to "get their parents to pay the down payment." Others openly expressed resentment towards their parents: it wasn't that their parents harmed them, but rather "they were two years late." Originally, they could have lived in a 100-square-meter big house, but now they could only live in a 60-square-meter small place, so "I really hate them." You see, parents gave you money for the down payment, and because they "were two years late," you want to "get rid of them." This is the reality: a lack of the most basic respect for life and property rights.

Sartre said, "Hell is other people," and in such scenarios, it is not an exaggeration. We claim to be a nation of propriety and righteousness, but the degree of respect for individual rights and human rights sometimes may not be much better than that of some backward tribes.

So to summarize, we can see more clearly: the reason why Chinese people cannot become wealthy and cannot last beyond three generations is deeply rooted in the overall indifference of society towards individual rights; and often, the first to trample on your rights are those closest to you. Therefore, our program always advocates a viewpoint: a person is a team. Their rights to life and property are supreme, and no one, no public opinion has the right to trample on them. When can China truly achieve this, only then can it become a civilized and mature capitalist country like Europe and America: where every poor person can become wealthy through hard work, and the wealthy can effectively protect their wealth and pass it down through generations; only then will China become a land of prosperity and a truly strong nation.

4. Question: What will be the main crises in the next two to three decades? What crises are coming?

Sun Yuchen: The first layer of crisis is the endogenous structural crisis of the Chinese economy itself. In simple terms, after so many years of rapid economic growth, China will inevitably enter a period of stagnation, or even phase negative growth—this is as normal as human aging and death. Just look at the growth curves of developed countries like the United States and Japan: when a country's GDP and per capita GDP reach a certain threshold, the growth rate will naturally decline. Therefore, we need to have such psychological expectations: China's overall environment will enter a long-term stagnation, low growth, and even phase negative growth. This is a "big premise" that all Chinese adults must seriously recognize, as it will profoundly affect our career choices, asset allocation, and family decisions. Reflecting on the overall atmosphere of the past forty years of reform and opening up, we grew up in a strong sense of optimism; the future may not continue to be so optimistic. If my children, parents, and I have to live in an environment of long-term low growth and a lack of new growth points, how should we allocate our assets? How should we plan our lives? This is the first question that must be seriously considered.

The second layer of crisis is the overall change in industrial structure. China's past main engines were industry, real estate, and a series of upstream and downstream industries driven by them, while foreign trade was also a key engine. However, these engines have phase characteristics—this is evident when looking at South Korea and Taiwan, which are one or two decades ahead of us. In the past, the West transferred industries to Japan and South Korea, and then to China; next, industries will continue to shift to Vietnam, India, and other places. Correspondingly, a large number of industrial jobs will be "pulled out" in bulk; this is not just a matter of a few individuals being laid off, but rather a segmental migration of industries. At the same time, the social "safety net" (social security, pensions, etc.) will also come under pressure and face problems—this is already happening; otherwise, why would there be discussions about delaying retirement? Don't laugh at the problems faced by the United States and Taiwan today; China will likely experience a round of similar challenges in the future. This is a challenge for the post-90s generation, and it is also a challenge for those born in the 70s and 80s. The education we received in university and high school was essentially a complete education under the industrial system.

For example, in our company, some people study social work; many of my classmates from Peking University studied chemical engineering, petroleum, and other majors closely related to industrial production; many liberal arts students studied literature and history, working in traditional media, print media, and party newspaper systems—these fields will all experience the painful "revolution" brought by the internet. Classmates often ask me in WeChat groups: "I didn't study the internet; I majored in petroleum engineering in college; what should I do now in the internet field? My original major's salary is also getting lower." This is what is called the "projection form" of industrial structural transformation onto individuals. It is not a new term that "tricks you" on a macro level, but rather a specific problem in your resume and job choices. This is a major challenge for national leaders, let alone individuals. But the good news is: personal adaptation and transition are often much easier than national-level transformations.

The third layer, which is also the "opportunity in crisis" summarized from the first two points: traditional society will undergo its last major transformation: from "an industrial production society based on families" to "an internet society based on individuals." Almost all the problems we will encounter in the future will be built on this main line: the organizational unit will shift from family to individual, and the modes of production and collaboration will shift from industrialization to internetization. This is not just a topic for China; developed countries face the same issue. Some countries have not fully understood this problem at the national level. Those who do not take action in the internet field will see their country, society, and nation fall behind, and individuals will certainly fall behind as well. This is also why I repeatedly emphasize "strategy": once a strategy falters, the country, society, nation, and individuals will collectively falter, without exception. Based on the same judgment, I do not recommend blindly immigrating. China and the United States are among the few countries that have a profound consensus on the importance of the internet to national fortunes, and I believe they will be rewarded by fate. The transition from "family-based industrial society" to "individual-based internet society" is likely to be the main theme for the next thirty to forty years, or even fifty or a hundred years. If it takes a hundred years, then let it take a hundred years; if it takes fifty years, then let it take fifty years. This is the major trend.

5. Question: Discuss the legitimacy of primitive accumulation and personal struggle in China. What problems exist in Chinese society's attitude towards wealth creation?

Sun Yuchen: This question is very important. Why? Because it is closely related to my repeated emphasis on "strategy determines everything": if the primitive accumulation of personal struggle lacks legitimacy in China, especially moral legitimacy, then how can this country and this nation talk about development?

As you all know, my life itself is a living inspirational story: a young man from a small town in a fourth or fifth-tier city, relying on my own efforts to establish myself in Beijing, supporting thirty to forty employees, and still generating tens of millions in net profit each year. This is the simplest Chinese story, and I believe we will continue to improve.

But along this journey, I have personally felt that although the system allows for primitive accumulation and personal struggle, it often does not receive moral recognition. You may have worked hard to build your career, yet there will always be people pointing fingers, saying you lack social responsibility, that you are only in it for yourself and just want to make money—how can that be noble? Some even believe that individuals should not seek personal gain—only verbal promises of "serving the people" count as correct. But when you honestly say, "I want to live well and take care of my family," they label you as "selfish." Such moral accusations are not uncommon in China.

From this perspective, I often say that China, in a certain sense, resembles Germany in the 16th to 18th centuries. European history has a period known as the "Dark Ages," characterized by the ethics under the medieval church's rule: it discouraged making money, and doing business was considered "bad." The logic was that you should spend more time serving God and giving to others. It sounds noble, but the effect is quite similar to some rhetoric we hear today. So what happens if someone is very capable and makes a lot of money? The church would scare them with the idea of "going to hell." When frightened individuals ask, "What should I do?" the church would say: you can buy indulgences. The implication is: I have connections with God; I can help you out; if you pay a little, God will let you off the hook. The result is predictable: "indulgences" became a highly profitable business. Whether God exists or has an account at China Merchants Bank is beside the point; the money goes straight into the church's pocket.

Later, Max Weber wrote "The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism," tracing the origins of capitalism and emphasizing that the reform of Protestant ethics paved the way. Martin Luther stood up and said: do not be intimidated. Calvin was even clearer: making money comes from trade, and as long as it is voluntary trade, both parties will benefit, and society will be better off as a result. Thus, "working hard and earning money" was endowed with moral legitimacy—making money is fulfilling one's duty and practicing faith; there is no need to use indulgences to take shortcuts.

To put it another way: God is like an excellent CEO. As a CEO, I will see the performance of each employee: those who do well will be promoted, and those who do poorly will be adjusted. Employees no longer need to secretly bribe me for promotions. Similarly, whether you "ascend to heaven" or "descend to hell" depends on whether you create value, work diligently, and improve society through trade. Making money is not a sin; rather, it is the realization of value; there is no need to worry about "atonement" because making money itself is the pursuit of good.

This set of ideas from Protestant ethics liberated people's hearts and productivity, serving as the ideological premise for the Industrial Revolution and technological leaps. Before this, "the ages were as long as night," with a thousand years feeling like a day, and society made little progress; once the ideas changed, entrepreneurs, scientists, and inventors emerged in droves, initiating a new round of civilizational progress. Once everyone realized that working hard to make money is moral and serves God—both economic and moral incentives aligned, everyone was willing to work hard, start businesses earnestly, and engage in active trade, leading to improvements in everyone's lives.

Most of us do not believe in religion, but we can still appreciate the importance of "moral appeal": making money in a legitimate way brings not only income but also social recognition and personal achievement. The most frightening thing in a society is to make those who work hard and pay taxes feel disheartened: you work hard, support employees, and create tax revenue, yet you are labeled as "bad"; meanwhile, those who are lazy become "good people." Over time, the moral standard will only decline, and the country will suffer as a result. This direction must be corrected.

I remember when we were in history class, the textbook mentioned that Protestant ethics is the ideological premise of the Industrial Revolution. This is still true today: for a country to develop, for a company to grow, and for an individual to establish themselves, there must be a belief in the power of trade, the power of capital, the power of effort, and the power of personal struggle. As long as you do trade well, run your business well, and perform your job well, life will definitely improve; others will recognize you, and you can genuinely promote social progress. There is no need for hypocrisy or shortcuts; by maintaining sincerity and diligence, you can become the backbone of society and share in the dividends of development. This is not only common sense for doing things but may also be the foundation for a country and a nation.

6. Question: Why do you support Trump? Why did Trump crush Hillary? Talk about the U.S. presidential election.

Sun Yuchen: In fact, by the time everyone hears this episode, the U.S. election will have been over for some time. I want to share my overall feelings about this election. I started paying attention to Trump as soon as he announced his candidacy and followed him until he was officially elected. First, let me reflect on my journey and then share some of my thoughts. I believe that this election itself has strong guiding significance for our entrepreneurship and real-life choices.

Around October 8, just before the voting, I was actually quite desperate. As an entrepreneur, I internally supported Trump, but as the voting approached, I had little confidence. Looking back, this is quite normal. We are in China, and our channels for understanding the U.S. are limited; predicting elections often relies on mainstream media reports, polling data, and statements from political elites as "benchmarks." In these dimensions, Hillary had an overwhelming advantage: the mainstream U.S. media, then-President Obama, and most official polls supported her. Many within the Republican Party also did not endorse Trump, especially after some "dirt" about him was exposed, leading many in the party to withdraw their support. But the fact is, Trump still won. This was a huge shock to me. It reminded us that traditional elites often overestimate the power of "connections, financial resources, relationships, and endorsements," while underestimating the explosive power of "ordinary public support." If I had to give a core argument, it would be this.

The reason Hillary received so many endorsements is simple: she is a typical American career politician, and her most valuable asset is the recognition of the entire political system. However, because of this, she gradually lost the trust of ordinary people. During her time as a senator and secretary of state, a series of events led the American public to question her integrity and style of conduct. Thus, social division intensified: the elite group viewed ordinary people as "ignorant," while ordinary people saw the elite as "liars." By the time of the vote, it had basically formed a situation where the "political elite group" mostly supported Hillary, even though many wealthy individuals preferred Trump, and the traditional political elite's control over the final outcome was far less strong than they thought.

Trump's rallies were very down-to-earth and engaging; Hillary's rallies felt more like "formal meetings," with little interaction and a lot of self-talk. Hillary is a typical traditional politician, making it difficult to inspire the recognition of ordinary people; although Trump comes from a wealthy background, he understands what the people want and like during his business dealings, and he is good at self-deprecation, easily connecting with the majority. This was key to his victory.

Looking at the public opinion landscape, I often browse American websites for news and social media: 4chan, Reddit, Twitter—roughly corresponding to domestic platforms like Bilibili, Zhihu, and Weibo. On these platforms, the overall voice supporting Trump is louder. The reason is not complicated: he is extremely relatable and uses internet language and expressions that resonate well. If you only look at these platforms, you would think he is bound to win; however, political and cultural elites are more likely to be reading traditional media like The New York Times and CNN—these channels overwhelmingly believed Hillary would win. My intuitive feeling is that Trump's election not only signifies the rise of social media but also further solidifies the decline of traditional media.

When I was in the U.S., I felt the decline of traditional media firsthand. Those who know me are aware that I interned at Southern Weekend in my early years, and when I first arrived in the U.S., I wanted to be a writer for The New York Times or Time Magazine, and I later wrote for Bloomberg Businessweek. However, shortly after I arrived in the U.S., I witnessed BusinessWeek cease publication and restructure due to insolvency, later merging into the Bloomberg system and being renamed Bloomberg Businessweek. This had a significant impact on me: the collapse of traditional media is a real phenomenon. Today, the decline in influence and credibility of The New York Times and CNN is merely a continuation of this trend. It can be said that the mainstream form of media in the future will definitely lean more towards distributed content from social media. At this point, some readers might say, "This isn't practical enough." In fact, the conclusion is very direct: if you are still working within the traditional media system, now is the best time to change careers.

Now, let's address another controversy: many people criticize Trump for being "uneducated" or "illiterate," even spreading rumors that he never attended college. This is completely untrue. He earned his undergraduate degree from the University of Pennsylvania, an Ivy League school, and attended the Wharton School of Business, one of the top business schools in the U.S., with a reputation in the business world that is not inferior to Harvard Business School. To draw a domestic analogy, it is equivalent to "Peking University's Guanghua School of Management." How could someone with a "formal education" be labeled as "uneducated"? Clearly, this is a significant distortion and bias; of course, I have a "stake" in this, as I graduated from that school, and Trump is my alumnus, being the second president elected from our school.

Why is there so little? Because the University of Pennsylvania is a school with a fully pragmatic tradition in business education, producing many successful businesspeople, such as Elon Musk, the founder of Tesla, who is also the founder of SpaceX and PayPal. Our school also produced Warren Buffett, who is known as the investment god. From this perspective, the school has a very strong tradition of pragmatism. I believe that Trump, to some extent, has inherited this pragmatic tradition from his alma mater, which allows him to excel in real life.

The University of Pennsylvania's pragmatic tradition is related to its founder, Benjamin Franklin. Many people may not know him; he is not as well-known as George Washington, one of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Most Chinese people know Franklin mainly because he invented the lightning rod and is one of the Founding Fathers, appearing on the $100 bill. Franklin was one of the early leaders, along with Hamilton, in shaping many of America's institutional frameworks. It can be said that the reason America is what it is today is largely due to Franklin's contributions.

Franklin was very skilled at turning a nearly bankrupt company into a thriving one. Even when a school was just established and had no resources, Franklin was able to make it flourish. Thus, it can be seen that Franklin himself possessed strong entrepreneurial qualities, and he had many ways to improve a newly established nation. While he may not have been a valiant warrior in battle, he was certainly a person with exceptional management talent. This is why I believe that even from the school's tradition, I trust that Trump can effectively lead America. Having a person with the acumen of a businessman and the qualities of a manager to run a country is akin to how Franklin managed the University of Pennsylvania; he could certainly operate the school successfully, ensuring that most people's lives improved significantly. From this perspective, you can see that the pragmatic tradition of the University of Pennsylvania has been consistently passed down. In fact, I have also been promoting this pragmatic tradition in my own entrepreneurial journey.

Returning to the point about Trump being uneducated or even having never attended college, this is completely incorrect. On the contrary, Trump has inherited the tradition of pragmatism and is very relatable. Thus, we can see that Trump interacts very smoothly with the vast majority of ordinary people and has a strong ability to resonate and inspire. These are qualities that many cultural and political elites, who are often entrenched in their studies, do not possess.

Many political and cultural elites in the Eastern U.S. must understand that if they cannot translate their high titles and prestigious degrees into the ability to "solve practical problems for America," especially in addressing the economic and security issues faced by ordinary people and managing various crises for the country, then no amount of labels or impressive resumes will matter. It is essential to grasp this point: this is precisely the "trap" that prestigious school experiences carry; many people become entranced by their shiny titles and cannot extricate themselves. Whether one graduates from a prestigious school or holds various "high-end" titles, it ultimately comes down to "whether it can provide you with an advantage in real battles and help you in the face of real problems."

From this perspective, Trump is clearly more pragmatic and knows better how to "solve problems"; Hillary does not. A simple example: Trump repeatedly emphasizes that he can effectively combat terrorism, handle illegal immigration issues, and solve the employment problems of the American people. These three issues are acknowledged by CNN as the most concerning topics for American voters: counter-terrorism, ISIS, and job opportunities. In contrast, some cultural and political elites represented by Hillary repeatedly hype up the so-called "Trump groping women" incidents.

In theory, major media outlets like The New York Times, CNN, and The New Yorker should seriously discuss national governance rather than focus their main firepower on "Did Trump insult women?" "Did he grope someone?" "Did he pay taxes?" "What is his private life like?" These "personal trivialities." Hillary seems to think that people love to see this kind of gossip: as long as I attack him for "insulting women" and gather a bunch of people to accuse him, he will be abandoned by voters. But the reality is quite the opposite. A truly wise nation cares more about "big issues" rather than "trivialities": who can better combat terrorism, who can better handle illegal immigration, who can bring back job opportunities. After the election, if you look at the follow-up polls conducted by CNN and The New York Times, you will find that on the issues of "counter-terrorism," "illegal immigration," and "employment," most respondents believe Trump would perform better than Hillary.

I believe that a person with a pragmatic tradition can be a good president, just as Trump has been able to successfully revive companies after numerous bankruptcies. I believe he can bring his company back to life and manage it increasingly well. Trump is currently also one of the top 200 wealthy individuals in the U.S.; although his ranking may not be that high, I believe that as a top 200 wealthy individual, he can also manage this country and make it better.

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