How long has it been since you last heard the term "Web 3"? As the narrative shifts from "Web 3" back to "cryptocurrency," investment institutions in the cryptocurrency market are experiencing a significant reshuffling, and we are witnessing all of this.

The result of this "narrative regression" is that Bitcoin and Ethereum continue to reach new highs, while the altcoin season has yet to arrive. Holding onto coins in anticipation of price increases may just be a beautiful wish; the harsher reality is that since 2022, the comprehensive decline in primary market investment returns has been continuously impacting VC practitioners and investors who adhere to the "Vintage Investment Theory." This article will systematically sort through the investment and financing data and market structure changes from early 2022 to the second quarter of 2025, to uncover the deep reasons behind the drastic switch in the cryptocurrency primary market from peak prosperity to shrinking returns.

We attempt to answer two core questions:

1. What dilemmas are cryptocurrency VCs currently facing?

2. How should investment institutions participate in this market under the new cycle logic?

As a long-term participant in the primary market, ArkStream Capital has observed that since the peak in 2022, the market has undergone a severe capital contraction and a cooling of financing activities, reaching a low point in 2023. Although the overall financing scale in Q1 2025 has rebounded somewhat, the increase is mainly concentrated in a few large financing events. Excluding these exceptional cases, market activity remains sluggish.

Parallel to this is a shift in venture capital strategies and preferences:

• Investment stages are shifting from early to late, with a significant contraction in risk appetite: Data shows that the proportion of early-stage financing (Seed and PreSeed) remained above 60% from 2022 to Q3 2023 (with a peak of 72.78%), but has since begun to fluctuate downward. By Q1 2025, the proportion of early-stage financing deals has dropped below 50% for the first time since 2022, falling to 47.96%.
• The narrative has shifted from application growth sectors like Social/NFT/Game to areas emphasizing practicality and long-term value, such as DeFi, infrastructure, and RWA. Comparing Q2 2022 and Q2 2025, financing for NFT/Games/Social has plummeted from 129 deals to 15; meanwhile, the infrastructure/DeFi/CeFi sectors accounted for 85.8% of financing deals in Q2 2025 (97 out of 113), becoming the absolute core of the market.
• The "paper wealth" under high FDV models is being debunked by the market: An analysis of 75 investments shows that market performance has dropped sharply from 46 deals with returns exceeding 10 times at peak to only 6 remaining; additionally, 24 investments (32%) and 18 projects (42.85%) have current valuations that have fallen below their private placement prices.
• Even Binance's "listing effect" is losing its efficacy, with "highs followed by lows" becoming the new norm: Data indicates that although 25 projects had first-day increases exceeding 10 times in 2024, by 2025, the number of projects that fell below their issuance price seven days after listing surged to 42, indicating that relying solely on endorsements from top exchanges to drive valuations has failed.
• Although the cycle from financing to TGE is lengthening, this has not resulted in a higher success rate: Data shows that among over 17,000 assets recorded by Coingecko, trading volumes for those ranked below 1500 are nearly zero, and even top VCs like Polychain Capital have a failure rate of 26.72% for their invested projects.
• The VC investment logic in the cryptocurrency primary market has become ineffective: Data shows that in the harsh reality where up to 77% of projects cannot issue tokens, only 5.5% of top projects eventually make it to Binance. However, the average return for these top projects is only 2-5 times, which is far from enough to cover the 94.5% of failed investments, making it mathematically impossible for the portfolio to achieve profitability.

Note: The relevant data analysis results are based on top cryptocurrency VC investment cases from Europe and the U.S. and mainstream exchanges. The selected samples are representative but do not cover the entire industry; see the following text for details.

We believe that this round of declining returns is not only a result of liquidity from the interest rate hike cycle but also reflects a fundamental paradigm shift in the cryptocurrency primary market: from valuation-driven to value-driven, from broad net casting to focusing on certainty, and from chasing narratives to betting on execution capability. Understanding and adapting to this paradigm shift may become a necessary prerequisite for achieving excess returns in future cycles.

Overview of Primary Market Data: Heat and Cycle Evolution

Global Cryptocurrency Primary Market Financing Overview

The investment and financing data in the primary market is a standard for measuring whether the market is willing to pay for innovative ideas. The higher the investment and financing data, the more risk capital is willing to bet on the future development of this industry. Whether it is the composability of decentralized finance (DeFi), the vision of Web 3 advocating for data to be "readable, writable, and ownable," or the continuous improvements in infrastructure regarding privacy protection, distributed storage, and scalability, all rely on the continuous betting of risk capital on this market. Accompanying risk capital is the influx of talent; the prosperity of the primary market is often reflected in the continuous stream of talent innovating and starting businesses in this industry.

This data peaked in Q1 2022, with a single quarter financing amount reaching $12.4 billion and the number of financing deals reaching 588. However, since then, the market has taken a sharp downturn, entering a sustained downward cycle, with both total financing and activity levels sliding. By Q4 2023, quarterly financing dropped to $1.9 billion, and the number of financing deals fell to 255, hitting the cycle's bottom. Although there was a slight rebound in 2024, the overall market still operates at a low level.

The financing data for Q1 2025 superficially shows signs of warming: the total quarterly financing amount rebounded to $5.2 billion, and the number of financing deals increased to 271. However, this "recovery" is difficult to withstand detailed dissection. In that quarter, the strategic investment by the Abu Dhabi sovereign fund MGX in Binance (approximately $2 billion) accounted for over 40% of the total amount, representing an outlier driven by a single event. Additionally, World Liberty Financial's $550 million ICO also significantly inflated the overall data. Excluding these large financing events, the actual financing scale for crypto-native projects in Q1 was only about $2.65 billion. The downward trend continued into Q2 2025. For instance, projects like SharpLink, BitMine, Digital Asset, and World Liberty Financial need to be treated separately and should not be considered the norm in the cryptocurrency venture capital market. It can be seen that starting from Q1 2025, there has been a clear divergence between crypto-native venture capital and traditional financial capital, with crypto-native venture capital continuing to contract while traditional financial capital rushes in, making significant moves in the equity market. Behind the apparent growth is capital accelerating its concentration on low-risk preference projects, and the overall venture capital activity in the market has not truly recovered.

Figure: Quarterly Financing from 2022 to Present

Data Source: Financing data panel from RootData

This downward trend shows a clear negative correlation with Bitcoin's market share. Bitcoin has experienced significant increases since early 2023, but the financing activity in the primary market has not rebounded in sync, breaking the past cycle's correlation between rising BTC prices and warming venture capital.

Figure: Bitcoin Market Cap Dominance from 2022 to Present

This means that the changes in the altcoin market's heat are no longer solely indicated by Bitcoin's price; rather, as Bitcoin rises, market confidence in altcoins is continuously eroding. The decline in 2022 reflects a macro retreat, while the low point in 2023 reflects the collapse of market confidence. The rebound in Q1 2025 is more driven by individual projects with strategic value or capital moats, marking that the primary market has entered a new phase of "selective concentration." The era of "a hundred flowers blooming" is no longer, and the wave marked by the "Web 3" narrative is receding.

For VCs, this means that the era of "broad net casting" is coming to an end, and reassessing certainty, strengthening fundamental screening, and evaluating exit paths have become the new paradigm. In the context of overall declining returns, rising Bitcoin prices without accompanying capital, VCs can no longer rely on the natural uplift of a macro bull market but should focus on technological barriers, business model resilience, and actual user value to meet investors' higher demands for stable returns.

Analysis of Mainstream Institutional Investment Activity

In the overall environment where the market is not meeting expectations, VCs still operating in the cryptocurrency market must switch their strategies from "all roads lead to Rome" to seeking more certain fixed strategies.

First, the preference for investment rounds has begun to shift from early rounds to later-stage projects. In Q1 2025, the proportion of early-stage financing rounds has dropped below 50% for the first time since 2022, marking a turning point. This change indicates that in an environment where exit paths are increasingly uncertain and top projects occupy resources, institutions' preference for "certainty" has significantly increased, leaning towards mature projects with validated products and clear revenue sources. Meanwhile, the proportion of financing deals in the PreSeed and Seed stages has decreased, although it still remains in a relatively healthy range, indicating that early entrepreneurial vitality is still present, but the fundraising threshold has significantly increased.

Figure: Quarterly Funding Round Distribution (%)

Data Source: Financing records collected by RootData, grouped and summarized by quarter and round

Secondly, the preference for investment tracks is becoming more concentrated. Starting from Q1 2024, the proportion of financing projects in crypto-native non-financial application tracks such as Social, Games, NFT, and DAO has fallen below 50% for the first time, marking the retreat of "concept-driven" narratives. In its place is a return to DeFi and infrastructure tracks, which emphasize the practical application value and sustainable revenue capabilities of protocols. Capital focus is shifting from To C narratives to platform projects with To B business models. Meanwhile, although the CeFi track has a lower presence in market narratives, its financing volume remains high, reflecting its recognition as a cash flow-intensive business.

Figure: Quarterly Sector Funding Trend

Data Source: Financing data collected by RootData for various sectors

Another impact of the shift in investment preferences is that the paths available to entrepreneurs have significantly narrowed. If starting a business in the cryptocurrency industry used to be an open-ended exam, it now feels like a "themed essay," with only Infra, DeFi, and RWA as options. Ultimately, the competition is about who can emerge from the red ocean within already mature business models.

For VCs, this trend means that: the investment research system needs to closely revolve around changes in industry structure, dynamically reallocating time and resources, and prioritizing support for projects with deep value capture capabilities rather than short-term traffic-driven themes.

Project Lifecycle and Exit Window Analysis

Project TGE and FDV

Project data explanation: This analysis uses top crypto VC investments from Europe and the U.S. as samples, involving institutions such as a16z, Coinbase Ventures, Multicoin Capital, YZi Labs, OKX Ventures, Polychain Capital, Paradigm, and Pantera Capital. (Source data can be found in the appendix tables VC Investments, VC-Backed Listings on Binance: Spot Returns, VC-Backed Listings on Binance: Spot Returns Pivot)

Data selection criteria:

• Prioritize the number of investments: The same project may undergo multiple rounds of financing, and the valuation differences between different rounds can significantly impact investment returns. Therefore, different rounds of financing for the same project are treated as independent investment counts to more accurately reflect investment activity.
• Prioritize Binance projects: As one of the largest exchanges globally, Binance has extensive liquidity and market coverage capabilities. To more comprehensively reflect market performance, only projects that have launched spot trading on Binance are selected as star projects.
• Data accuracy: Investments disclosed after token issuance are considered OTC (over-the-counter) and are not included in the venture capital category to ensure the accuracy and consistency of data statistics.
• Exclude projects with insufficient data dimensions: Projects that do not disclose investment amounts and valuations are not included in the statistical calculations due to insufficient data dimensions.

In the cryptocurrency primary market, the valuation system of projects is a core variable affecting VC return rates. In particular, the market performance of token prices after TGE (Token Generation Event) has become a key indicator for measuring exit efficiency. However, over the past decade, the method of financing through project valuations or FDV (Fully Diluted Valuation) in the crypto industry has become ineffective in the current cycle. This has rendered investments that could have brought tens or even hundreds of times paper returns nearly worthless upon final exit.

At the same time, whether traditional VCs or crypto VCs, project failures are the norm. For VCs, as long as a few star projects can achieve high returns, it is enough to significantly boost overall returns. Therefore, the core standard for measuring VC performance from the outside is not the investment success rate, but whether they have captured those star projects.

By analyzing the opening FDV, highest FDV, and current FDV after project launch, and comparing the initial costs of investment institutions with publicly available information, we further calculated the investment return performance of these institutions.

Figure: Investment Return Multiples

The above figure shows the market performance of mainstream VC investment projects after token issuance, revealing the severity of the current investment return situation. By calculating the ratios of opening FDV/private placement valuation, highest FDV/private placement valuation, and current FDV/private placement valuation, it is evident that a considerable number of investment cases correspond to projects whose current FDV is below or even far below their private placement valuations. At the same time, the number of projects with excess returns based on opening and highest FDV/valuation has shown a sharp downward trend over time.

Statistical results show that among 75 investment cases and 42 projects (detailed data can be found in the appendix table):

• There are 71 investments / 40 projects where the opening FDV / private placement valuation exceeds 100%, of which 28 investments / 18 projects have opening FDV returns exceeding 1000%;
• There are 73 investments / 41 projects where the highest FDV / private placement valuation exceeds 100%, of which 46 investments / 29 projects have highest FDV returns exceeding 1000%.

However, currently, only 6 investment counts and 4 projects have current FDV / private placement valuation exceeding 1000%, while 24 investments and 18 projects have current FDV / private placement valuation below 100%, accounting for 32% and 42.85%, respectively. This means that nearly one-third of investment counts and over 40% of investment projects currently do not even meet the valuation expectations of the private placement stage.

It is noteworthy that some star projects, even after landing on the most liquid Binance exchange, still cannot match the high valuations of the private placement stage. This phenomenon reflects the severe challenges that the current market environment poses to project valuations and highlights the downward pressure on investor returns.

Additionally, based on the "1+3" lock-up period commonly set by leading exchanges (i.e., a one-year lock-up period followed by three years of linear unlocking), the amount that investment institutions can ultimately exit is very limited. This further illustrates that although some projects achieved high market valuations in the early stages, their subsequent performance struggles to support investors' expected returns.

This phenomenon of "paper valuation inflation" is particularly common in the cryptocurrency primary market: project parties adopt high FDV pricing in early financing to obtain better valuations and terms, but once they enter the TGE circulation phase, insufficient market demand and continuous unlocking of token supply often fail to support the original valuation expectations, leading to a rapid price decline. Data shows that the actual circulating market value of many projects is even long-term lower than the entry valuation of the private placement round, directly compressing the exit multiples for VCs.

Essentially, high FDV often obscures two core issues:

• "Paper wealth" lacking real market liquidity support is difficult to realize in the secondary market;
• The token release plan is severely disconnected from market demand, leading to rapid selling pressure after TGE, further suppressing prices.

For VCs, if FDV is still regarded as the core pricing anchor in primary market investments, it may significantly overestimate the achievable liquidity returns of projects, thereby inflating the paper value of the investment portfolio.

Therefore, in the current market cycle, the judgment of project valuations must return to fundamentals: including the intrinsic closed-loop design of the token economic model, supply-demand dynamic balance, lock-up release rhythm, and the support of real buyer liquidity after TGE. We believe that FDV should not be seen as an "upper limit on valuation," but more like a "risk ceiling." The higher the FDV, the greater the difficulty of realization, and the higher the risk of discounting investment returns.

Shifting the focus from "paper premiums of high FDV" to "realization of exit liquidity value" is a necessary evolution of VC investment methodology at this stage.

Performance of Projects Listed on Leading Exchanges

In the cryptocurrency primary market, listing on leading exchanges was once seen as a hallmark of project success and a window for VC exits. However, this "endorsement effect" is clearly diminishing.

Analysis of the price fluctuations of projects listed on multiple exchanges from January 2022 to June 2025 shows significant differences in performance across different exchanges. However, a common trend is that the vast majority of projects experience a rapid price decline shortly after listing, even falling below the issuance price. This reflects that the empowering effect of exchanges on token prices is gradually weakening.

The following figure shows the price fluctuation statistics of spot projects listed on the Binance platform from 2022 to Q2 2025.

Figure: Binance Opening Performance Since 2022

This phenomenon of "rising and then falling" largely stems from excessive incentives and artificially created liquidity booms before listing. Some projects rapidly increase TVL and user attention through large-scale airdrops or "point mining," but simultaneously introduce significant selling pressure at the early stage of TGE. For example, this year's Berachain project saw a rapid decline in user retention after the TGE ended, leading to a significant drop in token prices.

More importantly, it has transformed into a continuous test of project market performance. In 2025, Binance adjusted its listing logic, launching the Alpha platform as an early showcase channel and introducing higher standards for tracking mechanisms, focusing on evaluating the activity, liquidity quality, and price stability of listed projects. If project parties cannot maintain real user growth and long-term narrative stickiness, even if they gain listing opportunities, they may be marginalized or even delisted. Listing on exchanges is no longer the "end event" of the valuation closed loop for projects.

This trend indicates that the liquidity exit window in the primary market is shifting from "node-driven" to "process-driven." For VCs, this requires longer-term post-investment support and value capture logic, where projects must rely on solid product capabilities and market validation to continuously support token performance in the secondary market, rather than relying on single event-driven "valuation realization." The model of relying solely on listings to create short-term valuation recovery windows is becoming ineffective.

Financing to TGE Cycle and TGE Success Rate

Project data explanation: This analysis uses top crypto VC investments from Europe and the U.S. as samples, involving institutions such as Coinbase Ventures, Multicoin Capital, YZi Labs, OKX Ventures, Polychain Capital, and Pantera Capital. (Source data can be found in the appendix table VC Portfolio Failure & Non-Listing Rate)

Data selection criteria:

• Prioritize the number of investments: The same project may undergo multiple rounds of financing, and the valuation differences between different rounds can significantly impact investment returns. Therefore, different rounds of financing for the same project are treated as independent investment counts to more accurately reflect investment activity.
• Prioritize Binance projects: As one of the largest exchanges globally, Binance has extensive liquidity and market coverage capabilities. To more comprehensively reflect market performance, only projects that have launched spot trading on Binance are selected as star projects.
• Data accuracy: Investments disclosed after token issuance are considered OTC (over-the-counter) and are not included in the venture capital category to ensure the accuracy and consistency of data statistics.
• Exclude projects with insufficient data dimensions: Projects that do not disclose investment amounts and valuations are not included in the statistical calculations due to insufficient data dimensions.

From the data provided in the previous paragraph, the final performance of star projects is often disappointing. So how do the performances of the majority of other projects fare? Can they redeem the reputation of crypto VCs? In this bottom-up industry, is it possible that the ultimate winners are those initially obscure "potential stocks" that only reveal their value over time? The answer is not optimistic. These projects are more likely to face the reality that investors cannot find suitable exit routes.

In traditional venture capital, seed round financing typically takes 6–12 months, while Series A takes 9–18 months. However, due to the flexibility of token financing mechanisms in the crypto industry (such as the rapid deployment of ERC-20 or BEP-20), there were extreme cases of "completing financing in days and TGE in weeks" in the early days. However, with increasing regulatory pressure and a gradual cooling of the market, project teams have begun to focus more on product refinement and user growth, leading to a significant extension of the average cycle from financing to TGE for crypto projects.

Although the extended cycle allows project teams to prepare more thoroughly, it has not fundamentally improved project quality. Data shows that since 2021, Coingecko has recorded 17,663 crypto assets, among which the trading volume of coins ranked below 1500 is nearly zero, indicating that a large number of projects lack actual value and sustainable vitality in the market.

Even more concerning is that the high failure rate is not only present among grassroots projects but is also common among institution-supported projects. Data shows that as of 2024, approximately 20.8% of VC-supported projects have ceased operations, and even top institutions have not been spared. For example, the failure rate of projects supported by Coinbase Ventures is 21.6%, while that of Polychain Capital-supported projects is as high as 26.72%. This phenomenon indicates that the current market's screening mechanism for crypto projects still needs further improvement, and the success rate of institutional investments urgently needs to be enhanced.

Figure: VC Portfolio Failure & Non-Listing Rate

Moreover, although there is a significant positive correlation between financing scale and project survival rate, many star projects with financing exceeding $50 million have still ceased operations. For instance, projects like Mintbase, which raised $13.5 million, MakersPlace with $30 million, and Juno with $21 million have all stopped operating. This indicates that ample capital is not a sufficient guarantee for project success; factors such as market environment, operational capability, and product competitiveness are equally critical.

These changes impose higher demands on VC investment strategies. The shift from the past "TGE first, then build" acceleration model to a more measured cycle of "refine first, then list" means that projects need to undergo a longer validation period before listing. Investors must conduct deeper evaluations of a project's technical implementation capabilities, team execution, and product-market fit to enhance post-investment survival rates and exit feasibility.

Downward Trend in Primary Market Investment Returns

Structural Analysis of Downward Returns

The significant decline in investment returns in the cryptocurrency primary market is not only a result of liquidity from the interest rate hike cycle but also the combined effect of various structural factors. These changes profoundly impact market operation logic and present new challenges for investment institutions.

Bitcoin's Siphoning Effect and Altcoin Dilemma

In recent years, the differentiation of capital flows has become increasingly evident. Bitcoin's market capitalization dominance has risen from about 40% at the beginning of 2023, repeatedly breaking through 55% in 2024, becoming the absolute leader in market liquidity. Meanwhile, since the approval of the U.S. spot Bitcoin ETF in January 2024, it has attracted over $100 billion in assets under management (AUM), with net inflows exceeding $30.7 billion.

Figure: Total net inflow of Bitcoin spot ETFs in 2024

In stark contrast is the slump in the cryptocurrency primary market. The total financing amount for the entire year of 2024 was only $9.897 billion, far below the $28.6 billion during the same period in 2022. The past correlation of "Bitcoin rising, altcoin season following" has been broken, with funds highly concentrated in Bitcoin, while the altcoin market is bleeding.

This phenomenon reflects the risk appetite of traditional financial capital. The compliant funds brought by ETFs, managed by institutions like BlackRock and Fidelity, primarily meet clients' needs for low-risk asset allocation. These funds view Bitcoin as "digital gold" rather than a gateway to "Web 3," and are unlikely to flow into higher-risk altcoins and early projects.

At the same time, the "Web 3" narrative is retreating. Once-popular tracks like GameFi and SocialFi have lost their appeal due to collapsing economic models and user attrition, leading the market to focus on Bitcoin's verified value storage function. This structural shift has made Bitcoin the main destination for funds, while the altcoin market struggles to support a large supply of projects and valuation systems.

Contraction and Concentration of Track Selection

The investment preferences in the crypto market have significantly shifted, reflecting VCs' pursuit of "certainty." In Q1 2025, the proportion of early financing rounds fell below 50% for the first time, indicating that institutions are more inclined towards mature projects, with as high as 68.75% of projects failing to launch, and some top institutions seeing project non-launch rates approaching 80%. The exit dilemma forces VCs to reassess capital efficiency, prioritizing projects with clear business models and competitive moats.

Track selection is also becoming more concentrated. Starting from Q1 2024, the decline of "concept-driven" tracks such as Social, Games, and NFT has led to a return to DeFi and infrastructure tracks, with VCs shifting towards emphasizing practical application value and sustainable revenue.

This trend has transformed the entrepreneurial path from an "open-ended exam" to a "themed essay," with only a few tracks like Infra, DeFi, and RWA remaining competitive, ultimately competing on who can break out of the red ocean. The concentration of market choices not only exacerbates capital differentiation but also compresses overall return rates, becoming a significant reason for the downward trend in VC investment returns. VCs need to dynamically adjust their investment research systems, focusing on deep value capture to meet the market's demand for certainty.

High Failure Rates of Projects and Inefficient Capital Conversion

Although the extended market cycle has provided projects with more preparation time, there has been no fundamental improvement in project quality. Data shows that since 2022, among the 17,663 crypto assets recorded by Coingecko, a large number of coins ranked below 1500 have trading volumes that are nearly zero, reflecting that most projects lack actual value and vitality.

Even more alarming is that the failure rate of projects supported by mainstream institutions remains high. As of 2024, approximately 20.8% of VC-supported projects have ceased operations, with top institutions like Coinbase Ventures and Polychain Capital having failure rates of 21.6% and 26.72%, respectively. This indicates that the advantages of capital and resources have not effectively reduced the risk of failure.

Even star projects with larger financing scales are not immune to shutdowns, such as Mintbase, which raised $13.5 million, and MakersPlace, which raised $30 million, both of which have ceased operations.

This cycle, characterized by a high elimination rate, has cleared the market and raised higher demands for investors: shifting from "TGE first, then build" to "validate first, then list." Only by deeply exploring a project's technical implementation, team resilience, and market fit can investors filter out truly capable projects under the dual pressure of capital and cycles.

Listing Does Not Equal Success: Valuation Bubbles and Exit Dilemmas

Listing on leading exchanges was once a hallmark of success for crypto projects and a signal for investment exits, but this effect is now waning. Data shows that 32.89% of investment counts and 42.85% of projects currently have FDV below their private placement valuations, and there are currently zero projects with FDV/private placement valuation exceeding 1000%, reflecting the severe challenges the market poses to high FDV valuations.

Projects initially created paper premiums through high FDV financing, but the disconnect between token release plans and market demand led to accumulated selling pressure, causing prices to plummet. Some projects, despite generating liquidity booms through airdrops or incentive mechanisms, struggle to maintain user retention and long-term narratives, ultimately resulting in token price crashes.

Furthermore, listing on exchanges has shifted from being a "valuation realization node" to a "long-term performance test." Leading exchanges like Binance have raised listing standards, requiring projects to maintain real growth and price stability, or risk being delisted. This has rendered short-term valuation recovery windows ineffective, making investment exits increasingly reliant on a project's long-term market performance.

This predicament reveals the inherent risks of high FDV: obscuring issues of insufficient liquidity and imbalances in token economics, compressing investment return space. VCs need to return to fundamentals, focusing on the design of token economic closed loops and real market demand; only solid product capabilities and market validation can support a project's long-term value, preventing paper wealth from becoming an illusion of exit.

Pressure from the Macroeconomic Environment and Withdrawal of Risk Capital

Since March 2022, the Federal Reserve has continuously raised interest rates, increasing the federal funds rate to a high of 5.25%-5.50% within a year and a half, while the yield on 10-year U.S. Treasury bonds broke 4.5% in the second half of 2023, significantly enhancing the attractiveness of risk-free assets and increasing the opportunity cost of investing in high-risk assets. During this time window, the risk appetite in global capital markets has clearly declined, leading to a sharp reduction in funding support for high-risk areas such as crypto projects.

The high interest rate environment has had a profound impact on the valuation and investment returns of crypto projects. First, high interest rates increase the discount rate for future earnings, meaning that the expected returns from long-term growth or token value that crypto projects rely on will depreciate due to increased discount costs, directly compressing project valuations in the secondary market. At the same time, as the yields on risk-free assets (such as U.S. Treasury bonds) exceed 4.5%, investors are more inclined to choose low-risk, high-return asset allocations, reducing their funding for high-risk crypto projects. This shift in capital flow further weakens the financing capabilities of crypto startups, making it difficult for many projects to secure sufficient capital support. Additionally, the low valuations and reduced funding in the secondary market have made it challenging for investors to achieve high-return exits, and the shrinking return on investment not only affects the returns of VC funds but also undermines market confidence in the crypto sector.

The Lifeline of VCs: Can "Home Run" Returns Cover Massive Losses?

Project data explanation: This analysis uses top crypto VC investments from Europe and the U.S. as samples, involving institutions such as a16z, Coinbase Ventures, Multicoin Capital, YZi Labs, OKX Ventures, Polychain Capital, Paradigm, and Pantera Capital. (Source data can be found in the appendix tables VC Investments, VC-Backed Listings on Binance: Spot Returns, VC-Backed Listings on Binance: Spot Returns Pivot)

Data selection criteria:

• Prioritize the number of investments: The same project may undergo multiple rounds of financing, and the valuation differences between different rounds can significantly impact investment returns. Therefore, different rounds of financing for the same project are treated as independent investment counts to more accurately reflect investment activity.
• Prioritize Binance projects: As one of the largest exchanges globally, Binance has extensive liquidity and market coverage capabilities. To more comprehensively reflect market performance, only projects that have launched spot trading on Binance are selected as star projects.
• Data accuracy: Investments disclosed after token issuance are considered OTC (over-the-counter) and are not included in the venture capital category to ensure the accuracy and consistency of data statistics.
• Exclude projects with insufficient data dimensions: Projects that do not disclose investment amounts and valuations are not included in the statistical calculations due to insufficient data dimensions.

In the venture capital field, a high failure rate is the norm. The success or failure of VC funds does not depend on whether they can avoid project failures, but rather on whether one or two "home run" projects can emerge from their portfolios. These successful projects need to deliver at least 10 times or more in returns to compensate for the losses of many other projects that have gone to zero, ultimately achieving overall profitability for the fund.

In the current crypto market, successfully launching on Binance spot has become the gold standard for measuring whether a project has truly "made it." Therefore, the core question for assessing primary market investment returns can shift from "Will the project die?" to: What proportion of the invested project portfolio will ultimately launch on Binance? Are the return multiples of these projects sufficient to cover the massive losses of those that did not launch?

Let’s look at a set of macro data to examine the brutal funnel-like screening process from investment to launching on Binance, from the dimensions of "number of investments" and "number of projects":

Taking a portfolio that includes 1,026 investments corresponding to 757 unique projects as an example, its overall performance is as follows:

The Vast Majority of Investments Remain Silent (Not TGE)

• Among all investments, as many as 747 investments (accounting for 72.8%) corresponding to 584 projects (accounting for 77.1%) failed to complete TGE (Token Generation Event and launch on exchanges). This means that over 70% of investments and projects are still at the paper stage, not yet entering public market circulation, facing extremely high uncertainty.

A Few Successfully "Launch Tokens" (Complete TGE)

• Only 279 investments (accounting for 27.2%), corresponding to 173 projects (accounting for 22.9%), successfully achieved TGE and entered secondary market circulation. This is the first step for projects to provide exits for early investors, but there is still a distance to "success."

The Final Narrow Bridge (Landing on Binance)

• At the top of the pyramid, only 76 investments corresponding to 42 projects successfully landed on Binance spot.
• This means that even among those projects that have successfully "launched tokens," only about a quarter (24.3% by project count, 27.2% by investment count) can reach Binance, the top liquidity market.
• From the starting point of the entire investment portfolio, the success rate is even more minuscule:
• By investment count, the proportion that can ultimately launch on Binance is only 7.4%.
• By project count, the proportion that can ultimately launch on Binance is as low as 5.5%.

For any crypto fund, the probability of its investments being able to launch on Binance is only about 5.5%. This means that over 94.5% of investment projects cannot deliver top-tier returns.

Now let’s look at how this 5.5% of "chosen ones" perform. Below is an estimate of the average return rate after successfully launching on Binance spot for projects invested in by top institutions:

As can be seen, even for the world's top VCs, the average return multiples for projects that launched on Binance generally range between 2 to 5 times, far from the "10 times" myth needed to cover losses.

Let’s do some calculations. Suppose a fund needs to break even, a highly simplified model would be: if 77% of projects go to zero, the remaining 23% of projects need to generate at least 4.3 times average returns (1 / 0.23 ≈ 4.3) to barely break even.

However, the reality is:

• The proportion that can launch on Binance is too low: only 5.5% of projects can achieve top liquidity.
• The returns from launching on Binance are not high enough: average returns of 2-5 times are far from sufficient to cover the losses of the other 95.5% of projects. Not to mention those that did not launch on Binance and only launched on ordinary exchanges, which have even worse return rates and liquidity.

This harsh reality is that even for top funds, viewing all investment projects as a whole, the current Binance launch rate and post-launch return multiples can no longer cover the losses of the many failed projects in their investment portfolios.

This ultimately leads primary market investment institutions to face three major challenges: declining absolute returns, lower listing multiples, and liquidity exhaustion. The entire industry's investment logic is being forced to shift from a model of "casting a wide net and betting on hits" to a deeper evaluation of a project's intrinsic value, team execution, and market fit.

Returning to Essentials: When the Tide of the "Web 3 Revolution" Goes Out

The previous text clearly reveals the "fruit" of the market, namely the comprehensive decline in primary market returns and the failure of the investment logic of the 2017-2022 Crypto Vintage. However, to truly understand this upheaval, we must explore the "causes" behind it. We believe that the current predicament faced by crypto VCs is not merely a cyclical adjustment but a profound paradigm revolution. The essence of this revolution is that the crypto industry, after experiencing a round of fervent exploration by the public, is finally beginning to return from the grand narrative of "Web 3" to its true core value: as a disruptive force for building the next generation of financial infrastructure.

Misaligned Skill Trees: The Bankruptcy of the Web 3 Narrative and the End of Growth

In recent years, the entire industry has been immersed in the dream of "Web 3." This dream depicts a decentralized internet where users have data sovereignty and can compete with Web 2 giants. Under this narrative, the logic for VCs is simple and clear: to find the next SocialFi, GameFi, or NFT platform capable of achieving exponential user growth, capturing markets worth hundreds of billions or even trillions through disruptive application layer innovations.

However, this path has ultimately proven to be misguided.

The End of Growth: The User Bottleneck of the Web 3 Narrative

All disruptive stories at the application layer are predicated on exponential user growth. But the reality is that user growth in the crypto industry has hit a bottleneck. Complex wallet interactions, difficult private key management, and a lack of real application scenarios have prevented crypto applications from breaking out of niche circles and reaching the mainstream. When the myth of user growth collapses, the high valuation models built upon it also come crashing down. The once-popular tracks now leave behind a mess.

Value Mismatch: When the "Revolution" Strays from Core Advantages

The core advantage of blockchain technology lies in its financial attributes: efficient creation of assets, permissionless global distribution, and programmable automated interactions. It is fundamentally aimed at changing production relationships, especially the production and circulation relationships of financial assets. However, in the past, less than 20% of "Web 3" projects truly targeted this core, while the rest attempted to use blockchain as a "financial hammer" to forcibly solve "non-financial nails" like social and gaming issues. This value mismatch has led to a significant waste of resources and failed explorations. VCs have propelled this great social experiment, and while the results may not be satisfactory, they are still valuable—validating with real money which paths are unviable.

Returning to Core: The Essence of the Crypto Industry is Building Next-Generation Financial Infrastructure

If the door to Web 3 cannot temporarily lead to the future, where is the true value outlet of the crypto industry? The answer is becoming increasingly clear: return to its technological roots, focusing on building a new, efficient, and global financial infrastructure.

Unlike the pursuit of a "fresh start" with the Web 3 revolution, the goal of building financial infrastructure is more pragmatic and foundational: it is not about creating a virtual world detached from reality, but rather about utilizing blockchain technology to provide a superior set of "tracks" and "traffic rules" for the flow of real-world assets and values.

This precisely explains the trends observed in the previous data:

• The return to DeFi and infrastructure: these are the new financial "tracks" themselves, the cornerstone of value circulation, whose importance is self-evident.
• The rise of RWA (Real World Assets): this is key to allowing real-world "goods" (such as bonds, real estate, credit) to embark on new "tracks," connecting the virtual and the real, and empowering the real economy with blockchain efficiency.
• The sustained financing capability of CeFi (Centralized Finance): as a "transfer station" and main entry point between the new and old financial systems, its cash flow value is highly favored by capital when the market returns to rationality.

As the direction of the industry shifts from "Web 3 applications" to "financial infrastructure," the entire evaluation system also changes. The previous valuation models that relied on vague narratives and user growth expectations have been discarded, replaced by a value assessment framework that is closer to traditional infrastructure, emphasizing system stability, transaction efficiency, asset security, and sustainable business models. This is the fundamental reason for the overall downward adjustment of the current valuation system.

Change of Participants: From "Believers" to "Rational Actors"

In the early stages of any emerging industry, it is dominated by endogenous, idealistic "believers." They are the risk embracers, the creators and disseminators of new narratives, willing to pay for high-risk, high-reward dreams.

However, with the approval of Bitcoin ETFs, the crypto industry is irreversibly moving from a niche geek circle to the mainstream financial market. The structure of industry participants has fundamentally changed.

• The source of funds has changed: Traditional financial giants like BlackRock and Fidelity are entering the market with compliant funds. They are not pursuing the speculative myth of hundredfold returns but rather stable asset allocation. In their eyes, Bitcoin is "digital gold," not a ticket to Web 3.
• The investor mindset has changed: After enduring a brutal bear market, investors in the market have transformed from fervent speculators to more cautious "rational actors." They are beginning to focus on the fundamentals of projects, assessing their intrinsic value rather than blindly chasing the next hot trend.

This shift from "believers" to "rational actors" is not an isolated case; it has a strikingly similar classic example in the development history of Web 2: the internet bubble around 2000.

At the peak of the bubble, the market's "believers" firmly believed that "whoever captures attention wins." They did not value profits, only paying for user click rates and grand narratives. A typical example of this is Pets.com. It had a disruptive story of selling pet supplies online and successfully went public to raise funds, but it quickly went bankrupt after burning through investments due to completely ignoring high logistics costs and basic business logic. The failure of Pets.com was not because the vision of the internet was wrong, but because it had the fervor of "believers" without the commercial core of "rational actors."

After the bubble burst, capital was exhausted, and the market returned to rationality. The core question for investors shifted from "What is your user growth?" back to the most fundamental question: "How do you make money?" It was in this "rational actor" dominated market that true giants emerged. Amazon, despite its stock price plummeting, survived due to its "heavy asset" moat built through warehousing and logistics; Google successfully went public in 2004 with its clear and efficient AdWords profit model, ushering in a new era.

The mirror of history clearly reflects the present: today's Web 3 projects that fail due to unsustainable economic models are akin to yesterday's Pets.com; while the DeFi, infrastructure, and RWA projects currently regaining capital favor are reminiscent of Amazon and Google in their day, with their value rooted in a sustainable, verifiable business logic rather than just a beautiful story.

This change in participants is a necessary path for the industry to mature. When the dominant force in the market shifts from "believers" to "rational actors," the high valuation bubbles built on faith and consensus will inevitably be squeezed out. Only those projects that can provide real, measurable value will be able to achieve reasonable valuations and market recognition in the new value system.

In summary, the current predicament in the primary market is a "course correction" in the industry's development path. It marks the end of an era—an era driven by grand narratives and limitless imagination; it also marks the beginning of a new era—an era dominated by real utility, sustainable business models, and rational capital. For VCs involved, understanding and adapting to this underlying shift in logic will be key to navigating cycles and winning the future.

Transformation of Investment Logic Under Value Reassessment

The market has cruelly declared: a business model that merely relies on "landing on Binance" as an exit path is not investing, but gambling. As the liquidity premium in the secondary market disappears and the valuation bubble in the primary market is punctured, the entire industry's value chain is undergoing a painful but necessary reassessment.

However, this is by no means a reason for pessimistic exit. On the contrary, it is a golden moment for top investors to recalibrate their stance with rigor and patience to capture real value. The goal is no longer to chase the next wave of hot tokens but to invest in and nurture the "Stripe or Uber of the crypto world."

From the VC perspective, in the post-AI era, the marginal effect of capital is diminishing, and the capital-intensive effect will decline. The costs previously used for hiring, market expansion, and R&D will decrease with the development of AI. Therefore, the value of VCs is no longer merely about putting in money but about endorsement and visibility. This will lead to the disappearance of mid-tier VCs that cannot actively uncover value and merely follow the trend of investing.

From "Narrative-Driven" to "Business-Driven"

In the past few years, VC investments have overly relied on "track narratives": ZK, Layer 2, GameFi, SocialFi, NFT… but most projects have failed to prove themselves in user retention and real revenue.

The core question for the future will no longer be "How many users do you have?" but rather:

• Who are these users?
• Are they paying for real pain points?
• If token rewards are removed, will they still stay?

Truly resilient projects often have stable on-chain transactions and fee income, driven by real demand rather than subsidies.

Case Study: Ethena

• Launched the stable asset USDe in 2024, with a circulation exceeding $3 billion within six months, becoming one of the fastest-growing stablecoins;
• The core mechanism is a Delta-Neutral structure that hedges perpetual contracts, creating real yield in market cycles;
• Users include not only "yield farmers" but also institutions, market makers, and hedge funds, with demand fundamentally being "hedging and stable returns," rather than short-term incentives;
• The revenue model is directly linked to the derivatives market, with annualized returns exceeding 20% in 2024, gradually solidifying into protocol-level cash flow.

This represents a virtuous cycle of "user demand—real income—protocol value," which is why Ethena can stand out in the fiercely competitive stablecoin market.

"Ballast" Cash Flow

Future investment portfolios will need more counter-cyclical cash flow protocols or applications.

• Compliance and security API services: Chainalysis had revenues exceeding $200 million in 2022, with a valuation reaching $8.6 billion at one point;
• Web 3 infrastructure SaaS: Alchemy, Infura, etc., charge through dollar subscriptions, with revenues independent of token prices, providing significant stability;
• Hybrid on-chain and off-chain valuations: referencing on-chain metrics like TVL and protocol revenue while also incorporating traditional equity tools like DCF and P/E.

These models provide value anchors for investments and serve as the "ballast" of the portfolio.

Realization of Return Curves

The return curve for crypto VCs is shifting from a "two-year hundredfold" J-curve to an "eight-year tenfold" step curve.

Future exit paths will become more diversified:

• Acquisitions by tech giants;
• Listings on compliant STO platforms;
• Mergers and integrations with traditional industries.

This implies longer cycles and deeper patience.

Signals Are Clearer Than Ever

The current contraction in the primary market is merely a "de-leveraging" following a period of wild growth. As the noise dissipates, signals are clearer than ever.

For serious investors, this means:

• Due diligence should focus on market size, unit economics, and product moats, just like top equity VCs;
• Post-investment support should genuinely empower, providing clients and channels, rather than just exchange resources.

Prospective Tracks: The Next Round of Investment Opportunities in the Crypto Market

ArkStream Capital identifies the following three directions as having long-term investment potential:

Stablecoins: The Cornerstone of Next-Generation Global Payments and Settlements

The fundamental significance of stablecoins is not just "counter-cyclical" or "providing cash flow," but rather liberating funds from the constraints of geopolitics, foreign exchange controls, and local financial systems, allowing capital to possess "Universal Finance" for the first time. In the past, dollar assets could not circulate freely in many countries, or even be accessed, but stablecoins have changed all that: they act like a "digital artery," injecting global capital into previously unreachable regions and industries.

Cross-Border E-commerce & Gaming Expansion

• Pain Point: Cross-border payments typically take 3–7 days to settle, with fees of 3%–7%, and low credit card penetration leads to payment conversion losses.
• Stablecoin Change: Using USDT/USDC for T+0/minute-level settlement, globally connected wallets significantly compress fees and reconciliation costs.
• Market Size: Cross-border e-commerce > $1 trillion/year (2023), estimated to exceed $3.3 trillion by 2028; global gaming at $184 billion (2023)—if only 10% of e-commerce and 5% of gaming adopt stablecoins, the potential annual on-chain flow could reach $200 billion+.

Global Remittances & Remote Payroll

• Pain Point: Traditional remittance average cost is 6.39% (Q4 2023), slow settlement, and limited channels; LMIC annual remittances at $656 billion (2023).
• Stablecoin Change: 24/7 settlement, on-chain traceability, significantly lower than traditional MTO costs, facilitating bulk payroll and micro-payment automation.
• Market Size: Global remittances approximately $860 billion (2023); if 20% migrate to stablecoins, it would create an incremental on-chain settlement space of $170 billion/year.

Corporate Working Capital in High Inflation/Capital Control Markets

• Pain Point: Currency depreciation and foreign exchange quotas squeeze operating cash flow, hindering cross-border raw material procurement and external payments.
• Stablecoin Change: Using stablecoins for dollar-denominated operating capital, directly connecting overseas suppliers and contractors, bypassing inefficient/unreliable channels.
• Market Size: Nigeria recorded $59 billion in crypto transactions from July 2023 to June 2024; in Q1 2024, small stablecoin transfers (<$1 million) approached $3 billion, making stablecoins one of the mainstream uses.

DeFi Hedging & Global Derivatives Access

• Pain Point: SMEs find it difficult to access foreign exchange/interest rate derivatives for hedging at low costs, with high barriers and slow processes.
• Stablecoin Change: Using stablecoins as collateral for on-chain lending, forward/options hedging, achieving programmable, composable risk control and financing.
• Market Size: Global OTC foreign exchange at $75 trillion/day (2022); each 0.5% increase in on-chain penetration ≈ $37.5 billion/day in potential on-chain nominal transactions.

RWA: Making Traditional Assets Truly Programmable

Traditional financial assets are vast but have long been constrained by geography, time, and settlement systems: government bonds can only settle on business days, cross-border real estate investments are cumbersome, supply chain bill approvals are lengthy, and private equity funds have almost zero liquidity. Although the capital is enormous, it is locked in "static reservoirs."

The value of RWA lies in: digitizing the rights to income and settlement, creating cash flows that can automatically circulate and combine on-chain. Government bonds can be used as collateral like stablecoins, real estate rents can be automatically distributed, supply chain financing can be instantly discounted, and private equity fund shares can gain secondary liquidity. For investors, this is not just the digitization of a single asset but a reconstruction of global capital efficiency.

Government Bonds / Money Market Funds

• Pain Point: High thresholds, T+1/2 settlement slows down capital turnover.
• On-Chain Change: Tokenization of T-Bills/MMFs, achieving 24/7 redemption and collateralization (BUIDL, BENJI).
• Market Size: U.S. money market funds > $7 trillion; tokenized U.S. Treasuries only $7.4 billion (as of September 2025).

Real Estate and Private Equity Funds

• Pain Point: Poor liquidity, long exit cycles, complex cross-border investments.
• On-Chain Change: Tokenization of property/fund shares, on-chain distribution of rents and dividends, and introduction of secondary liquidity.
• Market Size: Global real estate $287 trillion, private equity fund AUM $13 trillion+; less than $20 billion has been tokenized.

Supply Chain Financing and Accounts Receivable

• Pain Point: SMEs face financing difficulties, global trade financing gap of $2.5 trillion.
• On-Chain Change: Tokenization of accounts receivable, direct connection of investors to cash flows, with payments executed automatically by contracts.
• Market Size: Supply chain finance $2.18 trillion; cumulative on-chain financing $10 billion+.

Commodities and Stocks/ETFs

• Pain Point: High friction in cross-border transfer of gold and ETF shares, limited fractional trading.
• On-Chain Change: Tokenization of physical gold, ETF/stock shares, enabling both settlement and collateralization.
• Market Size: Market cap of gold tokens ~$2 billion; on-chain ETF/stock AUM > $100 million.

Crypto + AI: Empowering AI with Economic Agency

For AI to achieve autonomy, it must be able to spend money, reconcile accounts, and prove delivery on its own. The traditional financial system cannot achieve this: payments rely on manual account openings, cross-border settlements are slow, and fee cycles are long, making it difficult to verify results. The crypto network, however, provides a complete "operating system":

• Currency Layer: Stablecoins/deposit tokens enable global 24/7 settlement, smart wallets allow Agents to spend automatically by holding tokens, and streaming payments enable "pay-per-call" billing.
• Contract Layer: Fund custody, SLAs, and penalty clauses are written into contracts, with automatic refunds or penalties for substandard service; strategy wallets can set limits and whitelists.
• Verification Layer: TEE and zero-knowledge proofs make computing power and reasoning results auditable, with payments based on "proof" rather than "promise."

When spendable money and verifiable work are connected on the same chain, Agents are no longer just API callers but can operate like businesses: using money to buy computing power and data, exchanging delivery for income, and accumulating cash flow and credit. This is the true meaning of "Crypto is the native currency of AI."

Agent Native Settlement and Treasury

• Pain Point: Fragmentation in API billing and cross-border payments, manual reconciliation/invoicing/risk control bottlenecks, making "settle while calling" impossible.
• On-Chain Change: Agents hold smart wallets for streaming/micropayments (by token, by millisecond, by request); contract custody guarantees margin and SLA, with automatic refunds/penalties for defaults; strategy wallets set daily limits/whitelists/session keys to control risk and permissions.
• Market Size: GenAI total spending ~$202 billion (estimated for 2028); if 5% is settled in real-time via "Agent→on-chain," it would create a $10 billion/year native payment channel.

Verifiable Computing Power and Inference Market

• Pain Point: Expensive cloud bills with post-settlement, unverifiable inference results, and lack of automatic compensation for service failures/downtime.
• On-Chain Change: Computing power providers stake→accept orders→issue proofs (TEE/zk/multi-party verification)→settle based on proof; non-compliance results in slashing; prices are matched by bidding pools, "pay for proof" replaces "trust and pay later."
• Market Size: AI infrastructure spending ~$223 billion (estimated for 2028); 5% decentralized/verifiable channels ≈ $11 billion in volume-based settlement.

Data Provenance and Licensing Revenue Sharing

• Pain Point: Unclear data sources for training/fine-tuning/inference, difficult to measure authorization, and challenges in sustaining revenue sharing for creators and enterprises.
• On-Chain Change: Data/models/assets are licensed and fingerprinted on-chain; each call automatically splits revenue to addresses (creators, data DAOs, annotators, model owners), permanently binding earnings to sources.
• Market Size: Data brokerage ~$292 billion (2025), creator economy ~$480 billion (2027); integrating 5% into on-chain licensing and automatic revenue sharing could create billion-dollar continuous distribution channels.

Conclusion

In 2017, Crypto VCs brought "venture capital and token financing" into the crypto ecosystem. By 2024, with the completion of foundational infrastructure and compliance channels, the first curve—the creation and circulation of assets and highways from 0 to 1—has come to a close.

We officially enter the second curve of Crypto in 2024—not to recreate a "hotter narrative," but to treat crypto as a globally open, efficient, and verifiable financial highway that carries real productive forces: stablecoins enable cross-border capital flow, RWA brings cash flow assets on-chain, and Crypto + AI directly connects funds with delivery. The true value of the industry is shifting from valuation narratives to the reconstruction of production relationships.

For VCs, the role has not disappeared but has shifted towards more pragmatic value creation. Capital needs to transition from "chasing trends" to "calculating accounts," helping entrepreneurs connect real demand, stable cash flow, and reusable financial primitives on-chain. Investors who adhere to fundamentals and execution will become the true value capturers in the next decade.

Appendix

The investment and return data mentioned in this article can be found in the table below. Feel free to download.

References

https://cn.rootdata.com/

https://sosovalue.xyz/

https://defillama.com/

https://cryptorank.io/

免责声明：本文章仅代表作者个人观点，不代表本平台的立场和观点。本文章仅供信息分享，不构成对任何人的任何投资建议。用户与作者之间的任何争议，与本平台无关。如网页中刊载的文章或图片涉及侵权，请提供相关的权利证明和身份证明发送邮件到support@aicoin.com，本平台相关工作人员将会进行核查。