Author: Liu Honglin
During the May Day holiday, I drove through the Hexi Corridor and finally headed east back to Xianyang.
Standing here, I can't help but recall those familiar names from textbooks—banliang coins, wuzhu coins, Chang'an, Han envoys to the Western Regions… If the Silk Road is a channel for the exchange of civilizations, then Xianyang is the starting point behind it—not just the departure point of the Silk Road, but also the origin of the imperial value order.
Xianyang's role in history was as a system initiator. It was not only the capital of the Qin Empire but also the starting point of a complete system for "unifying measurements, standardizing credit, and organizing value circulation." Today, when we talk about "stablecoins," "Bitcoin," and "on-chain settlement," they may seem like technological innovations, but they are still old problems: Who issues the currency, how is the price determined, and what maintains the consensus on value?
"承秦" Stablecoins: Practicality Above All
After unifying the six states, the first thing Qin did was not to levy taxes or expand, but to standardize—unifying measurements, standardizing writing, and of course, including currency. The introduction of "banliang coins" was a nationwide integration of currency form and value standards, as well as a credit endorsement established based on administrative power.
The Han Dynasty further improved this structure. In the early years of the Western Han, there were multiple reforms of the currency system, ultimately establishing "wuzhu coins" as the national currency, and through mechanisms like border trade and gold settlement, promoted the currency system to serve foreign trade, forming the monetary foundation of the Silk Road.
Looking at stablecoins today, the logic is actually very similar. USDT is considered more stable than local fiat currencies in many countries and regions. This is not because it is politically stronger, but because it has wider circulation, more transparent credit, and lower transaction costs.
Isn't this a "Xianyang-level" functional node? It has no borders, but it has exchange rates; no emperor, but it has market consensus.
Coins like USDT and USDC do not rely on computing power or the belief in "decentralization"; they rely on anchoring, auditing, custody, and settlement efficiency—these elements are actually a set of systems, but not state systems; rather, they are a new version created by on-chain standards, commercial consensus, and quasi-regulation.
This "new Xianyang" is no longer maintained by terracotta warriors, city walls, and edicts, but runs on on-chain addresses, circulation protocols, and the transaction habit of "you transfer, I acknowledge." It may not be legal, but it is indeed practical; it may not be stable, but it is a solution that most people can use in reality.
Its advantage lies precisely in the fact that it does not "resist all centers" like Bitcoin, but selectively inherits the old system and connects to financial infrastructure, thus quickly becoming mainstream in scenarios like cross-border payments, gray finance, and exchange rate hedging.
In other words, it is not born for expression, but for use; not a chip of an ideal state, but an interface of the real world. It is like the "wuzhu coins" of the digital age, emphasizing efficiency, compatibility, and universality—this is not a rebellion against the old order, but a digital rewriting of the system.
"反秦" Bitcoin: Against All Centers
The logic of Bitcoin almost completely stands on the opposite side of the system.
It does not recognize the state, does not set a center, and does not require you to "believe" in any institution. What it seeks is precisely "to remove trust"—do not trust what anyone says counts, or what anyone prints is true; the rules are written in code, verified by the entire network, and no one can change them. Consensus relies on computing power, order relies on rules, with extreme logic and cold principles.
This design is not a spontaneous idea; it reflects a response to the long-standing operational issues of centralized monetary systems. And this problem is not uncommon in history.
In the late Qin period, the treasury was tight, and the court quietly reduced the weight of "banliang coins." It seemed that the coin's face value had not changed, but in reality, it had severely shrunk, leading to market currency value fluctuations and a collapse of public trust. The "Records of the Grand Historian: Book of the Equalization" mentions "coins being heavy or light and the people doubting and not trusting," indicating that once central credit is shaken, the entire currency system is also shaken.
The same was true in the early Han Dynasty. Although the central government attempted to unify the right to mint coins, local private minting was rampant, and enforcement was insufficient. The "Book of Han: Treatise on Food and Money" states, "There are many private mints, and prohibitions do not stop them," leading to a mixed variety of currencies and inconsistent standards, with the informal trading system almost operating independently. Li Zuojun pointed out in "An Initial Exploration of the Mistakes in Han Dynasty Monetary Policy" that the disconnection between the concentration of minting rights and enforcement led to the state’s credit being ineffective and the system failing.
Bitcoin is a completely technological response to the problem of "credit overflow + inability to control the system." It does not attempt to strengthen the center but seeks to eliminate it: not relying on the state, not relying on commercial credit, but solely on hard constraints of rules.
It is indeed not suitable for high-frequency payments, has significant price volatility, and is difficult to integrate into daily life. But it is not meant to serve the mainstream; it is meant to provide a safety net for the margins—in scenarios of financial crises, hyperinflation, and political turmoil, it has its unique "safety."
It is not designed for convenience, but for escape; not to make the system smoother, but to provide leeway when everything is completely out of control.
After Xianyang: The Freedom of Choice
For centuries, the Qin legal system has been in effect; to some extent, we can say "Bitcoin is anti-Qin, while stablecoins are pro-Qin." Bitcoin is a profound distrust of "centralization will corrupt," while stablecoins are a realistic response to "the system needs to evolve."
History has long proven that truly stable circulating currencies are never because "everyone likes them," but because "the system can support them." And the reason the system can support them is not based on ideals, but on rules, governance, and compatibility. Whether you mint coins through decrees or write chains through code, the mechanism that "most people recognize" is your "system origin point."
And now, those system origin points have shifted from Chang'an and Washington to Tether's settlement addresses, USDC's audit reports, EVM-compatible interfaces, or some globally recognized on-chain stablecoin contracts.
The legacy of Qin still exists, just transformed from city walls to protocols. The choice to inherit Qin or oppose Qin is, in fact, the choice each user makes when they hit the "send" button.
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