On April 1, 2026 (UTC+8), the geopolitical nerves surrounding the Strait of Hormuz were once again triggered. On that day, former U.S. President Trump posted on Truth Social, claiming that the Iranian president had "requested a ceasefire" from him, using the opening of the Strait of Hormuz as a bargaining chip; almost simultaneously, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responded firmly through official channels, clearly stating that control over the strait was "firmly in their hands" and that they would never open it to a so-called enemy due to the "absurd performance" of the U.S. president. On the surface, this was a social media spat, but behind it reflects the long-accumulated power rift between the Iranian civilian president and the Revolutionary Guard, amplified and thrown into the global public opinion arena by Trump using extreme rhetoric. Considering that the Strait of Hormuz carries about 20% of global oil transportation, this discourse clash over whether to "open the door" is being quietly priced in by energy markets and financial assets.

Trump Returns to the Spotlight: Ceasefire Deal and Extreme Threats

In a recent series of posts on Truth Social, Trump cast himself as the central figure "single-handedly influencing the battle in the Middle East." He claimed that the Iranian president had actively requested a ceasefire from him and was willing to open the Strait of Hormuz as a condition, suggesting that he held a "bargaining chip": as long as he nodded, the flames of war could be extinguished, and the shipping routes could be opened. This narrative directly packaged Hormuz as his personal political asset, rather than the result of a complex multi-party game.

Alongside the so-called "ceasefire deal," Trump employed his signature extreme language. He pronounced in his post that if Iran did not cooperate, the U.S. had the ability to "blow them to smithereens" and "send them back to the Stone Age," using Cold War-style destruction language to create a zero-sum confrontation stage effect. Such descriptions did not correspond to any specific military action plan but effectively amplified emotional tension, reaffirming his consistent tough persona in front of domestic voters and international audiences.

On the same timeline, Trump also threw out multiple security and diplomatic signals: on one hand, he claimed that the U.S. would "withdraw from Iran," questioning the significance of long-term security investment; on the other hand, he continued to voice doubts about the future value of NATO, while mentioning means such as satellite monitoring of nuclear facilities to demonstrate ongoing control over regional dynamics. These mixed slogans seemed more like narrative puzzles serving the U.S. domestic election battle rather than a coherent real-world diplomatic plan.

From a political intention perspective, this storytelling method of packaging the "Iranian president requesting a ceasefire," "opening Hormuz," and "returning to the Stone Age" focuses on reaffirming Trump's personal deterrence and negotiation power. Iran and Hormuz are treated as projection objects to stimulate domestic public opinion, seize the discourse power on security issues, and apply pressure on both opponents and allies simultaneously. Meanwhile, the truly complex regional game and procedural diplomacy are deliberately compressed into a dramatized transaction between him and the "Iranian president."

Tehran's Dual Power: Symbolic President and Iron-Fisted Military

To understand the misalignment in this discourse battle, one must return to Iran's own institutional design. According to the Iranian constitution, the president is a civilian elected head of state, with relatively clear powers in economic management and domestic coordination, but limited authority regarding security, war, and strategic direction. The final decision-making on external wars and security issues rests with the Supreme Leader, with the Revolutionary Guard serving as the critical execution and decision-making hub within this system.

This means that any major decisions involving war and ceasefires or adjustments in foreign strategy must achieve political and military consensus along the axis of "Supreme Leader-Revolutionary Guard," rather than being unilaterally decided by the civilian president. The president can propose policy suggestions and participate in negotiations, but cannot commit to opening key chokepoints or adjusting the regional security architecture without the consent of the military and the Supreme Leader.

The Strait of Hormuz is a concentrated illustration of this power structure. As a gateway connecting the Persian Gulf and the global shipping system, it is not only a vital artery for energy but also a core bargaining chip long managed by the Revolutionary Guard: military deployments at the inlet and outlet of the strait and oversight capabilities over merchant ships and oil tankers constitute its "hand" in external games and are its hard currency for maintaining discourse power in domestic politics. Under this logic, any transaction involving "exchanging the opening of the strait for a ceasefire" primarily falls within the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Guard, rather than being an independent matter for the president's office to decide.

Because of this, when Trump claims that "the Iranian president requested a ceasefire and is willing to use the opening of Hormuz as a bargaining chip," it appears to have limited credibility from both institutional and operational perspectives: even if there are certain degrees of contact or intent, a lack of endorsement from the Revolutionary Guard and the Supreme Leader would make it difficult to translate into substantive policy. This dual-track military-political structure makes the narrative of "the president requesting a ceasefire" seem more like a political tool within the electoral context, rather than a genuinely executable security agreement draft.

Hormuz Won't Open for the U.S.: The Revolutionary Guard's Firm Monologue

It is precisely under this division of power that the Revolutionary Guard's response becomes especially critical. In the face of Trump's "ceasefire and opening the strait" storyline on social media, the IRGC swiftly expressed its position through an official statement, publicly stating that it would not "open the Strait of Hormuz to this country's enemies because of the absurd performance of the U.S. president." The phrase "absurd performance" directly denies the personal mediation narrative Trump attempted to construct, positioning it as external propaganda manipulation rather than a serious negotiation basis.

More significantly, there is an emphasis on control. The IRGC repeatedly highlighted in the statement that the safety and passage through the Strait of Hormuz are "firmly in our hands," which not only publicly delineates a red line but also serves as a political declaration to consolidate its authority internally: on issues concerning the lifeline of the nation, only the Revolutionary Guard has the final say. For domestic audiences, this language shapes the image of a "military guardian"; externally, it conveys a clear deterrent signal—despite facing high-pressure rhetoric from a former U.S. president, there will be no concessions on core bargaining chips.

From the perspective of the global energy structure, the Strait of Hormuz is responsible for about one-fifth of global oil transportation and is a typical "oil transport chokepoint." In the strategic thinking of the Revolutionary Guard, this geographical condition is inherently viewed as a "sword hanging over people's heads": during a crisis escalation, even the mere creation of uncertainties in passage can push oil prices and insurance costs higher, forcing opponents to reassess the marginal costs of sanctions and military actions. Therefore, whether to "open" is far more than a technical shipping issue; it is a strategically maintained hostage they have carefully curated.

After Trump threw out terms like "blow them to smithereens" and "send them back to the Stone Age," the Revolutionary Guard, from its own incentive structure, has an added motivation to respond firmly to showcase its refusal and confrontational posture. On one hand, this is an external proclamation of "not succumbing to threats" to prevent signals of weakness from inciting more pressure; on the other hand, it also serves to demonstrate to the Supreme Leader and the conservative camp that it remains a frontline player in the game against the U.S., unwilling to let the civilian government steal the show on critical security issues. Consequently, the gate to Hormuz was starkly locked in the military's hands to counter every probing from the Washington narrative arena.

From Withdrawal from Iran to Questioning NATO: The Shadow of Washington's Promises

Another set of signals released by Trump at the same time directly touches upon the regional security architecture. On one hand, he declared that "the U.S. will withdraw from Iran," suggesting a reduced military presence and willingness to intervene in the region; on the other hand, he continues to publicly question the future value of NATO and America's long-term security commitment to its allies. This seeming contradiction of "withdrawal" while threatening "extreme strikes" leaves Iran and surrounding actors facing high uncertainty when interpreting U.S. intentions.

From Iran's perspective, this series of statements can easily be interpreted as a wobbling U.S. strategic focus: there is both an ever-looming threat of military strikes and mixed signals of "we might also turn away." For the Revolutionary Guard and its regional allies, this unstable commitment structure may provide operational space—they can reinforce their regional influence during windows of "U.S. withdrawal" while highlighting themselves as under threat in public opinion, seeking legitimacy for domestic security mobilization.

On a broader regional level, oil-producing countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as well as nations like Israel and Turkey that feel strong security threats, must re-evaluate their reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. If President Trump's words about "withdrawal" and "questioning NATO" were even partially fulfilled, the traditional security architecture in Hormuz would show cracks, and countries would need to consider increasing their own naval escort capabilities, seeking alternative multilateral security arrangements, or even exploring direct communication with Iran to mitigate shipping risks.

For European allies, the repeated oscillation of the U.S. position regarding NATO itself constitutes a strategic noise. Should security turmoil arise in Hormuz, the first impacted would be energy import security and the pace of economic recovery. The ambiguous threats and withdrawal hints in Trump's rhetoric push them to confront a harsh reality: in a world where U.S. security commitments are discounted, do Europeans need to prepare their own intervention plans for critical chokepoints like Hormuz rather than passively waiting for Washington to make decisions?

Markets are Quietly Pricing Risk: The Oil Transport Chokepoint and Risk Assets

Against the backdrop of tense control over the Strait of Hormuz, the crude oil and shipping markets are often the first sectors to react. Even in the absence of actual blockade actions, the mere vocal emphasis by the Revolutionary Guard that they "firmly control it" alongside Trump's threats of "blowing them to smithereens" is sufficient to prompt traders to start rehearsing extreme scenarios: should passage through the Strait be interrupted or restricted, the risk premium on oil prices would rise swiftly, and related shipping rates and insurance costs would follow, causing import-driven inflationary pressures to re-emerge for energy-importing countries.

In traditional financial markets, such geopolitical tensions often first manifest in subtle changes in volatility indicators and demand for safe-haven assets. Whether through a rise in implied volatility for options or increased short-term buying pressure for assets like gold or U.S. Treasuries, these behaviors demonstrate the market's "early insurance purchase against risk." Current reports indicate that JPMorgan has lowered its target for the S&P 500 index from 7500 to 7200 points, but this information comes from a single source and lacks broader verification; moreover, its direct causal link to the Iran-Hormuz situation is difficult to ascertain, making it more suitable as background noise to be treated with caution rather than a core basis.

In the higher-risk cryptocurrency market, geopolitical black swans like Hormuz typically do not immediately alter medium to long-term trends but may produce indirect impacts through channels of liquidity and risk sentiment: if volatility in energy and stock markets amplifies, some funds might be forced to reduce risk assets or decrease leverage, squeezing trading depth and buying willingness; concurrently, some speculative funds might see cryptocurrencies as "unconventional safe-haven assets," leading to further amplifying volatility. For traders, a more realistic response is to incorporate geopolitical conflict into macro sentiment variables, reserving ample safety margins in position management and leverage use, rather than attempting to make directional bets based on every single tweet.

The Military Holds the Throat, the U.S. Wages a War of Discourse: The Long-Term Script for Hormuz

Returning to the incident itself reveals a clear reality: in Iran, the real decision-makers regarding security are the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard, not the elected civilian president. No matter how Trump shapes the narrative of "the Iranian president requesting a ceasefire" on social media, without authorization from this power mainline, any promises regarding opening Hormuz or adjusting the regional security layout are unlikely to materialize.

What forms is a marked misalignment: Trump dominates the public narrative through platforms like Truth Social, attempting to shape America’s pressure on Iran through personal deterrence and transactional language; meanwhile, the Revolutionary Guard controls the real bargaining chips by physically controlling Hormuz and wielding armed forces. Information and power grip each end, one side escalates threats on-screen, while the other solidifies positions at the strait, a structural tension destined to repeat.

Looking ahead, under a pattern where the security confidence of U.S. allies wavers and the military-political power split within Iran persists, the Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to swiftly return to a "technical shipping lane" role; rather, it is more probable that it will remain long-term bound by geopolitical narratives: with every fluctuation in U.S.-Iran relations and every escalation in regional conflicts, this area will be thrust into the limelight again, becoming an amplifier for oil price curves and fluctuations in risk assets.

For readers concerned with markets and geopolitics, what matters more is not chasing every unverified detail or allowing exaggerated statements to drive emotions, but rather understanding the underlying structural power and interest games: who holds real decision-making power, who controls key assets, and who weaves international stories to serve domestic politics. Only by establishing a stable cognitive framework on this level can one maintain calm judgment in similar future events, rather than being repeatedly swept up in overnight narratives of “ceasefires,” “withdrawals,” and the “Stone Age.”

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