Introduction: Many people use Kimi to write reports and pursue long texts, but few know that its parent company has not yet gone public. On October 6, Bloomberg brought this matter to the forefront: The Dark Side of the Moon reportedly completed its last round of private placement financing, valuing the company at approximately $50 billion — rising about five times from around $10 billion in one year; on the same day, Kuaishou pushed its most valuable AI asset, Keling AI, onto the IPO track. This is not just two isolated news about new stocks, but a signal that the capitalization of AI in the Hong Kong stock market is transitioning from individual cases to batches: the window is real, and the competition within the window is also real.
I. What Happened: Two News, One Signal
According to Bloomberg, The Dark Side of the Moon has completed its pre-IPO last round of private placement financing, valuing the company at approximately $50 billion, and it has started preparing for communication with potential investors, with preliminary discussions set to begin as soon as this month; previously it was reported that the company submitted its IPO application to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange confidentially, with Bank of America acting as the overall coordinator, and CICC, Deutsche Bank, and Goldman Sachs serving as the underwriters. Reports indicate discussions are ongoing, and the IPO timeline may change; The Dark Side of the Moon has not responded to requests for comments.
On the same day, Bloomberg reported that Keling AI is collaborating with CICC, Goldman Sachs, and UBS to prepare for an IPO in Hong Kong, aiming to go public as early as next year and raising at least $1 billion; details may still adjust, and Goldman Sachs and UBS declined to comment. Additionally, The Information previously reported that regulators have initiated data security investigations into DeepSeek and The Dark Side of the Moon—whether this will affect valuation or the timeline is currently inconclusive.
With both pieces of news released on the same day, we tend to believe it is not a coincidence: the current strength of the new stock market in Hong Kong, the passage of Chapter 18C, and the preferences of southbound funds collectively constitute a window that may not last long. For companies in preparation, what they gain by submitting their applications first is not time, but pricing power.
II. Valuation: A 50 Times Price-to-Sales Ratio Is Not a Valuation, But a Bet Agreement
First, look at this curve: According to publicly available information, from January to February, three consecutive rounds of financing saw the valuation rise from $10 billion to $18 billion; after the D round in May, it was about $20 billion; one round during summer was about $31.5 billion (another report indicated a subsequent round of about $35 billion, with discrepancies in the figures); the latest round is around $50 billion. About five times in a year.
The supporting story is the growth rate of revenue, not the size of revenue. According to Bloomberg, ARR rose from about $300 million in June to about $1 billion currently, and the company expects it may reach $2 billion by December — note this is the company’s expected metric. In terms of the business model, the C-end is Kimi's tiered subscription, and the B-end outputs underlying technical capabilities to enterprises; in June, it launched the intelligent product Kimi Work, and in July, the released open-source model Kimi K3 reportedly is close to the leading models from OpenAI and Anthropic on some evaluation metrics.
Our view is: the approximate 50 times static price-to-sales ratio is not purchasing the current The Dark Side of the Moon, but rather a bet agreement about the speed of ARR realization. Let’s do a rough calculation: $50 billion against $1 billion ARR, static approximately 50 times; even if ARR doubles to $2 billion as expected, the forward price-to-sales ratio will still be 25 times. The reference is the secondary market: Zhiyun, as of October 6, has a market value of about HK$313.4 billion and an interim report of about $1.8 billion ARR, roughly calculating to about 22 times. The multiple given to The Dark Side of the Moon in the primary market is about more than twice that given to listed peers in the secondary market — the chasm in between can only be filled by two things: either ARR continues to scale at a pace exceeding the current speed, or the IPO pricing reverts to the secondary market anchor. The essence of the IPO pricing discussion is this negotiation; and if December’s ARR is realized to about $2 billion, it will be the first checkpoint of this bet agreement.
III. New Stock Market in Hong Kong: The Window Exists But Is Being Used Up
KPMG released its third-quarter review on October 6 (reported by the media): In the first three quarters, there were 116 new stock listings, with total fundraising exceeding HK$388 billion, more than double that of the same period last year, setting a record for the highest ever during this timeframe; active listing applications exceeded 600, significantly higher than the annual norm; the total fundraising for the year has the potential to reach HK$500 billion, which, if realized, would break the previous record of HK$427 billion set in 2010.
Structurally, two clues are worth monitoring: High-tech companies (AI, semiconductors, robots) account for more than half of the total fundraising, with record stock issuance financing in the third quarter; during this period, 19 specialized technology companies listed under Chapter 18C, raising HK$36.2 billion, while only eight were reported in the last three years combined. Our judgment about the 18C passage is: it has transformed from a backup door into the main door, and once the main door is opened, the countdown to scarcity begins. The listing qualification requirements of Chapter 18C mainly include market capitalization, research and development investments, and related conditions, and do not require profitability as a prerequisite, thus providing a listing pathway for specialized technology companies that are still in the investment phase; however, the larger the throughput of the passage, the thinner the premium each individual subject can enjoy — companies submitting applications this year benefit from a window, while those submitting next year may face fully occupied configurations.
IV. Keling AI: Continuation of Ammunition in the Arms Race, Not a Simple Exit
Keling AI is set to launch in 2024, focusing on generative AI videos. According to Bloomberg, after OpenAI shut down Sora, Keling and other Chinese service providers are competing to capture the market space it left behind; this year in July, it completed $2.8 billion in financing with a pre-investment valuation of about $15 billion, with investors including Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. By the end of August, according to announcements and reports from Kuaishou, it had completed another round of financing, and the independent financing amounts launched this year have all been exhausted.
Placing Keling's IPO within the competitive landscape, our interpretation is: this is a continuation of ammunition in the arms race, rather than a simple shareholder exit. Companies like ByteDance’s Seedance, Shengshu Technology (which is also reported to plan to go public in Hong Kong), and PixVerse (Aishi Technology, same as above) are betting on the same track; the computational power and data costs for video generation are extremely high, and the decisive factors in this track are likely not model rankings, but cash flow sustainability — the first to run out of capital ammunition will be the first to fall behind. How much of the gap left by Sora's exit can be filled, and how long it can be sustained, remains unanswered; but the length of the competitor list itself is a hint: the money in this track is currently burning faster than it is earning.
The stock price of the parent company is another variable worth thinking about. According to Bloomberg and corroborated by market data, Kuaishou has fallen over 50% this year (closing at HK$66.25 on the first trading day of 2026, and HK$30.18 on October 6). This double-edged sword is sharp on both sides: a weak parent company may suppress Keling’s valuation expectations; but conversely, separating AI assets from Kuaishou’s “content platform valuation” for independent pricing may be the market's first opportunity to price the AI video business individually — whether this separation results in a premium or a discount will be determined by the initial offering price. We lean towards the view that the latter may also be one of the factors influencing Kuaishou's consideration to promote the spin-off.
V. Why Hong Kong Stocks, Why Now
Southbound funds are the key variable for the subscription. Under Wind's metrics, southbound funds have accumulated a net inflow of HK$428.203 billion this year (as of September 28), with holdings valued at about HK$6.02 trillion (as of September 29); in the last three months, net purchases at the top were all AI-related stocks — Zhiyun at HK$40.021 billion leading, followed by MINIMAX-W at HK$11.411 billion. Judging by this structure, if The Dark Side of the Moon and Keling AI were to list and included in the Southbound trading, the marginal buyers are likely still from this group of funds; their performance after listing will in turn determine the attitude of southbound funds towards the asset class of large models — the performance of the first group of subjects will shape the pricing environment for later entrants.
Scarcity premium has a shelf life, which is exactly the answer to “why now.” After listing, Zhiyun and MINIMAX-W received continuous accumulation from southbound funds, with the important backdrop being that there are indeed very few large model subjects in the southbound trading; according to KPMG, in just the first three quarters, 19 18C companies have listed, and more than 600 applications are queued. When "scarcity" turns into "bulk," early listings enjoy pricing power, while later listings are left catching the tail end of the configurations. For companies preparing for an IPO, the pricing power during the window period is more valuable than the window itself — this is our core understanding of the current pace of intense applications.
VI. What to Watch Next
Progress on Applications and Hearings: The formal application version disclosed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s website, especially the disclosure metrics of ARR composition, subscription, and breakdown of B-end income;
Feedback from Preliminary Investor Discussions: The intent communication that may start as early as this month will provide a firsthand window to observe secondary buyers' attitudes towards the 50 times static price-to-sales ratio;
Whether the December ARR can realize the expected $2 billion: This is a core data point for whether the valuation story can be internally consistent;
Kuaishou's Stock Price and Market Environment: The performance of the parent company, interest rate environment, and overall new stock enthusiasm will all impact the issuance pricing.
In Conclusion
Three sentences to summarize our judgment. First, The Dark Side of the Moon's 50 times static price-to-sales ratio compared to Zhiyun's approximately 22 times reveals a gap in growth expectations between the primary and secondary markets — December's ARR data will be one of the important observation points: if it can be realized, it will support the current valuation logic; if it cannot be realized, it may increase the likelihood of the market reassessing its valuation. Second, the transformation of the 18C passage from a backup door to the main door signifies that scarcity is entering a countdown, and the essence of this round of intense applications is to seize pricing power, rather than just join the hype. Third, Keling AI's IPO is a continuation of ammunition in the AI video arms race, where the decisive factor lies in cash flow sustainability rather than ranking on lists; Kuaishou's weak stock price may suppress valuations but could also be the motivation for a spin-off. The above judgments are based on current publicly available information, and conclusions will change as conditions change.
Data Sources
Bloomberg (2026/10/6), KPMG Q3 Review 2026, Wind, exchange market data, and public reports.
The Dark Side of the Moon: Estimated at $50 billion, planned for Q1 2027 IPO, raising up to $5 billion; ARR 3→10→20 billion; valuation 10→18→20→31.5 billion (another figure of 35 billion exists). The company has not officially disclosed this.
The Dark Side of the Moon's sponsors/applications: Bank of America, CICC, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs; confidential submission.
Keling AI: Underwriters CICC, Goldman Sachs, UBS; aiming to raise at least $1 billion; July financing of $2.8 billion with a pre-investment valuation of about $15 billion. There are discrepancies in the financing amounts disclosed by Kuaishou.
Hong Kong IPO: 116 companies, raising over HK$388 billion, 600+ applications; 18C 19 companies/362 billion; high-tech companies account for over half; 2010 record at HK$427 billion.
Southbound funds: Cumulative net inflow of HK$428.203 billion, holding approximately HK$6.02 trillion; Zhiyun at HK$40.021 billion, MINIMAX-W at HK$11.411 billion. As of 9/28–29.
Kuaishou: Closed at HK$66.25 on the first trading day of 2026, closing at HK$30.18 on 10/6 (approximately -54%).
Price-to-Sales Ratio: The Dark Side of the Moon approximately 50 times static; Zhiyun approximately 22 times (October 6 market value approximately HK$313.4 billion, interim report ARR approximately $1.8 billion). This column provided rough calculations, with an exchange rate of approximately HK$7.78/USD, for reference only and not constituting a valuation judgment.
Note: Information regarding The Dark Side of the Moon and Keling AI has not been officially disclosed by the company and is based on media reports; there are differences in the figures disclosed by Kuaishou.
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