Written by: Charlie Little Sun

This weekend, the Chinese crypto circle's public accounts and Twitter were flooded: Following ICE's investment in OKX, it has been reported that Coinbase is in contact with Bybit, as U.S. compliance agencies are making inexpensive forays into offshore markets, and white capital is starting to harvest Chinese exchanges again.

Then looking at the English side, the tone of Bloomberg and Reuters' reports is entirely different. They talk about the strategic complementarity between traditional exchange infrastructure and crypto distribution networks, discussing the connection between two systems under the trend of tokenization.

Both sides are looking at the same thing, but the stories read are completely different.

The narrative in the Chinese circle sounds very satisfying, even cathartic, because it naturally satisfies the familiar dramatic structure: on one side is the developed countries with rule-based discourse power, and on the other side are the struggling players from emerging markets, with the story advancing as "they come to take away our fruits".

The problem is that satisfaction does not equal accuracy. More dangerously, once this narrative becomes an instinctive reaction, it will lead to a loss of understanding of the global market.

ICE–OKX: What exactly was bought for $25 billion?

ICE's investment in OKX was officially announced on March 5.

The structure is clearly written: ICE acquires a minority stake and a board seat; ICE authorizes OKX to use spot prices and launch futures under U.S. regulation; OKX can, contingent upon regulatory approval, distribute ICE's U.S. futures and NYSE tokenized equities to its global clients.

Reuters reported the valuation at $25 billion.

This is not a cheap bottom-fishing move. It is more like a two-way swap.

ICE has the U.S. regulatory framework, traditional market infrastructure, institutional clients, and orthodox access to the securities market.

OKX has a native global user base, on-chain infrastructure, offshore liquidity, and 24/7 distribution capability.

Both parties exchange their most scarce items for each other's hardest-to-replicate assets.

OKX is not just a passive entity waiting to be absorbed.

In April 2025, it will officially restart its U.S. operations, migrating OKCoin users to the OKX platform, clearly reconstructing access to the U.S. market.

However, as early as February 2025, the operating entity of OKX pleaded guilty to operating unlicensed U.S. remittance activities and was fined $504 million.

This means OKX's aspirations in the U.S. are very specific: having already paid such a hefty price, it now needs to rebuild its qualifications, rhythm, and credibility to interact with U.S. regulators and capital markets.

This aspect has been completely overlooked in much of the Chinese discussion: the most expensive things in the global market are often not user growth, not PR heat, and not entirely products, but rather legality within certain systems.

Legitimacy in the U.S. market is especially costly as it overlays regulation, capital markets, institutional credibility, accounting disclosures, and political visibility.

You can dislike this system, call it hypocritical, double-standard, imperialistic, but you cannot pretend it is worthless.

Therefore, ICE's investment in OKX is not primarily a case of "white people harvesting Chinese", but rather a Wall Street infrastructure player buying something it cannot create itself—native crypto distribution and global outreach.

At the same time, OKX is also buying something it is difficult to grow from scratch—stronger connectors to the U.S. market.

Is there asymmetry in the transaction? Of course, but the source of that asymmetry is primarily institutional position, not skin color.

Coinbase and Bybit: Don’t use the same template

Coinbase is not ICE.

ICE is essentially a market infrastructure operator, not an "American retail crypto platform" directly competing for users with Bybit.

Coinbase is very different; it is a publicly listed American company, carrying the whole baggage of SEC, investors, information disclosure, public opinion, and brand association, while actively expanding the product boundaries within U.S. regulation.

Look at its action line for 2025.

In May, it acquired Deribit, gaining a foothold for derivatives in non-American markets, especially Asia and Europe; in the same month, it became the first exchange to offer 24/7 futures under CFTC regulation; in July, it launched perpetual-style futures in the U.S.; in June, it publicly stated that tokenized equities are a tremendous priority for the company, but implementing them in the U.S. still requires a SEC no-action letter or exemption relief.

Looking at it together, the main line is very clear: deepen the product offering within U.S. regulation, and expand derivatives, liquidity, and international distribution outside U.S. regulation.

This is not a sudden whim to "harvest" some offshore exchange, but a systematic filling of its weakest and most profitable map.

How about Bybit? It hasn't shown any urgency to "immediately Americanize".

As of January 2026, its official website still lists the U.S. as an excluded jurisdiction, while in 2025 it obtained a MiCAR license in Austria and a full license from the UAE SCA.

This path looks more like first penetrating the EU and the Middle East, then scrambling for licenses in major non-American jurisdictions, leaving the U.S. as an option but without haste.

Thus, the significance of "Coinbase investing in Bybit" lies not so much in whether it will actually happen, but in exposing a potential transaction logic: if it happens, what Coinbase is likely buying is not "laundering Bybit", but overseas users, offshore depth, international retail distribution, along with certain outreaches it cannot directly own in the U.S. system.

Conversely, what Bybit is likely buying is also not "immediate entry into the U.S.", but the brand endorsement from a publicly listed company, institutional relationships, future compliance gateways, and long-term options.

Asymmetry is real, but the victim narrative is false

Some may say, your argument is too idealistic.

Isn't the asymmetry of institutional positions just a more high-level, more dignified form of plunder?

The U.S. compliance identity, U.S. dollar capital market, and publicly listed company shell already give the U.S. a stronger position at the negotiating table, and simply substituting "plunder" with "asset exchange" is just making the phrase sound nicer.

This rebuttal has depth, but I believe it captures only half of the issue.

Power asymmetry is real: whoever can enter the U.S. capital market, whoever can sell compliant products in the U.S., and whoever can speak more naturally before the SEC and CFTC naturally has more bargaining power.

Broadening the view, the controversy over MiCAR enforcement in Europe and France's concerns that license passporting may degenerate into regulatory arbitrage also indicate that so-called "compliance" is never a static certificate, but a politically and institutionally reassessed asset.

However, the other half is equally important: not all asymmetries should be translated into ethnic victim narratives.

Once translated this way, rationality is defeated by satisfaction.

You will interpret every action in the transaction as emotional harm rather than a benefit exchange.

You will perceive others' strengths as moral offenses while refusing to acknowledge how much your own strengths are worth in the global market.

You will confuse the genuinely difficult question of "how to build cross-system cooperation capacity" with the easy but useless question of "why do they bully us again".

This is precisely where many overseas companies have truly stumbled over the past decade or so.

Not because they were not diligent or smart enough, or even because their products weren't good, but because they have psychologically never placed themselves in the global ecosystem.

They are not trading, but emotionally hedging.

They are not examining value chains and ecosystems, but saving face.

They are not contemplating what unique value they can provide to the other party, but calculating how to prove they have not been taken advantage of.

The global market never rewards this kind of mentality.

The global market rewards only two types of abilities: can you clearly articulate what the most scarce card in your hand is; can you acknowledge that the other party also has a card you cannot replicate in the short term.

The real battlefield is in structure and ecology, not in emotions

Take OKX as an example; what is truly valuable about it is not just the label of "exchange founded by a Chinese entrepreneur," but the native crypto user base, global distribution, product execution capability, on-chain infrastructure, and liquidity network.

Taking ICE as another example, what is truly valuable about it is not just "old American money," but the regulatory framework, clearing systems, institutional channels, securities market brand, and an increasingly clear ambition for tokenization.

As of January 2026, ICE has publicly announced the development of a 24/7 tokenized securities platform, and in March, Nasdaq also announced a partnership with Kraken's parent company Payward to collaborate on tokenization infrastructure.

It is hard to say this is an isolated event; it seems more like a trend of traditional exchanges and crypto distribution networks connecting with each other.

Understanding this layer reveals that the statement "don't view the global market through a victim mentality" is not a moral persuasion, but a very practical business requirement.

Because once you become addicted to that framework, you are destined to miss the real battlefield.

The real battlefield is not in emotions, but in structure and ecology; not in identity, but in assets; not in who is more aggrieved, but in who is more irreplaceable.

This is also why real mature overseas ventures seldom resemble conquest or revenge; they are more like grafting.

You need to know where your roots extend, and also understand which branch you should be grafted onto.

If you graft incorrectly, no matter how good the tree species, it cannot survive; if you graft correctly, seemingly incompatible systems may bear new fruits.

Therefore, in my view, ICE–OKX represents a two-way swap between traditional market infrastructure and offshore crypto distribution networks; Coinbase–Bybit, if ultimately formed, is more likely to be compliant American leaders buying overseas extensions, and offshore leaders buying American options.

Neither represents a romantic story nor an ethnic parable, but rather a calm structural transaction.

It can be acknowledged that there are distinctions of strengths and weaknesses, positions of high and low, and regulatory premiums, and even geopolitical shadows, but there is no need to frame it as the old trope of "white people harvesting Chinese".

Such framing is the most emotionally stirring but does not help any truly aspiring overseas players.

The greatest fear of going overseas has never been that others are better than you, but that you interpret everything as malice directed at you.

The former can drive growth, while the latter will only ensure that you can never develop negotiation skills, collaboration abilities, and ecological perspectives.

View yourself as part of the ecosystem, and understand what you can offer to others and what they can offer you.

If you cannot understand this, your overseas journey will forever remain at the level of slogans. If you understand it, even if the people at the table have different backgrounds, languages, and nationalities, deals can still be made, and value can still be created together.

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