Running points serve as the initial entry point for illicit funds into the cryptocurrency system, characterized by recruiting individuals to rent out bank accounts, digital wallets, or exchange addresses to receive and transfer illegal proceeds from scams, gambling, etc. This is currently the most common cryptocurrency money laundering-related behavior in judicial practice. The core of charge determination lies in the level of participation in the behavior and the depth of subjective awareness, primarily involving the crime of assisting in cybercrime activities (hereinafter referred to as "assisting crime") and the crime of concealing and hiding criminal proceeds (hereinafter referred to as "concealment crime").

According to Article 287-2 of the Criminal Law and Article 12 of the Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Problems Concerning the Application of Law in Criminal Cases Involving the Illegal Use of Information Networks and Assisting Cybercrime Activities, knowing that others are using information networks to commit crimes and providing payment settlement assistance for an amount exceeding 200,000 yuan or illicit gains exceeding 10,000 yuan constitutes "serious circumstances" for assisting crime.

In judicial practice, individuals who solely provide bank accounts or digital wallets without participating in the splitting or transfer of funds, and who have no prior collusion with upstream criminals, are convicted under assisting crime.

If the point runners or organizers not only provide accounts but also actively split funds, transfer across platforms, and connect in real time with upstream criminals, it indicates their clear awareness that the funds are criminal proceeds and that they engage in active behaviors of "concealing or hiding," which should be classified as a concealment crime.

Judicial authorities do not require the subject to admit "knowledge." Instead, they deduce it based on objective evidence: for instance, if the running point advertisements clearly indicate "bearing legal consequences," if the commission rate significantly exceeds normal market levels, or if funds move in and out quickly with trading partners being unspecified foreign entities, it can be presumed that there is subjective "knowledge."

Money mule motorcades are a core link in the layering of funds for cryptocurrency money laundering, characterized by achieving two-way conversions between fiat currency and cryptocurrency through offline transactions, ATM withdrawals, and third-party payments, utilizing multiple accounts and layers of operations to obscure the traceability of funds. These behaviors go beyond simple "helping with payment settlement" and are generally recognized in judicial practices as concealment crimes. In some cases, they may constitute co-conspirators of upstream crimes.

According to Article 312 of the Criminal Law, knowingly transferring or converting criminal proceeds and their generated profits constitutes concealment crime. Money mule motorcades operate through "motorcade formations," converting illegal funds into cryptocurrency after splitting the funds or cashing out cryptocurrency into fiat money transferred to upstream criminals, which is a typical act of "transferring or converting criminal proceeds."

For instance, in the 2025 case involving the USTD virtual currency money laundering gang dismantled by the Wuhan police, the criminal gang converted overseas fraud proceeds and transferred over 6 million yuan through USDT virtual currency; this is a typical operation of money mule motorcades, and all members of the gang should be held criminally liable for concealment crime.

If money mule motorcades have premeditated collusion and stable cooperation with upstream criminal gangs involved in telecommunications and online gambling, such as consistently providing money laundering services to a specific scam gang or participating in the profit-sharing scheme of the upstream crime, they should no longer be recognized as independent concealment crimes but should be convicted and penalized as accomplices in fraud or operating a gambling house. According to the "Opinions on Handling Criminal Cases Related to Assisting Cybercrime Activities," such cases must be punished more severely according to the upstream crime, with sentences significantly longer than for concealment crime.

The cross-border money mule motorcades mentioned in the report from Africa and Southeast Asia fall under the territorial jurisdiction principle of Article 6 of the Criminal Law. As long as part of the criminal acts occurs within our country's territory (e.g., funds being transferred from domestic accounts or the organizers being Chinese citizens), our judicial authorities have the criminal jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute criminal liability according to the law.

Underground OTC is a core link in the exchange of cryptocurrency and fiat currency, playing a key bridge role in money laundering networks. Its activities violate both national financial regulatory regulations and anti-money laundering laws, presenting an imagination competition between illegal operation and money laundering crimes. In judicial practice, it is usually punished as a major crime; mere underground OTC trading without connecting to illegal funds is only charged with illegal operation.

According to Document No. Yinfafa [2026] 42, virtual currency-related exchange and trading activities are considered illegal financial activities. Article 225 of the Criminal Law clearly states that engaging in payment settlement business without the approval of the relevant state supervisory authority, disrupting market order, and in severe cases, constitutes illegal operation.

Underground OTC merchants without payment licenses or foreign exchange operational qualifications engaging in the exchange of legal currency and virtual currency, regardless of whether they connect to illegal funds, constitute illegal operation. The criteria for determining the amount of crime refer to judicial practice, with involved transaction amounts of over 5 million yuan or illicit gains of over 100,000 yuan deemed "serious circumstances," resulting in a sentence of less than five years in prison; amounts reaching five times the standard are deemed "especially serious circumstances," carrying a sentence of more than five years in prison.

If underground OTC merchants knowingly use funds from scams, gambling, embezzlement, bribery, etc., through virtual currency to facilitate transfers or conversions, they simultaneously commit both illegal operation and money laundering crimes. According to Article 191 of the Criminal Law and the "two highs" Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning Money Laundering Criminal Cases, transferring criminal proceeds through virtual asset transactions is directly identified as money laundering crime.

Such situations belong to an imaginative competition offense. Based on the principle of "punishment based on major crimes," the sentencing for money laundering crime is higher than that for illegal operation (money laundering crime with serious circumstances carries a sentence of 5-10 years, while illegal operation with especially serious circumstances carries a sentence of more than five years), and it should be recognized as a money laundering crime in judicial practice.

Underground OTC merchants often use "white U (clean funds)" as a pretext to evade responsibility, but judicial authorities can overturn this defense through on-chain data tracing (such as links between wallet addresses and money laundering networks, the identity characteristics of trading partners). As long as on-chain evidence proves the transactional funds are related to illegal funds, it is presumed that merchants had "knowledge," and there is no need for the merchants to admit it.

Black U services represent a special type of cryptocurrency money laundering, characterized by publicly reselling illegal crypto assets obtained from hacking attacks, scams, and wallet theft at prices 10%-20% lower than market value. It is the most typical act of money laundering evidence in judicial practice, with little dispute over charges.

According to the "two highs" Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning Money Laundering Criminal Cases, transferring or converting proceeds from seven types of upstream crimes including drug offenses, gang crimes, and financial fraud through virtual asset transactions is directly recognized as money laundering crime under Article 191 of the Criminal Law. Black U services explicitly claim to handle "illegal crypto assets," and their actions meet all the constitutive elements of money laundering crime: clarity of "knowledge" subjectively and actions of "transferring or converting criminal proceeds" objectively, with types of upstream crime all falling within the seven crimes regulated by money laundering crime.

The sentencing focus for Black U services considers the amount of money laundering and subjective malice: according to judicial interpretations, laundering amounts exceeding 5 million yuan, along with multiple money laundering actions, refusal to cooperate in the recovery of illicit funds, causing losses exceeding 2.5 million yuan, or resulting in other serious consequences, are recognized as "serious circumstances" for money laundering crime, carrying sentences of 5-10 years of imprisonment along with fines of 5%-20% of the money laundering amount.

If the operators of Black U services simultaneously participate in upstream hacking and scamming activities, such as negotiating profit sharing percentages with hacker gangs or providing wallet addresses to hackers, they should be recognized as co-conspirators in upstream crimes plus money laundering crime, and convicted for multiple crimes.

Crypto gambling is not merely a channel for money laundering; it constitutes an independent criminal offense, with the core charge being operating a gambling house. Using crypto gambling platforms to launder funds from other crimes also constitutes a money laundering crime, with penalties for multiple crimes; merely providing funding settlement for a crypto gambling platform may constitute accomplice in operating a gambling house or concealment crime.

According to the second paragraph of Article 303 of the Criminal Law and the opinions from the Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security on several issues concerning the application of law in handling online gambling crime cases, using the Internet and mobile communication terminals to transmit gambling videos and data to organize gambling activities is recognized as operating a gambling house crime.

Crypto gambling platforms that accept bets in virtual currencies, set odds, and manipulate outcomes (such as the "guaranteed compensation" mentioned in the report) are typical behaviors of online gambling house operations. As long as the total betting amount exceeds 300,000 yuan and the total number of participants exceeds 120, it constitutes "serious circumstances" for operating a gambling house crime, carrying sentences of 5-10 years of imprisonment. For example, in the 2025 case regarding virtual asset gambling in Handan, Hebei, the defendant Xu used the virtual asset "Ling Stone" to establish an online gambling house, with the OTC transaction chain involving amounts of 557 million yuan, ultimately being convicted of operating a gambling house crime and sentenced to 8 years in prison.

If there is prior collusion with the crypto gambling platform to provide services for funding recharge, withdrawal, or transfer, it constitutes an accomplice in operating a gambling house; if the party does not collude with the platform but only helps other criminal gangs to launder money using the gambling platform, it constitutes a money laundering crime.

Ordinary investors participating in crypto gambling may constitute gambling crime if their betting amounts are large; if they provide funding settlement for others' betting through their accounts and meet the charge criteria for assisting crime, they will be charged with assisting crime.

Token mixing services blur the transaction traces of cryptocurrencies through mixing coins, cross-chain transfers, etc., providing "anonymized" processing for illegal funds. The core of charge determination lies in whether they specialize in connecting to illegal funds, that is, whether they are neutral technical services or criminal assisting behaviors.

If the operators of token mixing services know that the other party is a criminal and still provide coin mixing or cross-chain transfer services or specifically develop "anonymization" functions targeting illegal funds (such as obscuring on-chain tracing, faking transaction traces), it constitutes a money laundering crime. A typical example is Tornado Cash, which, if operated within our country's territory providing such services, should be convicted and penalized for money laundering crime.

If token mixing services are open to all users, without specifically connecting to illegal funds, and if the operators have fulfilled reasonable due diligence obligations (such as setting up KYC verification, monitoring suspicious transactions, and reporting suspicious transactions to regulatory authorities), it falls under neutral technical services and lacks subjective "knowledge," generally not constituting a criminal offense.

The determination of subjective intent of token mixing service operators by judicial authorities is mainly inferred from two aspects: first, the service objects; if over 90% of users are holders of foreign illegal funds, the operator can be presumed to "ought to know"; second, the functional design; if the core functionality of the service aims to "avoid on-chain tracing" with no compliance risk control design, it can be directly inferred that the operators had "knowledge."

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