Ronin needs to verify node multi signature across chains, and being attacked is also caused by node concentration; Wormhole, on the other hand, has a loophole in the logic of the contract side, which was exploited by hackers to bypass verification; Nomad was attacked due to a contract upgrade error and a lack of security auditing. So looking at these, it can only be said that the vulnerabilities are different every time, and what can be done is to learn from these past security incidents as much as possible. I took a look at Solayer's sBridge and also considered these risk points. For the centralized verification of nodes, the Guardian Network has been decentralized, allowing validators to run independently, and a node rotation mechanism has been designed. Simply put, a single node failure can also not affect network operation. HSM (Hardware Security Module) ensures that private keys do not enter system memory, and even if the server is compromised, the key cannot be obtained. In response to the vulnerability in cross chain verification logic, the target chain directly calls Solana ed25519_comgram precompilation to verify the signatures of all guardians one by one; Each cross chain request generates a unique PDA (Program Derived Address) to prevent duplicate execution or forgery. However, ultimately, security mechanisms are difficult to intuitively demonstrate. Users cannot perceive the underlying technology, but can only experience the degree of wear and tear during the cross chain process, and whether the process is smooth or not. But not being able to perceive does not mean it is unimportant, on the contrary, security is the most important thing in cross chain. By completing this step, it is estimated that Solayer's main network will be fast.