Objectively speaking, this risk event has little to do with the so-called 'USDE circular finance.' The essence of this activity is to give back to customers, with the core change being the inclusion of USDE / WBETH / BNSOL into the contract margin system, and offering relatively high conversion rates. Risk control overlooked one critical variable here: depegging risk. By allowing these three types of assets to be used as margin and setting relatively high conversion rates, the system essentially assumes within its 'risk framework' that their exchange relationships with the base currency are sufficiently stable (e.g., USDE/USDT, WBETH/ETH, BNSOL/SOL). Looking back: 1. WBETH and BNSOL are assets within the platform's ecosystem, with pricing and risk control mechanisms being more manageable. In theory, stronger stabilization mechanisms could be applied (e.g., imposing stricter exchange rate constraints at the risk control level to avoid amplified depegging in extreme situations). The platform's subsequent announcements also mentioned adjustments, but they weren’t implemented in time. 2. USDE is different. Its depegging risk should not be 'assumed stable at 1:1.' While allowing it to be used as margin with a relatively high conversion rate, if stricter depegging monitoring and conversion/limit mechanisms are not introduced simultaneously, this becomes the key oversight in this round of risk control.