Binance hacker exchanged ETH using THORChain.

CN
30 minutes ago

The hacker addresses that had long lurked after attacking Binance have finally begun to significantly "cut down" their ETH holdings. According to a single on-chain monitoring source, these addresses previously held a total of approximately 602,402 ETH, with almost no records of movements of similar magnitude for a long time. However, recently, approximately 74,880 ETH, accounting for about 12.4% of their existing holdings, was suddenly transferred out in a concentrated manner within about 3 hours. The same monitoring source indicates that this is not a simple migration on-chain — the transferred ETH is gradually being exchanged for BTC through THORChain, breaking down the originally large ETH position into cross-chain BTC holdings. What is even more noteworthy is that this action has only disposed of a portion of the positions, with the majority of the ETH still held by the relevant addresses, and no signs of a transfer of the same scale have emerged. In the absence of a clear response from law enforcement and Binance officials, whether this cross-chain asset conversion is to reposition risk, test market capacity, or lay the groundwork for a larger-scale disposal remains a signal of risk and competition that looms over on-chain participants.

Large amounts of dormant ETH awakened: Hacker positions moved en masse for the first time

According to a single on-chain monitoring source, the hacker addresses related to the Binance attack event were previously observed to hold a total of approximately 602,402 ETH, estimated to be worth about $1.09 billion at the time. This batch of assets had almost no reports of similar scale concentrated outflows for a long time afterward; on-chain, what was more evident was a posture of "holding still": a large amount of ETH has been accumulating in a few addresses for a long time, becoming a silent risk point in the market's view.

This silence was suddenly broken recently. The same source shows that within approximately 3 hours before the report, these related addresses concentrated on transferring out about 74,880 ETH. If taking the previously stated 602,402 ETH as a base, this action accounts for roughly 12.4% of the original holdings. In terms of timing and rhythm, this is the first large-scale movement observed in the hacker's position since a long period of silence: neither a "one-time clearout" nor daily minute testing, but rather carving out more than one-tenth of the position in a short time, marking a transition of these historically leftover chips from "static risk" to a "dynamic disposal" phase.

ETH converted to BTC via THORChain

To understand this action clearly, it is necessary to place THORChain in the correct context. It is essentially a cross-chain liquidity protocol that allows users to directly exchange assets from one public chain for assets from another public chain without relying on traditional centralized intermediaries — for example, exchanging ETH for BTC. The path monitored in this instance is a typical "inter-chain adjustment": the hacker-controlled address first transferred approximately 74,880 ETH out of the existing position into THORChain-related contracts, completing the exchange from ETH assets to BTC assets within the protocol. This is equivalent to moving the position that was originally concentrated on the Ethereum side to the asset side of the Bitcoin chain. According to existing public materials, this process has yet to disclose more detailed breakdown data, such as the specific number of exchanges, the scale of each exchange, and the corresponding BTC receiving addresses. Therefore, currently, we can only confirm the fact that "ETH is exchanged for BTC via THORChain" at a rough level.

Compared to directly selling or converting on a specific institutional platform, choosing to exchange a large ETH position for BTC through a decentralized cross-chain protocol like THORChain already reveals some preferences: one is a preference for holding BTC on the asset side rather than continuing to rely on ETH, and the other is a preference for using cross-chain channels that do not require a single centralized entity to review or freeze. Intuitively, this may relate to considerations of reducing concentration control risk and increasing the difficulty of subsequent tracking, but these motivations are currently only reasonable speculations without independent verification outside the blockchain. The hacker's true risk preference and disposal strategy will still need to be further compared and judged in subsequent on-chain behaviors.

Only moving 12% of the position: Is the hacker testing the waters or starting a long-term withdrawal?

According to a single on-chain monitoring source, these addresses related to the Binance attack event held a total of approximately 602,402 ETH previously, and this time they concentrated on transferring out about 74,880 ETH in a short period, which only accounts for about 12.4% of the total amount. From the position structure, this resembles more of a "partial reduction" rather than a one-time liquidation: the vast majority of ETH remains in hacker-controlled addresses, and there is currently no public information indicating that these remaining assets have been completely emptied or uniformly migrated to other clear new positions.

Under this premise, a natural deduction is: the hacker may first dispose of a small portion of the position, using this 12.4% position adjustment to "test the waters", observing market price fluctuations, the intensity of responses from on-chain monitoring, and the pace of potential counterparties' reactions before deciding whether to continue expanding the scale of disposal. It is also possible that they will first test the feasibility and concealment of the THORChain route before planning the next steps for withdrawal. However, these interpretations can only be viewed as situational hypotheses based on limited on-chain facts, and currently lack independent verification of off-chain information. Therefore, this round of disposing of approximately 12.4% of the position is more like an open process that requires continuous on-chain tracking for interpretation rather than a settled conclusion.

THORChain's cross-chain compliance controversy

From this operational path, the hacker was not reported to have directly pushed the chips towards centralized exchange accounts but instead first circumvented THORChain, exchanging about 74,880 ETH for BTC. For an attacker already exposed to public scrutiny, this choice of path seems more like a deliberate distancing from custodial scenarios that require account real-name verification and could be frozen at any time, favoring decentralized cross-chain tools that "do not ask for the source, only recognize on-chain assets." However, this preference can currently only be inferred from the path and lacks off-chain evidence support, making it difficult to assert whether it is simply a pursuit of technical convenience or a conscious avoidance of traditional financial system risk control tentacles.

The paradox is that the transparency of public chains means that this "decentralized" route is not genuinely hidden. Publicly verifiable on-chain records allow third-party monitoring accounts to track how this roughly 12.4% of ETH was exchanged for BTC via THORChain, bringing the open cross-chain protocol THORChain directly into the spotlight of "being utilized by risky funds." For protocol governance, on one side emphasizing neutrality and the infrastructure stance that any address can freely cross-chain, on the other side are the reputational and compliance pressures arising from potential abuse. Given that there is currently no law enforcement agency or Binance official publicly commenting on this disposal path, how THORChain and similar protocols respond to external doubts without deviating from decentralized principles may become a topic that can't be avoided in subsequent governance discussions.

Three on-chain signals to watch next

Currently, the only key signal truly revealed on-chain is: the hacker addresses related to the Binance attack event, after a long period of silence, suddenly concentrated on transferring out about 74,880 ETH within a few hours and exchanged it for BTC via THORChain, which accounts for about 12.4% of the total holdings of 602,402 ETH as previously monitored. This means that hackers have begun to actively dispose but still retain the vast majority of their chips. The next three points worth monitoring are: first, whether the remaining over 80% of ETH will continue to be transferred out in batches — will it follow a similar "large concentration over several hours" rhythm, or be split into smaller long-tail transfers? Different rhythms will directly determine the length of the warning window we capture on-chain; second, whether new cross-chain pathways or target assets will appear in the future. If other protocols besides THORChain appear in future trading paths or if assets expand beyond ETH or BTC into more forms, it will indicate that hackers are actively testing and diversifying conversion channels; third, whether project parties and regulatory sides will be passively dragged into the battlefield. If any public statements, governance proposals, or on-chain-level list mechanisms emerge, they will constitute new, verifiable facts. It is essential to emphasize that currently, what we can confirm are only the aforementioned on-chain records and the holding scale provided by the same monitoring source. Regarding whether hackers will continue to transfer out in batches, switch to other protocols, or trigger new official actions, these are all situational deductions based on existing data. Readers should always view these deductions as observational hypotheses pending verification, rather than settled conclusions that have already occurred.

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