Original Title: Day 29: What could possibly be the U.S. options in Iran?
Original Author: John Spencer
Translated by: Peggy, BlockBeats
Editor's Note: While the outside world is still discussing "whether it will evolve into ground war," the logic of this conflict no longer remains within the traditional framework of war.
This article aims to answer not whether the U.S. will "go in," but what means the U.S. might have to change the opponent's behavior without occupying the capital. From missiles and the navy to energy exports, electrical systems, and information control to internal governance structures, the targets of the strikes are expanding from singular military capabilities to the overall operational system of a country.
In this process, the real key is no longer regime change, but rather pressuring the opponent to adjust its decision-making under multiple pressures by simultaneously suppressing its "combat capability" and "governance capability." This nonlinear, cross-dimensional method of pressure is becoming the new logic of war.
It is precisely for this reason that what is more worth paying attention to in this conflict is not what has already happened, but the options that have yet to be deployed.
Below is the original text:
The U.S.-Iran war has lasted for 29 days. Now, true strategic and military analysis is increasingly difficult to distinguish from politicized viewpoints, speculation, and narratives. Too many people habitually jump directly to the conclusion of "full ground invasion" from the current situation, as if the only option for the U.S. is to capture Tehran, forcibly control nuclear facilities, defeat a so-called million-strong army, and then fall back into decades of national reconstruction or a quagmire similar to Mao-style guerrilla warfare.
This is not analysis. This is merely a shallow judgment based on outdated or even biased cognitive models of war.
President Trump has stated that the strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure will be suspended for 10 days, and this deadline has now been extended to April 6. We are currently within this time window. But the real issue is not what has already happened, but rather—what options remain to be explored next.
From Military Strikes to Systematic Paralysis
It is certain that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and Israel will continue systematic strikes against Iran's military system. At the outset of the war, Iran possessed thousands of ballistic missiles, hundreds of launch systems, distributed drone networks, multi-layered naval capabilities in the Persian Gulf, and a military-industrial system that has redundancy and survivability. This system is being weakened, but has not yet been completely destroyed.
Meanwhile, Israel's targets are not limited to military capabilities themselves; more critically, it aims to weaken the regime's ability to maintain control after the war. This includes eliminating political and military leadership, targeting internal stability forces such as the Basij, and destroying checkpoints, intelligence nodes, and internal security networks.
This is not just a tactical action, but rather a strategic pressure aimed simultaneously at both "means" and "will": weakening its combat capabilities while also undermining its governance capabilities. This is precisely the way to force the opponent to change behavior without occupying the capital.
Any discussion must anchor on established strategic objectives. According to U.S. high-level statements, the goals of "Operation Epic Fury" include: destroying Iran's missile system and production capabilities, disrupting its naval forces and its ability to threaten global shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and preventing it from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Although "regime change" has been discussed, it is not an official objective. The real goal is "behavior change." The current regime has been given diplomatic avenues to adjust its policies, which is crucial as it determines the boundaries of strategic options. The core of this war is not to occupy Tehran but to paralyze the regime, destroy its capabilities, and force it to accept new conditions.
Even if the regime collapses under military and economic pressure, the U.S. can still achieve its goals in a new strategic environment. However, it must be emphasized that achieving these goals does not depend on the regime's collapse.
From this moment on, options are not diminishing but expanding.
One option is to target the regime's economic "center of gravity." Kharg Island accounts for approximately 85% to 90% of Iran's oil exports, usually between 1.5 and 2 million barrels per day. This oil is the regime's primary source of hard currency. Controlling it, paralyzing it, or directly destroying its export capabilities affects not only the economy itself but also the regime's ability to fund the military, maintain its power networks, and sustain internal control.
This is significant because the regime has already begun to show signs of weakness under economic pressure. The protests in January 2026 were sparked by inflation, instability in the banking system, and the inability to provide basic public services (including a severe water shortage affecting millions in Tehran). There was even discussion about relocating the capital due to the inability to provide safe drinking water. The regime's response was large-scale violent repression, resulting in over 32,000 civilian deaths in one of the most brutal crackdowns in its modern history. Thus, economic pressure is not merely a theoretical deduction but has already pushed the regime to the brink.
Another option is to target the national power grid. Iran's power system is concentrated in major urban hubs; precise strikes on key substations and transmission nodes could trigger a chain reaction of blackouts throughout the region—Tehran would be plunged into darkness.
Once power is lost, the regime will immediately find itself in turmoil. Command and control, monitoring systems, communication networks, and internal security coordination all rely on electricity to function. By precisely targeting key nodes, it is possible to trigger widespread systemic paralysis without completely destroying the infrastructure. This capability has been demonstrated by the U.S. in previous conflicts.
Cyber warfare further amplifies this effect. Iran has often used internet shutdowns to control society, and this capability can be reversed—disrupting the regime's command networks while restoring connections for the populace through external systems. Information itself will become a weapon, and the narrative, coordination capability, and cognitive advantages will shift from the regime's hands.
The Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive strategic point. Approximately 20% of the world's oil supply (around 20 million barrels per day) passes through this channel. Iran's long-term strategy has been to threaten and manipulate this flow.
One option is to shift from "deterrence" to "control." Occupying or neutralizing key islands. For a long time, experts have viewed Abu Musa Island and Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands as crucial terrain for controlling the strait passages. Qeshm Island in the north is also home to facilities, missile systems, and monitoring infrastructures deployed by the Revolutionary Guard Navy. These positions enable Iran to cover anti-ship missiles, conduct fast attack boat operations, and exert maritime coercion. Controlling or neutralizing these islands will fundamentally alter Iran's gaming capabilities in the strait.
Iran has also constructed a "toll booth"-like system in the strait. The Revolutionary Guard has effectively established a system requiring ships to obtain approval to pass through designated routes under its influence and, in some cases, pay millions of dollars in "security fees." Reports suggest that fees for each oil tanker can reach as high as $2 million, with selective releases based on political considerations, all while controlled routes are set near Qeshm Island.
The U.S. and Israel have the capability to systematically dismantle this system: targeting its command layer, destroying coastal radars, intelligence monitoring reconnaissance nodes, and command centers, and clearing fast boats, drones, and missile positions executing control. Once this system is dismantled, Iran will lose its ability to convert vital global corridors into sources of income and tools of coercion.
Another related option is to intercept Iranian oil exports at sea. Iran exports about 1.5 to 2 million barrels daily, a large portion of which is conducted through networks that evade sanctions. By intercepting and diverting tankers and conducting extensive inspections and seizures, this system can be compressed to the brink of shutdown. Actions of this sort have already been initiated on a limited scale, and if expanded, will bring the regime's revenues close to zero. Without revenue, there will be no missiles, no proxy networks, no capacity for repression, and ultimately, no ability to maintain the functioning of the state.
Some options shift focus internally. With a population of over 85 million, a youthful and highly urbanized demographic, there has been longstanding discontent. Current polls, protest patterns, and observable social unrest indicate that over 50% of the populace opposes the current regime, potentially even higher. This is not a solid foundation of power. The January 2026 protests were a clear signal of this underlying pressure.
Thus far, the public has largely been advised to "shelter in place." However, this strategy may change. Through information dissemination, security channels, and psychological warfare, the detachment of the populace from the regime's control mechanisms can be gradually achieved.
At the same time, support can be provided to internal resistance forces, including airdrops of weapons, communications, and intelligence. There are multiple fractures within Iran—national, political, and regional layers of accumulated contradictions have often led to opposition and turmoil. When external pressure coincides with internal resistance, the regime becomes more susceptible to cracks or, at the very least, faces increased pressure.
Meanwhile, the range of strikes can continue to expand beyond traditional military targets. The regime's control system is essentially a network: including leadership, the Revolutionary Guard headquarters, Basij forces, police, intelligence agencies, and repressive infrastructures. Targeting these nodes will accelerate the dissolution of central authority.
History shows that pressure can create fissures: the military begins to hesitate, intelligence systems experience splits, political elites realign, and personnel defect. Collaborating with these defectors often yields effects far greater than mere strikes alone.
Of course, numerous unknowns remain. We cannot fully ascertain where the regime is strongest and weakest. However, certain signs are worth noting. For instance, reports indicate that Iran is trying to expand its mobilization scale, even lowering the recruitment age to 12, which suggests it is under immense pressure. This is not the behavior of a confident regime.
These options do not exist in isolation but can be combined: destroying missile systems and production capabilities, dismantling naval forces, continuously weakening nuclear programs, and blocking its ability to project power externally. Concurrently, by striking at leadership and command systems, decision-making paralysis can be induced, applying simultaneous pressure across military, economic, information, and political dimensions.
The core lies in simultaneously striking at the regime's "means" and "will," rather than proceeding sequentially. Creating multiple dilemmas that exceed its coping capacities forces it into a passive survival state, prolonging decision cycles and weakening its coordination and control capabilities.
The Essence of War is "Choices within Uncertainty"
War is not a checklist, but a dynamic matching of objectives, paths, and means under uncertain conditions. Various options can be advanced in order, layered, or unfolded simultaneously.
Additionally, one must remain cautious of those who conduct comparative analyses with a tone of "certainty." Iran is not Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq, nor is it 1968, 2002, or 2003. Each contextual backdrop is entirely different. Political objectives range from "changing regime behavior" to "maintaining regime survival," and vary in between. Past wars often involved nation-building, democratic export, long-term counterinsurgency, and enemies having external safe havens, none of which apply currently. Geographic environments, technological conditions, intelligence capabilities, and regional dynamics have all changed. The options available now are more diverse and targeted.
We know what has happened, but we do not know what will happen next. More importantly, we cannot foresee the next decisions of all parties involved.
This uncertainty is not a flaw in analysis but the very nature of war.
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