REFERENCES (1) Here's a good piece from 2011 on Sematech, which is part of how the US responded to the Japanese challenge. Unfortunately, I don't think today's America has the patience for something like this, because they want a quick fix with a button press. But it is possible that some consortium of the EU, Canada, Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the like could do this to create second suppliers for key Chinese components: https://www.technologyreview.com/2011/07/25/192832/lessons-from-sematech/ (2) Regarding public-private partnerships, that is how the Chinese responded to the ASML sanctions. They set up a public-private partnership to collaborate on EUV lithography, they have a state-owned firm, they're funding multiple teams, and they're aligning incentives. https://americanaffairsjournal.org/2024/02/a-new-era-for-the-chinese-semiconductor-industry-beijing-responds-to-export-controls/ (3) One potentially obvious point is that an international public-private consortium outside the US will need a neutral ground to hold the capitalization table and allow the global Internet to participate in it. There are various options for a new Switzerland that I won't get into here. (4) With that said, simply saying one will do a public-private partnership is like saying one will do venture capital. It is very easy to spend money and very hard to make quantifiable returns! There are many details in the execution. Much of the time, a public-private partnership just turns into an excuse for graft, like the green jobs boondoggle of the last admin. And even when it isn't graft, the best guys still can't always pull them off, because coordination is hard. (5) Still: given that the goal is to compete with an Asian giant, one should at least understand (a) how America responded to the last Asian giant (Japan) with a chip consortium like Sematech, and (b) how China is responding to ASML with their own public-private consortia for EUV, and (c) how one might use the Internet to coordinate similar consortia to get second suppliers as alternatives to key Chinese vendors.