Original | Odaily Planet Daily (@OdailyChina)

Author｜jk

On February 28, 2026, a joint airstrike by the US and Israel against Iran has begun. At this time, less than two hours have passed since Trump posted an 8-minute video on Truth Social, and Khamenei's death has yet to be officially acknowledged by Tehran.

However, on Polymarket, the odds for "Will the US strike Iran before February 2026?" have already reached $0.98.

From February 28 to April 30, over $300 million in trading volume was generated around the US-Iran conflict contracts on Polymarket. During this period, the market experienced several highly volatile events, including the start of war, the blocking of Hormuz, the announcement of a ceasefire, the collapse of the ceasefire, and the extension of the ceasefire, with each major event accompanied by extreme repricing of contract prices.

This article breaks down four accounts that achieved significant profits during this period, with one core question: What was the public information environment when they placed their bets, and was this judgment backed by facts at the time?

Case 1: All in on the ceasefire, 3,503% return in a single day, profit exceeding $450,000

Account: Fernandoinfante

On April 7, Trump announced a ceasefire between the US and Iran on Truth Social, causing the contract for "The US and Iran will cease fire before April 7" to jump from single digits to nearly $1. The winner of this trade is Fernandoinfante, who had previously purchased 477,543 Yes contracts at an average price of 2.8 cents, with a total cost of $13,200.

A single return of 3,503%, settled the same day, yielding a profit of $450,000, equivalent to over 3 million RMB.

Before April 7, the public information regarding ceasefire negotiations was as follows: On April 5, Pakistan proposed a two-week ceasefire draft, which Iran formally rejected and proposed a countermeasure with ten conditions, including troop withdrawal, compensation, and full sanctions relief. On April 6, Trump threatened to expand attacks on power and bridge targets, but then postponed by five days, stating "we are negotiating." Early on April 7, the market consensus pricing for a ceasefire was still extremely low, with 2.8 cents indicating that the market believed the probability of achieving a ceasefire that day was no more than 3%.

From the perspective of public information, Iran had just rejected Pakistan's proposal, Trump was still threatening bombing, negotiations had no formal channel, and Hormuz remained blocked. No mainstream media reported on April 6 evening that a ceasefire was imminent.

What was the basis for this judgment?

First, information asymmetry. Polysights pointed out on Twitter that this trade was placed two days before the ceasefire announcement. If true, the buying time was around April 5, when Trump had already begun to soften his rhetoric (postponing the power strike by five days), and the mediation channel with Pakistan was still open. Some Washington observers began discussing on April 5-6 that "Trump needs a result." A trader who continuously follows negotiation channels might come to conclusions regarding Pakistan's diplomatic movements faster than the market pricing, but this would still require very strong information acquisition abilities or inside channels.

Second, extreme odds betting. A price of 2.8 cents means that even if the ceasefire probability is only 10%, it is still a positive expected value bet. The trader's strategy was to systematically buy all low-priced Yes contracts in the late stages of geopolitical contracts, using small capital to cover multiple deadlines, waiting for one of them to trigger.

Fernandoinfante also had other failed trades, such as predicting the normalization of the Strait of Hormuz, a permanent peace agreement, and the overthrow of the Iranian regime, all of which were failures. This validated the logic. He simultaneously bet on multiple directions, with the ceasefire being just one that he happened to win.

Of course, his own explanation is "Jesus told him."

He claims to have received divine inspiration

So what can be learned from this?

This person did not bet on a specific outcome, but rather on the broad direction of "conflict de-escalation" in some form. He bought into the ceasefire, permanent peace, the reopening of Hormuz, and the overthrow of the regime, diversifying his directional bets.

In the end, only the ceasefire event won, with the others all losing, but a single return of 3,500% was enough to cover all losses and net a profit of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The logic behind this structure is that the market pricing on low liquidity tail contracts systematically underestimates the probability of sudden geopolitical twists. When the probability of an event is priced at 2-3%, but the actual probability may be 10-15%, systematically buying such contracts is reasonable in terms of expected value, even if most will go to zero.

Case 2: Continuous losses until the last day, hitting all: "Steadfast Choice" strategy

Account: Vivaldi007

Vivaldi007 registered on Polymarket in February 2026, less than three weeks before the outbreak of geopolitical conflict. From the first day of registration, he did one thing: bet that the US would strike Iran.

His operation record is quite outrageous: Starting from February 11, for each deadline—11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 22nd, 25th, 26th—he consecutively bought Yes contracts, with an average price between 0.4¢ and 3.6¢. Each position went to zero, resulting in a total loss of about $39,000.

A strategy of repeated battles and failures

Then on February 28, the US-Israel joint airstrike began, and Khamenei was killed that day.

On the February 28 contract, he held 504,416 Yes contracts at an average price of 12.7¢, with an investment of $63,986. Ultimately, he profited $437,930, yielding a return of 684%. Along with the contracts held on the same day for "Will Khamenei step down" (bought at 53¢, +88%) and "Will Israel strike Iran" (bought at 14.9¢, +571%), the total income from three contracts exceeded $629,000, covering all previous losses and netting a profit of $511,098.

Timeframe and information environment at the time

At the beginning of February when Vivaldi007 registered the account, several important events occurred publicly:

On February 6, indirect US-Iran negotiations resumed in Muscat, with Witkoff, Kushner, and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper appearing on the US delegation list—military participation in negotiations was itself an unusual signal. On February 13, Trump ordered the USS Gerald Ford carrier strike group to head to the Middle East. On February 17, Khamenei publicly stated that "the US Navy could be sunk." On February 20, Trump announced a 10-day deadline and publicly threatened military action. On February 24, during the State of the Union address, Trump claimed that Iran had restarted its nuclear program. On February 26, the third round of negotiations in Geneva broke down, with the US delegation "disappointedly leaving." On February 27, multiple embassies began evacuating non-essential personnel from Tehran.

Of course, the Trump administration had already set a precedent with Venezuela, which was also an essential consideration.

From February 11 to February 27, the market never priced "Will the US strike Iran in February" higher than 15¢. The cost of buying all these deadlines was very low because the market overall still leaned towards the belief that negotiations would continue.

The logic of this strategy

Vivaldi007's operation did not predict a specific date, but rather laid out across all deadlines within a time window, using extremely low unit costs to cover as many dates as possible, waiting for one of them to trigger.

This strategy has several structural prerequisites: First, he had a strong judgment that "the US will eventually strike." Otherwise, he would not have continued to bet from early February to the end of February. Second, he accepted ongoing losses, totaling up to $39,000. Third, his position on the February 28 contract was significantly heavier than on other dates ($63,986 vs. other dates averaging $250–$11,000), indicating that he increased his bet on this specific date at some point, rather than distributing evenly.

Case 3: $2.1 million bet on "nothing will happen": a stability strategy for large funds

Account: AdrianCronauer

The logic behind this account's operations is completely different from the previous two cases. Fernandoinfante and Vivaldi007 bet on "what will happen," while AdrianCronauer bet on "nothing will happen."

He uniformly bet No on all major Iran contracts before the end of April: a permanent peace agreement will not be reached, Trump will not announce an end to military action, Iran will not surrender enriched uranium, Hormuz blockade will not be officially announced as lifted by the US, diplomatic meetings will not be held before the deadlines. Each bet was No, and every single one won.

The return rate compared to the first two is not very high; the highest was only 8.45%, and the lowest was 0.44%. But the scale of the principal made up for everything. For example, the bet on "Will a permanent peace agreement be reached before April 30" had an investment of $630,305 and a profit of $53,257. For "Will Trump stop military action before April 30," the investment was $529,058, yielding a profit of $10,568. Out of 38 predictions, with a 79% win rate, the total principal deployed exceeded $2.1 million, netting a total profit of $147,464.

Timeframe and information environment

The buying nodes for these transactions concentrated from early April to mid-April, right after the ceasefire announcement, but before the negotiations broke down.

When the ceasefire was announced on April 7, the market briefly raised the pricing on "permanent peace agreement" and "end of military action." AdrianCronauer's No positions were partly established during this window: When the market became optimistic due to ceasefire news, pushing the Yes for "Will a permanent peace agreement be reached before April 30" up to 7-8¢, he bought No at 92¢, locking in the optimistic premium of the opposing side.

On April 11-12, negotiations with Pakistan lasted 21 hours and ended in "no agreement." JD Vance publicly stated that Iran "refused to accept our conditions." On April 13, the US announced counter-blockade measures against Iranian ports. On April 17, Iran announced the reopening of Hormuz, which was then closed again on April 18. By April 21, when Trump extended the ceasefire, there were only 9 days left until the April 30 deadline, and the negotiations were effectively stalled.

In this information context, the pricing for "Will a permanent peace agreement be reached before April 30" and "Will Trump stop military action before April 30" was even at 7-8¢, which was, for AdrianCronauer, an overestimation.

The core judgment of this strategy

AdrianCronauer's operation is based on a relatively simple but continuously verifiable judgment: in a highly uncertain geopolitical impasse, major breakthroughs within short deadlines are always overestimated by the market.

He did not bet on specific negotiation results, but rather on "there's not enough time." The probability of events such as a permanent peace agreement, a declaration to end military action, or surrendering enriched uranium being completed within weeks is extremely low, even if they may eventually occur. When the market prices such contracts' Yes at 1-8¢, the corresponding No is at 92-99¢, with yields of only 1-8%, but with very low risk. He used scale to replace yield, distributing $2.1 million across dozens of related contracts, systematically harvesting the market's optimistic premiums.

Where is the risk?

The fatal weakness of this approach is a black swan event for a single occurrence. If Trump actually announces an end to military action before April 30, his $529,058 No position would go to zero. Buying No at 97¢ implies he believes the probability of this event happening is no more than 3%. Trump's decisions have always been difficult to predict.

However, from the information environment throughout April, this judgment is supported: negotiations have broken down, bilateral mutual trust is extremely low, internal leadership within Iran is divided, and Hormuz has been repeatedly opened and closed; any of these conditions makes the probability of "a formal agreement being reached within 30 days" negligible.

Case 4: How can small funds achieve the same effect as Case 3? High-frequency trading strategy

Account: 0xcd7..0d127

This account does not have a single massive profit story. 2,000 transactions, $25.9 million in total trading volume, an average position of $7,900, with a 75.5% win rate, yielding a total profit of $292,000.

The PnL curve started in June 2025, slowly, continuously, and almost linearly climbing to the upper right, with no obvious jumps or significant drawdowns in between.

The essence of the strategy: systematically shorting market panic

Analyst Jay Godiyadada on X pointed out exactly about this account:

The Iranian regime has historically successfully resisted external shocks about 95% of the time, yet the market, under panic sentiment, priced the probability of "regime change" Yes at around 20%, leading to a corresponding No being undervalued by 15-20¢. Whenever the market raised the Yes price due to an event (such as war, leader being killed, ceasefire breaking), this account would buy No at a large position, harvesting that excess panic pricing; then, once the event gradually stabilized, he would take profits.

For instance, "Will the Iranian regime fall before June 30?" At the early stages of the war, when the situation was most chaotic and the uncertainty was highest, the No price was squeezed down to around 91¢, suggesting a nearly 10% implied probability of regime change. He bought at this node. As the ceasefire was established and the situation stabilized, the market reassessed the likelihood of regime change, and No prices climbed from 91¢ to 95¢, resulting in a floating profit of 4% on his position.

In general, this account is making short-term trades in the market.

The difference between this account and Case 3

On the surface, the strategies of both are similar, but there is a key difference: AdrianCronauer is concentrating capital, low frequency, and large positions—individual trades of $500,000–$630,000, several contracts, with a total of 29 transactions. 0xcd7 employs diversified capital, high frequency, and medium positions—averaging $7,900 across 2,000 transactions, spanning multiple market categories (Iran, Greenland, Chair of the Federal Reserve), continuously operating for nearly a year.

AdrianCronauer's approach is closer to a one-time arbitrage, while 0xcd7 is closer to the logic of a market maker: continuously identifying Yes contracts that are driven by emotions and overvalued, systematically shorting them, and accumulating profits through frequency and win rate.

$25.9 million trading volume, $7,900 average position, 2,000 transactions

This means this account maintains a relatively high turnover rate for the vast majority of the time. This style is very meme-oriented; the trader does not wait for settlement but continuously scans the market, taking action whenever he spots a pricing discrepancy with even a 5-10% profit potential. A 75.5% win rate from 2,000 transactions holds statistical significance and is unlikely to be mere luck.

The core competitive advantage of this account, as Jay put it, is the "status quo bias"—a systemic bet on the "status quo will continue." In the geopolitical market, major changes are always overestimated, while gradual impasses are always underestimated.

Knowing this and having enough capital and discipline to continue execution is all that is needed.

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