Author: Hu Tao, ChainCatcher
On November 16, former OpenAI researcher Leopold Aschenbrenner's hedge fund Situational Awareness LP submitted a 13F quarterly holding report to the U.S. SEC for the period ending September 30, 2026. The numbers are shocking: the nominal value of publicly held positions plummeted from $20.24 billion at the end of the second quarter to approximately $1.58 billion, a single-quarter decrease of 92.2%.
This document caused a stir in the market not only because of the drop itself but because it revealed the trajectory of the story following the collapse in July—Aschenbrenner did not pull back but instead bet the remnants on the options table.
From 439% to -67%: Completing a Cycle in Four Months
To understand the impact of this 13F, one needs to turn the clock back six months.
Leopold Aschenbrenner, 25 this year, gained fame in 2024 for publishing a 165-page long article titled "Situational Awareness" that predicted AGI would arrive between 2027 and 2030. After being dismissed by OpenAI the same year, he founded Situational Awareness LP with $225 million in seed funding provided by Silicon Valley luminaries including Stripe founders the Collison brothers and former GitHub CEO Nat Friedman.
The fund's strategy was clear and extreme: All in on AI infrastructure—storage chips, data centers, clean energy—while simultaneously shorting software stocks like Adobe. In the first half of 2026, the fund's return rate soared to 439%, and its management scale ballooned to about $45 billion, making it Wall Street's hottest "AI stock god."
However, this brilliance was built on a leverage rate of about 400%. In July, the AI infrastructure sector collectively retrenched, and the software shorts faced a reverse squeeze; the dual pressure combined with high leverage triggered margin calls. Aschenbrenner was forced to sell a large portion of his public equity portfolio at a discount to Citadel, with the net asset value plummeting by about 67% that month.
In a letter to investors, he admitted that the fund was "closer to permanent capital loss than acceptable," but insisted that this was a "costly yet invaluable lesson," announcing that all leverage had been removed.
Truths Revealed by Q3 13F
If the August Q2 13F was the "last position report before the collapse," then the November Q3 13F is the "first complete snapshot post-collapse"—it proves that Aschenbrenner did indeed eliminate leverage, but he did not reduce his risk appetite; he simply switched to a more covert leverage tool.
The specific changes are as follows:
Eliminated 21 positions, including previously absolute heavyweights: Sandisk ($5.67 billion), Micron ($5.57 billion), Bloom Energy ($1.9 billion), TSMC ($1.27 billion), Nebius ($1.23 billion), as well as all positions in the computing power supply chain like CoreWeave, Core Scientific, and STMicroelectronics, which went to zero.
Reduced holdings in 3 positions: mining company IREN was cut by 94%, CleanSpark was reduced by 75%, Bitdeer saw a 44% reduction.
New builds and increases: Bloom Energy call options surged approximately tenfold to a nominal value of $389 million; SharonAI (SHAZ) stock increased by 50% to about $441 million, becoming the current largest single position (27.9%); at the same time, new call option positions were established for Nebius, Sandisk, and Roundhill Memory ETF, totaling about $656 million.
Structural upheaval: In the current portfolio, the nominal value of call options totals $1.045 billion, accounting for 66.23%; the underlying stocks are only worth $533 million, making up 33.77%. This represents a long book centered around options—something that had never appeared in the previous four quarterly reports.
What does this mean? Aschenbrenner has not abandoned his belief in AI infrastructure, but he has given up expressing that belief through underlying stocks, opting instead for deep out-of-the-money call options to seek high-leverage returns. From Total Return Swaps (TRS) to call options, the tool has changed, but the essence remains the same: he is still betting in one direction with other people's money (though the options premium is less than the nominal value, the gamma risk is equally lethal when volatility amplifies).
The "hero narrative" of Silicon Valley versus the cold jokes of Wall Street
After the July collapse, the reactions in Silicon Valley were entirely opposite to those on Wall Street.
Sequoia Capital partner Pat Grady stated in a Bloomberg TV interview, "Our judgment is that he will long remain an important figure in Silicon Valley." Veteran investor Elad Gil publicly announced his first investment application into his fund; Redpoint Ventures managing director Logan Bartlett bluntly remarked, "There is a hero archetype here. Leopold took a punch and instead sparked a collective unity."
Wall Street's attitude, however, was much more cold-hearted. S3 Partners founder Bob Sloan pointedly noted, "Let's be clear, this is a super-concentrated position, a super-crowded position, and it is also a super-high-leverage position." Wall Street trading coach Jerry Diao's comment was even more straightforward: "Many see this as 'not whether it will collapse, but when it will collapse'."
Professor Gygmy Gonnot from NYU Stern School of Business provided a structural explanation: "Silicon Valley rewards those who make correct judgments in transformative technology directions, while Wall Street rewards those who create considerable risk-adjusted returns while preserving their principal."
The conflict between these two evaluation systems was brutally validated in the Q3 13F: Aschenbrenner's directional judgment on AI infrastructure may not have been wrong—Sandisk and Micron's fundamentals indeed did not collapse after July—but he did not live to see the day of logical fulfillment. The Q3 options ledger indicates that he is still trying to recover what has been lost using the same logic but with higher-risk tools.
A Problem That Needs to Be Acknowledged
From an investment perspective, the most dangerous signal in the Q3 13F is not the "92% shrinkage" but the "66% options."
The 13F document reveals options only in nominal value (strike × contracts × 100), not showing the strike price, expiration date, or actual premium cost. This means the outside world cannot determine whether these call options are deep out-of-the-money or at-the-money, nor can they know if the premium will go to zero should the underlying continue to decline.
However, tracking data from Tracefour shows that these new options positions corresponded to underlying assets that generally continued to decline in Q3: SharonAI fell from Aschenbrenner's entry price of about $68.59 to $22.56, a drop of 67%; Bitdeer fell from $11.57 to $5.60, a decrease of 51%. If the strike prices of their call options are close to the entry costs, then the Q3 options positions likely suffered equivalent or even more severe losses than the underlying stocks—because options have time value decay.
SharonAI collapsed in July with 400% leverage and then rebuilt its positions using call options in August-September, while the AI infrastructure stocks continued to decline in Q3; these options may have significantly depreciated by the snapshot on September 30. The $1.58 billion on the books may already reflect a number "after the fall."
Conclusion
The reason Aschenbrenner's story deserves attention from the crypto industry is not only because he is a phenomenal figure but also because his predicament mirrors that of many participants in this industry: an unwavering faith in technological direction coupled with a serious lack of reverence for risk management.
From $225 million in seed funding to a peak of $45 billion, and now down to $1.58 billion in Q3 13F, Situational Awareness LP has completed a full leverage cycle in just 16 months. The Q3 options ledger indicates that this cycle may not be over—it has merely switched from "total return swaps" to "call options," from one type of leverage to another.
Silicon Valley can continue to applaud the "hero archetype," but the numbers on the 13F do not lie. When 66% of a position report consists of call options, and the largest holding is a small-cap stock that has fallen 67%, "correct direction" is no longer an effective defense.
The Q4 13F, expected to be disclosed in February next year, will tell us whether these call options were exercised, closed, or have gone to zero. At that time, whether the "AI stock god" has risen from the ashes or has completed a second collapse will truly be revealed.
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